Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance,1865-1926 by Low, Michael Christopher
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
History Theses Department of History
7-16-2007
Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-
Islam under British Surveillance,1865-1926
Michael Christopher Low
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses
Part of the History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in History Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Low, Michael Christopher, "Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British Surveillance,1865-1926." Thesis,
Georgia State University, 2007.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses/22
EMPIRE OF THE HAJJ: PILGRIMS, PLAGUES, AND PAN-ISLAM 
UNDER BRITISH SURVEILLANCE, 1865-1926 
by 
MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER LOW 
Under the Direction of Stephen H. Rapp 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 From roughly 1865 to 1926, the forces of European imperialism brought the 
Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca under the scrutiny of non-Muslim interests.  The driving 
force behind this dramatic change was the expansion of the British Empire’s maritime 
supremacy in the Indian Ocean basin.  With the development of steamship travel and the 
opening of the Suez Canal, colonial authorities became increasingly involved in the 
surveillance of seaborne pilgrims.  During this period, the hajj came to be recognized as  
both the primary conduit for the spread of epidemic diseases, such as cholera and plague, 
and a critical outlet for the growth of Pan-Islamic networks being forged between Indian 
dissidents, pilgrims, and the Ottoman Empire.  As a result, the British and Ottoman 
empires engaged in a struggle for control of the hajj, which would ultimately reshape 
both the hajj and the political landscapes of the Middle East and South Asia. 
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To the barefooted believer who,  
trapped in the toils of existence, 
remains thirsty for Zamzam 
 
To the awakened soul who,  
having seen the vision of an umma 
rising from the plain of Arafat, 
remains locked out of the Haram 
 
To the son of Abraham who,  
having declared the liberation from idols  
of the East and West,  
is forced to silent obedience 
before the gatekeepers of the Ka‘ba 
 
To the daughter of Hagar who 
Cannot find her footprints 
 
To the sister of Khadija who 
Searches her threshold in vain 
  
To the forgotten brother of Bilal who 
Longs for his voice 
 
To the cast-down gaze that seeks the path of the Prophets 
 
And to the expectant hands that rise in supplication. 
 
-‘Alī Sharī‘atī, Hajj: Reflections on its Rituals   
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
 
Transliteration and Grammar 
 
Because this project includes names, sources, and technical terms in Arabic, 
Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, a few guidelines regarding transliteration methods are 
necessary.  Although there are several well accepted methods of transliterating Arabic 
characters into the Roman script, I have primarily used the modified Encyclopedia of 
Islam system employed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies.  However, I 
have only used this system as guide rather than a rigid set of rules.  Where I have strayed 
from this system, I have done so in order to make my research more accessible across 
disciplinary lines.   
For a non-Arabist or Persian specialist, it is not very helpful to be able to 
distinguish between the two types of h (ح and  ه) or s (س and ص) or t (ت and ط) found in 
the Arabic alphabet, and readers who are familiar with the languages will already be 
aware of these subtleties.  The Arabic character qāf (ق) is transliterated as q not k.  The 
letter jīm (ج) is equivalent to j not dj.  The letter dhāl (ذ) appears as dh as in the month of 
Dhū al-Hijja.  And the Arabic character khā’ (خ) is rendered as kh.   While I have avoided 
cluttering the text by omitting diacritical marks for consonants, I have indicated 
differences in vowel length in most cases.  Simply put, ā is pronounced as a long aa, ī as 
an ee, and ū as an oo sound.  I have also made certain to mark the Arabic letter ayn (ع) as 
‘ and the hamza () as ’. 
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Generally speaking, I have not assimilated the l of al- according to the following 
consonant, regardless of its Arabic grammatical status as a “sun” or “moon” letter.  While 
many Persian or Urdu speakers tend to render names like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani as ad-
Din, od-Din, or ud-Din, I have purposely retained the al- regardless of the language being 
used.  The exception to this rule comes in the case of Indians, either serving as colonial 
officials or corresponding in English, such as Dr. Abdur Razzack.  In these cases, I have 
maintained the spellings in which they themselves have used to render their names into 
the Roman script.  Similarly, in cases, where names have common or accepted English 
spellings, I have opted for the most common spelling, as in the case of Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II.  This also becomes a major issue in Chapter 5.  Because of the ubiquity of 
hybridized Indo-Persian Indian names in that chapter, many of which have been 
anglicized in a variety ways both by colonial officials and subsequent historians, I have 
largely omitted diacriticals throughout that chapter.   
 The Arabic ta marbuta (ة) is rendered a not ah.  As a result, colonial-era spellings, 
such as Jeddah, have been changed to Jidda, except when they appear in quotations.  
However, in Persian, the equivalent of the ta marbuta, the letter heh ( ), has been 
rendered as ih in words such as safarnamih.  The adjectival –ya followed tā’ marbūtta is 
rendered –iyya in Arabic and iyyih in Persian.  The nisba is also rendered  
–iyya.  And the Persian equivalent of the Arabic idāfa (al-), the izāfat, is rendered as –i as 
in Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba, as opposed it the Encyclopedia Iranica’s –e. 
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Names and Places 
 For my non-specialist audience, I have tried to eliminate the use of complicated 
diacritical in commonly-used names, places, and terms.  For example, I have avoided the 
use of diacriticals in familiar names like Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II, while for less well-known figures, such as Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-Dawlah or 
Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Farāhānī, I have included the diacriticals.  Similarly, for place 
names I have typically used common English spellings.  However, in the case of more 
obscure locations like Kamarān Island or the Yemeni coastal region of Tihāma, I have 
provided the diacriticals.  As for terminology, all Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu 
words have been italicized.  For common terms like dar al-Islam, jihad, mujahidin, 
shaykh, khilafa, and hajj, I have not included diacriticals.  However, for more technical 
terms, such as tawwāf (circumambulation of the Ka‘ba), tā‘ūn (plague), and wabā’ 
(epidemic or cholera), I have opted to include diacriticals.  Similarly, all books from 
Arabic or Persian have been cited with full diacriticals.   
 
Dates 
 Unless otherwise noted all dates are from the common era (C.E.).  However, 
when quoting directly from diary-style-safarnamih sources, I have indicated the date as 
quoted (hijra, A.H.) with its common-era equivalent in parentheses.
INTRODUCTION
 
The first House established for the people was that at Bakka [Mecca], a place 
holy, and a guidance to all beings.  Therein are clear signs—the station of 
Abraham, and whosoever enters it is in security.  It is the duty of all men towards 
God to come to the House a pilgrim, if he is able to make his way there. 
                 -Qur’an, 3:96-97 
  
 And proclaim to humanity the Pilgrimage, and they shall come unto thee on foot 
 and upon every lean camel.  They shall come from every remote place that they 
 may witness things profitable to them. 
-Qur’an, 22: 27-281 
 
The Tale of the “Twin Infection” 
For nearly fourteen centuries, each year during the month of Dhu al-Hijjah, 
throngs of Muslims from all of over the world have descended upon the Holy City of 
Mecca and its environs.  As one of the Five Pillars of the Islamic faith, all Muslims are 
obliged to perform the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in life, so long as they 
are physically and financially able.  They come to walk in the footsteps of their spiritual 
forbearers from Abraham to Muhammad.  They feast their eyes upon the Ka‘ba, the very 
same shrine to which the prayers of all Muslims are directed five times a day.  There at 
the center of the Masjid al-Haram (the Great Mosque) they perform seven 
circumambulations around the Ka‘ba in imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and the 
                                                 
    
1
  All translations from the Qur’an have been taken from A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1955; repr. ed., New York: Touchstone, 1996).  Both the spiritual significance and 
obligatory nature of the hajj are clearly outlined in verses 3: 96-97 and 22: 27-28 of the Qur’an.   
 
  
2 
 
Figure 1.  The Ka'ba and the Masjid al-Haram, Mecca, 1885, by Snouck Hurgronje. 
 
angels encircling Allah’s throne in heaven.  Given the spiritual sensitivity of the sites and 
rituals involved in the hajj, however, non-Muslims are strictly forbidden from entering 
the haramayn (sacred areas) of Mecca and its nearby sister city, Medina.  Yet, from the 
mid-nineteenth to the early-twentieth centuries, the forces unleashed by the age of 
European imperialism and its rapid encroachment on the dar al-Islam (the Islamic world) 
increasingly brought the hajj under the scrutiny and regulation of non-Muslim interests.   
The principal driving force behind these changes was the expansion of the British 
Empire.  In particular, as Britain’s power in the Indian subcontinent grew, so too did its 
maritime supremacy throughout the Indian Ocean basin.2  Concurrently, Britain and its 
European rivals increasingly exploited the declining military and financial fortunes of the 
                                                 
    
2
 For the latest Indian Ocean perspective on the British imperialism and the hajj, see Sugata Bose, 
“Pilgrims’ Progress under Colonial Rules,” in One Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of 
Global Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 193-232.  
  
3 
Ottoman Empire and its weakening control over Egypt, the Red Sea, and the Arabian 
Peninsula.  As Britain looked to secure its access to India, ward off its European 
competitors, and expand its commercial interests in southwestern Arabia, the Red Sea, 
and the Gulf of Aden, its role in the region was intensified by the transit opportunities 
that emerged with the development of regular steamship routes between the 
Mediterranean and India from the 1830s to the 1860s and the eventual opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869.3  With the exponential growth of maritime traffic that accompanied 
these technological advances came a similarly dramatic rise in the ocean-going pilgrim 
traffic from and through British India.  Freed from the rhythms of sailing in accordance 
with the monsoon cycle, the costs of transport and the length of passage for Indian 
pilgrims were reduced drastically.  While previous generations of pilgrims were confined 
mainly to elite officials, wealthy merchants, and the ‘ulama’ (religious elites and 
scholars), after the introduction of the steamship the “modern” hajj also became 
accessible to ordinary Muslims of modest means.4  However, the relative affordability of 
the steamship-era hajj also made the journey possible for a group identified by both  
                                                 
    
3
 Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal and the inauguration of a direct route to India, communications 
between India and England via the Red Sea involved multiple stages.  For instance, a letter sent from 
England required a train journey across France, a steamship journey to Alexandria and onward to Cairo, 
where it would be transferred by camel to Suez before a further steamship leg to Bombay or Calcutta.  This 
process could take up to forty-five days, while a letter sent in reply could take up to three months to make 
its way back to England.  Daniel Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 130.   
    
4
 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Malden, M.A. and Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), 354; William R. Roff, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the Nineteenth 
Century Hajj” in Arabian Studies VI (London: Scorpion Comm. and the Middle East Centre, University of 
Cambridge, 1982), 143. 
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Figure 2.  Major Pilgrimage Routes in the Nineteenth Century.5 
 
Muslim and non-Muslim authorities as a “dangerous class” of “pauper pilgrims.”6  As the 
numbers of destitute Indian pilgrims rose, so did the incidence of death and disease in the 
Hijaz.  Much to the dismay of Turkish and Egyptian officials, and to the embarrassment 
of the British who vehemently denied that British India and its pilgrims were the source 
of epidemic cholera for fear of restrictions that might be placed on the flow of trade 
between India and Europe, by the 1860s the connection between the influx of India’s 
destitute pilgrim masses and the globalization of epidemic disease was becoming all too  
                                                 
    
5
 Reproduced from Mīrzā Mohammad Hosayn Farāhānī’s A Shi‘ite Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1885-1886: 
The Safarnameh of Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahani, edited, translated, and annotated by Hafez 
Farmayan and Elton L. Daniel (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), xii. 
    
6
 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 186-189.  
  
5 
 
Figure 3.  "Actual and Supposed Routes of Cholera from Hindoostan to Europe."7 
 
clear.8  The breaking point came in 1865, when a particularly virulent epidemic of 
cholera broke out in the Hijaz, killing an estimated 15,000 pilgrims.  To make matters 
worse, when ships carrying returning pilgrims arrived at Suez in May of the same year, 
they falsely reported that no instances of the disease had been detected, despite the fact 
                                                 
    
7
 Reproduced from Edmund Charles Wendt, A Treatise on Asiatic Cholera (New York, 1885), in 
Valeska Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on 
Cholera, 1851-1894,” The Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (2006), 456.  
    
8
 For a sampling of the discourse surrounding indigent pilgrims and the various attempts to deal with the 
problem, see Foreign Office (hereafter F.O.) 78/4094 in “British efforts to improve travel conditions for 
pilgrims; appointment of travel agent; problem of indigent pilgrims,” Oct. 1884-Feb. 1887, Alan de L. 
Rush, ed., Records of the Hajj: A Documentary History of the Pilgrimage to Mecca, vol. 3 (London: 
Archive Editions, 1993), 593-626.  For Turkish and Egyptian complaints about indigent pilgrims, see F.O. 
78/4328, “Mémoire adressé au Conseil Supérieur de Constantinople sur la proportion sans cesse croissante 
des indigents parmi les pélerins Musulmans sui se rendent a la Mecque et sur les inconvénients sérieux qui 
en résultent (Constaninople 1890); F.O. 78/4328, “Translation: Circular addressed to Mudirs and 
Governors,” Riaz Pasha, Minister of the Interior, Khedival Government of Egypt, 20 Jan. 1890.  
  
6 
that over a hundred corpses had been tossed overboard since leaving the port of Jidda.  
By June, cholera had attacked Alexandria, killing some 60,000 Egyptians and setting off 
a chain reaction that subsequently spread to, and ravaged, the port of Marseilles and all of 
Europe.  Finally, by November 1865, cholera was recorded as far away as New York 
City.  By the epidemic’s end, over 200,000 lives had been lost in major cities alone.9 
Given the severity of the 1865 epidemic, international attention focused 
immediately on the role of the hajj in the dissemination of cholera.  Writing shortly after 
the outbreak, Dr. Achille Proust, a Professor of Hygiene at the Faculty of Medicine at the 
University of Paris, wrote of the terror felt throughout the Mediterranean region, 
commenting that “Europe realized that it could not remain like this, every year, at the 
mercy of the pilgrimage to Mecca.”10  Echoing Dr. Proust’s anxiety and contempt for 
Indian pilgrims, W.W. Hunter, the Director General of Statistics to the Government of 
India and a leading authority on Indian ethnography and history, noted with haughty 
contempt that while India’s pilgrim masses might “care little for life or death,” their 
“carelessness imperils lives far more valuable than their own.”11  As a result, for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century, European Powers, acting upon the conclusions of the 
International Sanitary Conference of 1866 held in Constantinople (Istanbul),12 embarked 
upon an ambitious and highly contentious program of sanitary reform and surveillance.13   
                                                 
    
9
 Firmin Duguet, Le pélerinage de la Mecque au point de vue religieuse, social et sanitaire (Paris: 
Reider, 1932), 126-128; F.E. Peters, The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 301-302. 
    
10
 A.A. Proust, Essai sur l’hygiéne…Avec une carte indiquement la marche des épidémies de cholera par 
les routes de terre et la voie maritime (Paris, 1873), 45, quoted in Roff, “Sanitation and Security,” 146.    
    
11
 W.W. Hunter, Orissa, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1872), 1: 145, 156, 166-167, quoted in 
Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 189. 
    
12
 While Istanbul would ordinarily be the preferred name for the Ottoman capital, I have used 
Constantinople throughout this project.  I have chosen to do so primarily because of the importance of the 
International Sanitary Conference of 1866.  The correspondence regarding the Constantinople conference, 
  
7 
As F.E. Peters observes in The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the 
Holy Places (1994), “the threat of devastating cholera epidemics invading Europe” 
resulted in a “concerted politique sanitaire whose objective was the regulation of the life 
of Western Arabia and, no less, of the most sacred ritual of Islam, the hajj.”14  For British 
officialdom, however, these dramatic changes were further complicated by the looming 
anxieties of Muslim-inspired political subversion that haunted British officialdom in the 
wake of the Sepoy Mutiny (Great Rebellion) of 1857-1858.15  As William Roff succinctly 
states in his pioneering article, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and the 
Nineteenth-Century Hajj” (1982), the hajj came to represent a source of “twin 
infection.”16  On the one hand, despite British claims to the contrary, India’s Ganges 
valley was established as the source of cholera.  On at least forty occasions between 1831 
and 1912 cholera spread from either Bombay or Calcutta to the Hijaz, and then was 
dispersed far and wide by returning hajjis, ensuring that outbreaks of cholera were a 
                                                                                                                                                 
upon which I have relied heavily, reflects the Eurocentric terminology of the era.  Although I am fully 
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perennial threat to Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Europe and even the Americas.17  On the 
other hand, contact with Arabia was widely considered by British officials to be the 
primary source of religio-political fanaticism among Indian Muslims.  First referred to as 
“Wahhabism” and then later as Pan-Islam, Arabian influences were blamed for spreading 
unrest and rebellion in India, the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies.   
Though the British certainly understood the risk of political subversion that the 
hajj entailed, they were also fearful that direct interference with this fundamental Islamic 
practice would surely inspire a religio-political backlash in India.  During the height of 
the cholera era, from 1860s to the 1890s, these political considerations placed Britain in 
direct confrontation with the reform-minded politique sanitaire being imposed by the rest 
of Europe and the Ottoman Empire.  Britain’s concerns were three-fold.  First and 
foremost, Britain feared that restricting its pilgrims’ access to the hajj would agitate its 
Muslim population in India.  Second, Britain feared that international sanitary restrictions 
and quarantines would threaten the free flow of trade between India and Europe.  And 
third, Britain was hesitant to submit to any international agreements that would have 
enhanced the Ottoman Empire’s ability to govern the hajj effectively, enforce its 
sovereignty in Arabia, or exert more Pan-Islamic influence over Britain’s Muslim 
colonial subjects.  As a result of these concerns, British officialdom obstinately denied a 
mounting body of scientific evidence and international consensus that cholera was a 
contagious disease.  For over three decades Britain obstructed international efforts to 
impose quarantine restrictions and limit the number of indigent and infected pilgrims 
going on pilgrimage.   
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Fighting for administrative control of the sanitary functions surrounding the hajj 
would only serve to increase the intensity of Anglo-Ottoman contestation regarding 
pilgrimage traffic as a whole.  Though the initial impetus for increased British 
involvement in the Red Sea and the administrative details of the hajj was largely the 
result of international sanitary and trade concerns generated by the spread of cholera via 
the hajj and the resultant call for quarantine measures in the region, such interests cannot 
be separated from more directly political considerations.  In the decades that followed the 
Sepoy Mutiny and the international sanitary conference of 1866, British officials became 
increasingly concerned with monitoring the international networks of anti-colonial 
radicalism, both real and imagined, being forged between diasporic networks of Indian 
dissidents, pilgrims, and the Ottoman Empire.  However elusive these connections may 
have been during the 1850s and 1860s, it had become clear to British officials that by the 
1870s and 1880s these linkages had given way to a more clearly-defined Pan-Islamic 
ideology, sponsored in part by the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1908).  Thus, 
as a result of the “twin infection” of both sanitary and security concerns, both the British 
and Ottoman empires became engaged in a contestation of sacred space in which the 
stakes ranged from suzerainty in the Hijaz and the administration of the hajj to even 
larger questions of hegemony over the Red Sea region and even the entire dar al-Islam.    
 
Things to Come… 
 Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the existing literature concerning the hajj, 
beginning with a discussion of Victor Turner’s anthropological model of pilgrimage.  
Despite my initial skepticism regarding his universalizing tendencies, I have come to 
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recognize the elegance and flexibility of Turner’s model.  By adapting his dualistic theory 
of “communitas” and “structure” to the specificities of the colonial-era hajj, I have 
discovered a high degree of commonality between Turner’s model and the musings of the 
famous Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje, many of whose ideas played a 
crucial role in shaping Dutch (and to a lesser extent British) policies toward the political 
and medical administration of the colonial-era hajj.  By comparing Turner and Hurgronje, 
I transition from the world of academic theory to the practical questions of colonial 
administration, many of which lay at the heart of the early historiography of the hajj.  In 
my review of the historiography of the pilgrimage, I begin with the nineteenth-century 
classics produced by European adventurers, many of whom entered Mecca and Medina 
disguised as pilgrims.  Although these accounts would undoubtedly provide excellent 
fodder for a Saidian analysis of Orientalist thought, I have opted to leave this task to 
others.18  Instead, I am more concerned with the way in which the area-studies system has 
suppressed and fragmented the study of trans-regional connections embodied by the 
Indian Ocean’s bustling pilgrimage traffic.  I am convinced that by separating the Middle 
East and Islamic South Asia into discrete regional units, the existing literature has 
unnecessarily obscured the enduring unity of the dar al-Islam.  In order to transcend the 
conventional regional boundaries of the Middle East and South Asia, I will discuss how 
the emerging historiography of the Indian Ocean offers a way to reframe both the hajj 
and the boundaries of British India.                       
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 Chapter 2 examines the period between the great cholera outbreak of 1865 and the 
outbreak of plague in Bombay in 1896.  It will first be necessary to briefly trace the roots 
of epidemic cholera back to India.  Here, particular attention will be paid to the 
combination of factors that allowed cholera to repeatedly leap beyond India’s borders 
during the nineteenth century and eventually led international opinion to place the blame 
for this disaster squarely upon British India and its legions of infected pilgrims.  
However, the process by which cholera was transmitted from human to human would not 
be fully understood until Robert Koch’s discovery of the bacillus vibrio cholera in 1884.  
Thus, while international opinion during the period between 1866 and the 1890s called 
for the imposition of quarantine measures in order to protect Europe from cholera, Britain 
repeatedly denied that cholera was caused by human-to-human contact and therefore 
remained vehemently opposed to the implementation of such measures.  Here, I will 
explore the diplomatic and scientific rift between Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the 
rest of Europe caused by the quarantine controversy.  I will also compare the more 
stringent recommendations made at the subsequent sanitary conferences held during the 
1870s and 1880s with the parallel program of reforms being pursued by British India, 
which while meant to avoid economically undesirable quarantines were nonetheless 
aimed at curbing the number of indigent pilgrims as well as improving both the 
scandalously unsanitary conditions aboard pilgrimage vessels and the abusive business 
practices associated with the pilgrimage trade. 
 In Chapter 3, the focus shifts from infections of epidemic disease to infections of 
a political nature.  This chapter will trace how the advent of the steamship era brought 
British India into much closer contact with the Red Sea region and the Muslim Holy 
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Land.  Increased European presence in this sensitive region often provoked violent 
responses among local populations.  Particularly in the decades that followed the Sepoy 
Mutiny of 1857-1858, British officials became increasingly concerned with monitoring 
diasporic networks of anti-colonial radicalism being forged between Indian dissidents, 
pilgrims, and the inhabitants Red Sea region.  Especially in the case of the 1858 massacre 
of Jidda’s Christian population, I will demonstrate how anti-colonial tremors originating 
in India spread to the Hijaz.  As episodic as such outbursts may have been during the 
1850s and 1860s, by the 1870s and 1880s, these informal networks had given way to a 
more clearly-defined Pan-Islamic ideology, sponsored in part by the Ottoman Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II.  As a result, during Abdul Hamid’s reign the Holy Places became an 
important outlet for Pan-Islamic propaganda directed toward Indian Muslims.  Here, 
particular attention will be paid to how Pan-Islam’s strategic relationship with the hajj 
and the Holy Places spurred British officials to implement daring schemes of espionage, 
which would ultimately blur the lines between medical and political surveillance of the 
hajj and turn doctors into spies. 
 Chapter 4 will explore the radically transformative period between 1896 and 
1926.  By the close of the nineteenth century, significant progress in containing cholera 
had been made.  International Sanitary Conventions had been ratified in Venice in 1892 
and again in Paris in 1894 and with the outbreak of plague in Bombay even Britain’s 
long-held policy of obstructing international sanitary regulations finally became 
untenable.  Thus, by the 1890s, but especially after World War I, the hajj had been 
colonized.  British and international commitments in Arabia and the Red Sea had become 
an institutionalized part of the pilgrimage experience.   
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 The final chapter will explore the flurry of Pan-Islamic activities in India 
immediately before and after World War I, many of which involved organizations, most 
notably Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba (Society of the Servants of the Ka‘ba), ostensibly 
created to protect the Holy Places from defilement or destruction at the hands of 
European powers.  Similarly, as in the case of the Silk Letter Conspiracy, Mecca and 
Medina served as the key point of communication between the Ottoman Empire and 
India’s pro-Ottoman radicals coordinating a frontier jihad from Afghanistan during 
World War I.  Many of the central players in these Pan-Islamic networks would 
eventually become instrumental figures in the Khilafat Movement (1918-1924) and 
Indian Muslims’ rejection of the British-backed Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali’s claims upon the 
Caliphate and control of the Holy Places.  While the Khilafat Movement was ultimately 
unsuccessful in its efforts to save the Ottoman Caliphate, its importance as the first mass 
nationalist movement to span all of India and garner support among both Muslims and 
Hindus underscores the Pan-Islam’s impact on the later development of Indian and 
Pakistani nationalisms.          
  Finally, I will conclude with a brief consideration of the Wahhabi take-over of the 
hajj in 1925.  In many ways, the changes to the hajj wrought by the House of Sa‘ūd and 
the Wahhabis have been more profound and long-lasting than the European interventions 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As Sugata Bose points out, “The 
removal of the authority of the Ottoman sultan-khalifa over the Holy Cities, the 
Hashemite interregnum, and the establishment of Saudi dominance widened fissures not 
just between Muslims and non-Muslims but also within the universal community of 
Islam.”  With their puritanical sensibilities and penchant for iconoclasm, the traditional 
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practices of South Asian pilgrims, ranging the from Sufi to Shia, their Persian-influenced 
namaz, their salutations at the Prophet’s grave, and their pious veneration of shrines and 
tombs, all came under intense scrutiny.  Thus, while British colonial regulation of the hajj 
had been “galling enough,” South Asian pilgrims suffered new forms of tyranny at the 
hands of the their Muslim brothers.19
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CHAPTER 1 
PILGRIMAGE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
 
 … and how few have looked upon the celebrated shrine!  I may truly say that, of 
 all the worshippers who clung weeping to the curtain, or who pressed their 
 beating hearts to the stone, none felt for the moment a deeper emotion than did the 
 Haji from the far-north.  It was as if the poetical legends of the Arab spoke truth, 
 and that the waving wings of angels, not the breeze of morning, were agitating 
 and swelling the black covering of the shrine.  But to confess humbling truth, 
 theirs was the high feeling of religious enthusiasm, mine was the ecstacy of 
 gratified pride. 
-Sir Richard F. Burton1 
 
 One must guard against the too-common tendency to generalize.  This art is  
 known to our “experts” on conditions in the East Indies, as well as to anybody.   
 One hears from one Resident who has often come into unpleasant contact with the  
 Hajjis that the Hajjis are the plague of native society; they encourage the natives 
 to resistance, sow fanaticism and hatred of Europeans, etc.  Another, whom 
 chance has brought into contact with docile Hajjis, and whom they have served as  
 very useful “boys”, replies that all this is the invention of clumsy colleagues, for  
 anyone who knows how to deal with Hajjis (like the speaker) learns to know them  
 as sober, orderly people.  All start from the fallacious hypothesis that the Hajjis  
 have, as such, a special character. 
-Christian Snouck Hurgronje2 
 
Rethinking Victor Turner: 
Pan-Islamic Communitas, Anti-Colonial Liminality, 
 and the Structure of Colonial Surveillance 
 
To a considerable degree, the theoretical discussion of pilgrimage and its impact 
on society has been dominated by one man, British anthropologist Victor Turner, an 
authority on ritual and a trail-blazing scholar in the fields of comparative religion and  
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pilgrimage studies.  Turner is best known for his binary model of “communitas” and 
“structure” in the pilgrimage experience.  For Turner, pilgrimage offers an opportunity to 
create communitas, which involves movement away from one’s institutionalized social 
status, family, town, political party, job, etc.  Traveling away from one’s home on 
pilgrimage offers an opportunity to shed these conventional roles.  As the pilgrim 
distances himself from the structure of normal, everyday life, he will ostensibly move 
away from established hierarchies into a “liminal” status, freed from the normal bonds of 
structure.  Above all else, communitas generated by the pilgrimage experience represents 
a kind of strained reach toward lofty concepts like equality, global unity, and 
brotherhood.  As Turner points out, the hajj and its well-known penchant for equalizing 
rituals is an outstanding example of a communitas-generating pilgrimage. 
Structure is a system of rank and status underlying mundane functions such as 
labor and government.  Obviously, structure is dominant and pervasive in the world.  
Structure remains dominant by creating safe spaces and times where communitas can be 
expressed without fear of major disruption.  Thus, communitas has been relegated to the 
world of myths and symbols.  However, rituals, including pilgrimage, create liminal 
spaces where the norms of structure can be safely challenged and bent, if not broken.  
Despite this relegation, Turner was committed to the resilience of pilgrimage and 
communitas.  Moreover, he argued that pilgrimage served a special, almost irrepressible 
function in society.  Pilgrimages, even if for only a fleeting moment, can slip the bonds of 
structure, criticizing it instead of reproducing it.  While this rough sketch of communitas 
and structure cannot do justice to Turner’s thought, it does provide a sense of Turner’s 
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basic vocabulary and the formula around which much of the previous scholarship on 
pilgrimage has been constructed.   
Despite the importance of Turner’s model, for historians it has proved more 
controversial than influential.  Most have taken issue with the ahistorical nature of 
Turner’s work or its claims of universal applicability across widely varying religious 
traditions.  Many have also doubted whether or not pilgrims embarking on the hajj can 
ever really achieve the lofty goal of communitas as described by Turner, noting that even 
in Mecca divisions of class, ethnicity, language, and nationality are plainly evident.  
Moreover, the supposed liminality of hajj experience has often been called into to 
question, particularly when one considers the degree to which the entire pilgrimage 
experience is subject to rigid textual guidelines, the instructions of professional 
pilgrimage guides, and the dictates of religious and governmental authorities determined 
to maintain certain standards of religious orthodoxy.3 
Although these criticisms are well-founded, Turner’s model remains a useful 
starting point for thinking about the colonial-era hajj and its relationship to Pan-Islam, 
anti-colonial radicalism, and the growth of sanitary surveillance spawned by repeated 
outbreaks of cholera.  While the origins, authenticity, sincerity, and plausibility of the 
grandiose schemes hatched by both the Pan-Islamic movement’s most famous activists 
and its official Ottoman sponsors have already been scrutinized and dissected by other 
scholars, it may be more useful to rethink Pan-Islam and its relationship to the hajj using 
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a simplified version of Turner’s theoretical vocabulary.4  At its most basic level, Pan-
Islam was an anti-colonial movement that stressed the unity of the Islamic umma 
(community).  Not surprisingly, Pan-Islamic thinkers gravitated to universal symbols like 
the Caliphate, Mecca, the Ka’ba, and the hajj.  In each case, the underlying value of these 
symbols was derived from their ability to convey notions of communitas. 
 One of the main elements of communitas is, of course, its tendency to criticize 
structure rather than reproduce it.  Applying this definition to Pan-Islam, we can see that 
it was a vehicle for criticizing British, French, Dutch, and Russian imperialisms.  Pan-
Islam, like other expressions of communitas, was closely monitored and discouraged 
within the colonial structure of not only India, but also the British Empire as a whole, and 
throughout the Islamic world.  Thus, Pan-Islam needed symbols, rituals, and liminal 
spaces in order to express itself.  I would argue that sites where British authority was 
weak, non-existent, or contested were the very places where Pan-Islamic communitas 
was most likely to form.  Mecca and the Hijaz were the most obvious examples of 
territories where the British had little authority.  Mecca also had the added advantage of 
an already high capacity for the creation of communitas as a result of the hajj.  More 
generally speaking, the entire Ottoman Empire, although challenged by British and 
European interference, was still an independent Muslim power, headed by the self-
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professed leader of the Islamic world, the Sultan-Caliph.  One might also argue that a 
certain kind of loosely-associated communitas existed in the arc of radical Indian 
diasporic communities scattered throughout the Indian Ocean basin, the Red Sea, and 
Middle East. 
 Positioned at the fringes of colonial structure (beyond or at the margins of British 
power and/or surveillance), each of these sites show characteristics of what might be 
dubbed anti-colonial liminality.  Where anti-colonial liminality existed, the potential for 
Pan-Islamic communitas as well anti-colonial protest and violence was greatly increased.  
While anti-colonial liminality might seem to contradict the universalizing purpose of 
communitas, as Turner points out in “Pilgrimage and Communitas” (1974), though 
pilgrimages strain, as it were, in the direction of universal communitas, they are still 
ultimately bounded by the structure of the religious systems within which they are 
generated and persist.”  As a function of this inherent exclusivity, Turner also recognized 
that the hajj carries with it the potential for generating “fanaticism” and reactivating 
“Muslim belief in the spiritual necessity of Jihad or Holy War.” 5   
Though it is doubtful that colonial administrators would have seen themselves as 
policing anti-colonial liminality and Pan-Islamic communitas, they nevertheless 
recognized the potential that Mecca, the Ottoman Empire, and the Red Sea region had to 
generate feelings of exclusivity, fanaticism, and political subversion.  How then was this 
problem of colonial “disorder” approached by British officialdom?  Ironically, the 
answer, as the renowned Dutch Orientalist Christian Snouck Hurgronje pointed out, was 
that the hajj was inherently manageable.  In other words, structure was inherent in the 
hajj.  Throughout his career he reassured nervous elites in both the Dutch and British 
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empires that the supposedly unruly hajj could be policed and disciplined, suggesting that 
it might even offer an avenue to further subjugate the Islamic world to the colonial order. 
Having spent nearly a year in Jidda and Mecca in 1884-1885, Hurgronje became 
convinced that “Europeans greatly exaggerated the city’s role as a breeding ground for 
anti-colonial agitation in the Islamic world.”6  To prove his point, he emphasized the 
inherently conservative nature of hajj and the mundane business of the pilgrimage 
industry, arguing that “the vast majority of hajjis returned home exactly as they 
departed—not as rebels but as ‘sheep.’”7  Hurgronje also painted native Meccans as more 
concerned with “fleecing their pilgrim prey” than fomenting rebellion.  In sharp contrast 
to the “herd of gullible hajjis,” Hurgronje acknowledged the presence of a small minority 
of “conspirators who turned their piety into fanaticism and rebellion.”8  He argued that 
the true danger of the hajj lay in the “networks of exiles and students [muqīm] who took 
refuge in Mecca’s many expatriate communities, exploiting the freedom of the hajj to 
propagandize visitors from their homelands.”9   
Hurgronje’s solution to this paradox was simple.  He argued that instead of 
restricting access to Mecca, a strategy which he reasoned was needlessly provocative, 
colonial governments should increase their diplomatic, intelligence, and sanitary presence 
in the Hijaz.  Following his recommendation, the Dutch created a full-service hajj agency 
in Jidda, ostensibly to protect their subjects from fleecing and epidemic disease.  He 
argued that by supporting the hajj, colonial regimes could simultaneously endear 
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themselves to the majority of their subjects, while keeping a watchful eye on any 
subversive elements.  His strategy was to bring the hajj within the framework of colonial 
governance and surveillance.  Following Hurgronje’s model, both the Dutch East Indies 
and British India moved to pry as many of functions of the hajj as possible from Ottoman 
control.  By engaging in this strategy of inter-imperial contestation, the British and their 
European colonial counterparts slowly decreased the liminal space for anti-colonial 
activities previously afforded by the hajj and extended the tentacles of colonial authority 
to include pilgrimage institutions spanning the entire Indian Ocean basin.  In this way, 
colonial structure became pervasive even in Mecca, successfully making Pan-Islam and 
the hajj manageable dangers.   
 
A Historiography in Fragments 
Bernard Lewis, commenting on the dearth of scholarly research related to the hajj, 
once commented that the “effect of the pilgrimage on communications and commerce, on 
ideas and institutions, has not been adequately explored.”  Moreover, Lewis lamented 
that “it may never be, since much of it will, in the nature of things, have gone 
unrecorded.”10  While the first part of Lewis’ complaint remains surprisingly accurate, 
the latter half of his analysis is slightly exaggerated, at least in the case of the colonial-
era.  In reality, the British, Dutch, French, and Ottoman empires have all left voluminous 
archival collections detailing almost every conceivable issue related to pilgrimage 
administration during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  In addition to 
these archival sources, numerous pilgrimage accounts from medieval times up to the 
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present are available in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, and a variety of other 
languages.11  Moreover, there are a number of pilgrimage accounts, particularly from 
South Asians, written or translated into English.12  In addition to descriptions of Mecca 
and the pilgrimage written by actual hajjis, there is also an important genre of nineteenth-
century travel and exploration literature written by Westerners.  However, as Lewis and 
others have pointed out, despite the existence of these primary sources, which are of 
course the necessary raw materials with which a richer analysis of the hajj could be 
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constructed, the historiography of the hajj remains embarrassingly slender, indeed almost 
non-existent.13  In response to this historiographical lacuna, three central questions spring 
to mind.  First, what secondary analyses of the hajj are currently available?  Second, 
which academic disciplines are producing these accounts, and what are the temporal 
periods, geographical areas, and themes with which these scholars have primarily been 
concerned?  And third, what are the disciplinary, linguistic, and theoretical obstacles 
facing scholars who might wish to address these issues? 
In terms of the scholarly literature, while an obvious starting point for any 
discussion of pilgrimage is of course Victor Turner’s work, its impact on the 
historiography related to the hajj has been muted as a result of the criticisms already 
mentioned.  While Turner’s work may be applied in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of how the hajj might be considered as an important influence on political 
power and societal change in the Islamic world and beyond, his body of research is not 
specifically about the hajj.  Rather, Turner’s oeuvre was a work of anthropology and 
comparative religion, which compared pilgrimage rituals as varied as those of Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam.  Moreover, its deeply ahistorical comparisons paid 
little attention to the most important aspect of historical research, change over time.  
Similarly, because of its far-flung geographical and temporal comparisons, its claims of 
universality across religious traditions, and its lack of attention to primary sources written 
in Middle Eastern languages, scholars of Near Eastern and Middle East Studies the vast 
majority of whom are deeply convinced of the cultural, linguistic, and religious 
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distinctiveness of their geographical area of specialization are equally suspicious of 
Turner’s work.          
Thus, the historiography of the colonial-era hajj begins not with Turner but with 
the work of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Orientalists and explorers, who either 
converted to Islam or at least feigned their conversion and successfully disguised 
themselves as Muslims in order to enter the Holy Cities.  The two most important and 
comprehensive accounts from this genre are those of Sir Richard F. Burton and Christaan 
Snouck Hurgronje.  While Burton’s account of his 1853 pilgrimage-in-disguise is 
undisputedly the most famous, Hurgronje’s account of his sojourn in Mecca from 1884-
1885 is by far the more politically important of the two and speaks most directly to the 
fears aroused by the “twin infection” of sanitary and security concerns that haunted 
colonial regimes of the late nineteenth century.  Though the works of Burton and 
Hurgronje have garnered the lion’s share of scholarly interest, similar narratives left by 
John Lewis Burckhardt, Charles Doughty, John F. Keane, Eldon Rutter, and A.J.B. 
Wavell have also been used extensively.14 
The majority of these Western narratives of pilgrimage-in-disguise were written 
in English, Hurgronje’s account in Dutch being the notable exception.  Yet, the earliest 
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efforts of twentieth-century professional historians and Orientalists were undertaken by 
Dutch, French, and German scholars.  The contributions of the Dutch scholar A.J. 
Wensinck, particularly his articles on the Hadjdj, the Ka‘ba, and the Masjid al-Haram in 
the Encyclopedia of Islam, have been foundational sources upon which others have relied 
greatly.15  Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes’ Le pélerinage à la Mekke: Étude d’histoire 
religieuse (1923) and Firmin Duguet’s Le pélerinage de le Mecque au point de vue 
religieuse, social et sanitaire (1932) were the first academic, monograph-length studies 
solely dedicated to the hajj.  While Gaudefroy-Demombynes’ work is more useful for 
understanding the religious and ritual aspects of the hajj, Duguet was the first to examine 
the hajj from a medical perspective.  Thus, Duguet’s study is of seminal importance, 
particularly for scholars interested in tracing the impact of cholera and quarantine 
measures related to the hajj.16 
In the post-World War II era, the current area-studies system began to develop, 
one might expect a proliferation of studies on the hajj given its centrality to the practice 
of Islam and to the Middle East as a region.  However, that has not been the case.  As we 
shall see, “the general narrowing of scholarly focus within the framework of area-
studies” and the tendency of many scholars to concentrate their efforts on a particular 
nation-state seems to have discouraged scholars from tackling topics which would require 
them to examine broader trans-regional connections between the Middle East and the rest 
of the Islamic world.17  Strangely, from the 1950s until the late 1970s, very little Western 
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scholarship concerning the hajj was produced.  With the exception of a lone chapter from 
G.E. Von Grunebaum’s dated but still useful classic, Muhammadan Festivals (1951), 
which also deals only with the religious rituals of the hajj, the great pilgrimage was 
virtually ignored by historians and area-studies specialists.   
This trend was finally reversed in 1978 when the first volume of Hajj Studies was 
published by the Hajj Research Center in Jidda.  Though it contained a number of 
interesting articles, all dealing with modern topics and mostly of a social-science 
orientation, no subsequent volumes appeared.18  Then, in 1979, David E. Long’s The Hajj 
Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Makkah Pilgrimage was published.  Long’s 
thorough and sympathetic study, the most comprehensive since those of Gaudefroy-
Demombyne and Dugeut, details the economic, medical, political, religious, and social 
implications of the hajj.  Of particular value is Long’s chapter, “Health Aspects of the 
Hajj,” which concisely describes both the international sanitary reforms of the nineteenth 
century and the subsequent development of Saudi health institutions relating to the 
pilgrimage.19  Despite its usefulness, however, Long’s book is more of a study of Saudi 
Arabia’s contemporary administration of the hajj than a comprehensive history of the hajj 
itself.   
At present, the most chronologically comprehensive histories of the hajj have 
been written by F.E. Peters, a professor of Near Eastern and Islamic studies at New York 
University.  In fact, Peters’ scholarly output has been prodigious.  In 1994 alone he 
published two massive tomes, The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy 
Places and Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land.  Both volumes span 
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from the pre-Islamic period up to 1926 and the foundation of the Saudi state.  Both tomes 
weave together Arabic, Persian, and Turkish sources, religious texts, pilgrimage 
narratives, and European archival materials, all handsomely embellished by copious 
maps, illustrations, and early photographs of the Holy Places.  In particular, his chapter, 
“Steamships and Cholera: The Hajj in Modern Times,” in The Hajj, has been an 
important point of reference for this project.  However, I have come to view these 
volumes as more of an encyclopedic guide, a textbook, or something of a mine from 
which one might extract quotations, references, or the answer to an obscure question.  
Though it feels strange to admonish any author for using too many primary sources, in 
the case of these two books, such a criticism may be appropriate.  Because Peters relies 
so heavily on lengthy quotations, allowing the primary sources to speak for themselves, 
he provides very little in the way of analysis.  As a result, both volumes careen from topic 
to topic, bereft of transitions, explanations, or any kind of theoretical or historiographical 
compass.20 
In terms of theoretical sophistication, the most important general study of the hajj 
is undoubtedly Robert Bianchi’s recent masterpiece, Guests of God: Pilgrimage and 
Politics in the Islamic World (2005), which won the Middle East Studies Association’s 
Albert Hourani Book Prize.  Particularly for those concerned with not only the rituals of 
the hajj and their administration in Saudi Arabia, but rather with the hajj’s social and 
political impact on Muslim societies scattered across the Islamic world, Bianchi’s 
research, unlike any other study before it, deals with both the national and trans-national 
dimensions of the great pilgrimage.  Bianchi, an international lawyer and professor of 
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political science, also a Muslim and himself a hajji, examines the international politics of 
the contemporary hajj through a series of case-studies on Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Indonesia, and Nigeria.  From a historical perspective, however, Bianchi only briefly 
deals with the colonial roots of the present-day pilgrimage system.  Despite its brevity, 
Bianchi’s discussion of Hurgronje’s views on the administration of the pilgrimage from 
Dutch-ruled Indonesia and his insightful comparison between Hurgronje’s ideas and 
Turner’s theoretical model of pilgrimage have proved extremely useful.21 
In many ways, Bianchi’s geographical de-centering of the hajj offers important 
clues about the direction in which the historiography of this topic is heading.  While one 
might expect the vanguard of hajj research to have emerged from Near Eastern or Middle 
Eastern studies programs, from specialists of the Arabian Peninsula, or from among those 
whose primary research language is Arabic, this has not been the case.  Rather, it has 
been specialists of the Ottoman Empire, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and a coterie of 
historians interested in questions of imperialism in the Indian Ocean world that have 
begun to lead the way.  While their collective efforts currently account for little more 
than a handful of book chapters, articles, and a few full-length studies, by patiently 
piecing together the historiographical fragments that have been produced across these 
disparate fields, a fuller appreciation of the pilgrimage’s trans-regional, even global, 
dimensions can be exposed.    
By far the most valuable investigation produced by this collection of scholars has 
been William Roff’s seminal article, “Sanitation and Security: The Imperial Powers and 
the Nineteenth Century Hajj” (1982).  Roff, a specialist of Southeast Asia, was the first 
scholar to explore the confluence of medical and political concerns shared by colonial 
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administrators in India, Malaysia, and the Dutch East Indies.22  He was also the first to 
make use of the copious colonial archives amassed by the British.  Although this study 
borrows much from Roff’s research, the two differ in several important respects.  First, 
Roff’s study is now twenty-five years old and is therefore in need of an update to reflect 
more recent research.  Second, despite its claim to cover both “sanitation and security,” 
the vast majority of the essay is dedicated to issues of sanitary surveillance, while 
specific threats posed by Pan-Islam and other forms anti-colonial radicalism are only 
briefly addressed in the articles concluding pages.  Moreover, the narrative is told 
exclusively from a European perspective.  As a result, I have striven to give more 
attention to the actions and voices of Muslims themselves, whether they be indigent 
Indian pilgrims, the Ottoman Sultan, Pan-Islamic activists, or participants in anti-colonial 
violence in the ports of the Red Sea and Mecca itself.  Thus, this study has been 
deliberately designed so as to read less as a study of British colonial policy and more as a 
narrative of inter-imperial contestation between the Ottoman Empire, Britain’s Indian 
Ocean empire, and a collection of polyphonic Muslim voices spanning from Jidda to 
Bombay.23  And finally, despite some areas of overlap, I have tried wherever possible to 
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expand upon Roff’s use of British archival sources, particularly those from the Foreign 
Office, related to the hajj.24 
Though Roff’s research has exerted the greatest influence upon this study, another 
noteworthy contribution has come from the work of Mark Harrison, a specialist in the 
history of medicine in colonial India.  His article, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial 
trade: India 1866-1900” (1992), deals extensively with British sanitary policies related to 
the containment of both cholera and plague as well as with British objections to 
international quarantine procedures.25  Harrison’s article includes copious documentation 
from India Office records as well as newspaper coverage taken from the Bombay Gazette.  
While the outbreak of cholera and plague in colonial India have been well documented by 
Harrison, David Arnold, I.J. Catanach, Ira Klein, and Sheldon Watts, Harrison’s article is 
still the only study to specifically address the relationship between cholera and plague in 
India, the quarantine of pilgrims en route to Mecca, and the quarantine controversy’s 
effect on Britain’s maritime trade.26 
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While Roff and Harrison have shown us glimpses of the richness of Britain’s 
colonial archive, there still remains much to be discovered in the Ottoman archives.  
Suraiya Faroqhi’s Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans, 1517-1683 (1994) 
and Naimur Rahman Farooqi’s “Moguls, Ottomans, and Pilgrims: Protecting the Routes 
to Mecca in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” (1988) have both contributed much 
to our understanding of the political and organizational aspects of the early-modern 
hajj.27   However, William Ochsenwald’s investigations of the nineteenth-century Hijaz 
vilayet and Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s famous Hijaz Railway project stand as the only 
works based on Ottoman sources dealing with the time period under consideration in this 
study.  In particular, Oschenwald’s Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz 
Under Ottoman Control, 1840-1908 (1984) contains valuable accounts of the Ottoman 
response to cholera as well local resistance to European sanitary interventions in Jidda 
and Mecca.28 
Owing in part to its unwieldy trans-regional scope and the daunting linguistic 
obstacles it presents, the hajj has been consistently treated as an orphan by scholars 
trained to write histories of particular nations, area-studies regions, or empires.  Indeed, 
as Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen point out in The Myth of Continents: A Critique of 
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Metageography (1997), the “various area studies complexes at American universities” 
have also encouraged “a certain insularity in scholarship, making it unnecessarily 
difficult for scholars to investigate processes that transcend conventional world regional 
boundaries.”29  In many ways, their analysis of the area-studies system as a whole is 
reflected in the historiographic fragmentation of hajj-related scholarship in particular.  As 
a result, there is as of yet no cohesive historiography of the hajj.    
 
Beyond Area-studies: The Hajj as Indian Ocean History 
As Kären Wigen explains in “Oceans of History,” while maritime regions have 
typically been slighted by stubbornly continental and area-studies-driven conceptions of 
geography, “across the discipline, the sea is swinging into view.”  Indeed, “no longer 
outside time, the sea is being given a history, even as the history of the world is being 
retold from the perspective of the sea.”30  Reflecting upon these exciting advances, 
particularly in the growth of Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn remarked that: “There 
comes a moment when historians… blink their eyes and suddenly see within a mass of 
scattered information a new configuration that has a general meaning never grasped 
before, an emergent pattern that has some kind of enhanced explanatory power.”31  
Nowhere has this process been more evident than in the field of South Asia history.  
Drawing upon the now classic seascape template provided by Fernand Braudel’s 
investigations of Mediterranean basin, pioneering scholars such as K.N. Chaudhuri, 
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Sugata Bose, Ashin Dasgupta, Kenneth McPherson, and M.N. Pearson have reframed the 
Indian subcontinent as part of vast chain of political, economic, and cultural interaction, 
stretching from East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in the West to China and Southeast 
Asia in the East.32 
In his recent study, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global 
Empire (2006), Sugata Bose defines the Indian Ocean basin as an “interregional arena.”  
Bose situates this concept “somewhere between the generalities of a ‘world system’ and 
the specificities of particular regions.”  Bose contends that stubborn colonial boundaries 
have tended to “obstruct the study of comparisons and links across regions.”  Moreover, 
this legacy has also played an important role in the construction of “regional entities 
known today as the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, which underpin the 
rubric of area studies in the Western academy.  As a result these divisions tend to 
“arbitrarily project certain legacies of colonial power onto the domain of knowledge in 
the post-colonial era.”33 
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Figure 4.  The Western Indian Ocean Basin, c. 1935.34 
 
By transcending the artificial metageographical boundaries between the Middle 
East and South Asia, Bose exposes both Islamic and imperial connections that the 
traditional historiographies of area-studies regions have left inchoate.  As Bose, 
Chaudhuri, and almost every other scholar of the Indian Ocean basin have repeatedly 
stressed, the Indian Ocean’s complex cultural and trade networks, which emerged in the 
pre- and early-modern periods, owe much of their existence to the spread of Islam.  Of 
course, one of the primary vehicles that bound together the disparate peoples of this vast 
oceanic space was the hajj.  In fact, as M.N. Pearson explains in his study of the Mughal-
era hajj, Pilgrimage to Mecca: The Indian Experience, 1500-1800 (1996), while most 
scholars have long focused on trade as the most important unifying element of the Indian 
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Ocean, what has been neglected is the immense influence of passenger traffic associated 
with the pilgrimage trade.35  These sustained opportunities for person-to-person cross-
cultural exchanges between groups as diverse as Arabs and Malays, Egyptians and 
Indians, or Hadramis and Indonesians breathed a cosmopolitan ethos and shared sense of 
cultural norms into this “interregional arena.”36   
By firmly insisting upon the existence and importance of these interregional 
Islamic contacts, the geographical space constructed by Indian Ocean scholars, perhaps 
more so than any other regional scheme, allows us to shake off Western scholarship’s 
pernicious tendency to conflate Islam with the Arab Middle East and South Asia with 
Hinduism.  While this idea may seem ridiculously simple, precious few studies since 
Marshall Hodgson’s three volume tour de force, The Venture of Islam (1974), have been 
able to adequately articulate Islam’s capacity to integrate far-flung civilizations from the 
Mediterranean basin to China.37  Addressing almost identical concerns, Chatterjee notes 
in The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (1993) that 
because the history of the Indian nation-state, which dominates South Asian studies, has 
become synonymous with the “normalizing project” of Hindu nationalism, the trans-
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national “fragments” of Indian history, especially those of Indian Muslims and their 
interactions with the dar al-Islam, are often occluded, if not wholly “suppressed.”38 
Similarly, Bose complains that “The British raj has been typically regarded as 
having its basis in the territorial landmass of the Indian subcontinent and its 
extraterritorial relations have been studied following the longitudinal axis that linked 
metropolitan Britain and colonial India.”  However, in reality, British India’s territories 
and political influence extended well beyond the national boundaries that constitute 
present-day India; its western frontiers stretched into the Persian Gulf, Arabia, the Red 
Sea and the coasts of East Africa.  Thus, my thesis is concerned with the “latitudinal” 
linkages between India and its various dependencies and interests in the Red Sea, Arabia, 
and the Suez Canal zone.  Likewise, the primary threats to British India’s security 
considered here also involve “latitudinal” contacts between the Ottoman Empire, Pan-
Islamic activists, ex-Indian mutineers, and pilgrims.  Despite tremendous efforts to 
monitor and control these contacts, “Muslim colonial subjects who undertook the 
pilgrimage could never be wholly subjected to state discipline.”  In this regard, Islam’s 
universalist aspirations linking nineteenth-century Indian Muslims with their 
coreligionists across the Indian Ocean and the dar al-Islam may be viewed as an 
understudied, extraterritorial relative of the anti-colonialism trends that would later 
spawn the nationalist movements of the twentieth century.39    
Just as state boundaries and networks of surveillance could not contain the anti-
colonial currents of Pan-Islam, studies confined by conventional area-studies regions 
have been utterly incapable of expressing the global reach of disease flows.  Thus, on the 
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one hand, the respective historiographies concerning cholera outbreaks in Britain, 
Europe, and India are rich, because few scholars have dared to address this topic from a 
trans-regional or global perspective.  On the other hand, the complicated process by 
which cholera spread across the globe and ignited both international controversy and 
cooperation concerning how best to halt its advance has been repeatedly reduced to little 
more than a footnote.40  However, by addressing these issues from an Indian Ocean 
perspective, this study aims to articulate a critical plane of analysis that is flexible enough 
to shift between previously disconnected national, regional, and global frames.       
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CRISIS OF CHOLERA
 
            The policy which has been consistently maintained by the Government of India is  
 that, as the exportation by sea of cholera from India to the Red Sea and Europe  
 has never been known, elaborate precautionary measures, framed on the  
 supposition that cholera, has been so exported, are useless restrictions upon trade  
            and upon the great Mohammedan population of India. 
                                        -Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India1                   
  
 Ships loaded with emigrants or pilgrims, or which may be judged of especial  
 danger to the public health, may be subject of special precautions to be 
 determined by the sanitary authority of the port of arrival. 
         -William Maycock, Foreign Office2  
  
 This quarantine in no way causes any loss or expense for the Ottoman Empire.   
 Whatever they expend on it, they get back double from the pilgrims.  Exorbitant  
 sums go to the employees of the quarantine.  When officials are posted to the 
 quarantine, it is as if [they had been appointed] officials in charge of fleecing and 
 plundering the pilgrims. 
                       -Mīrzā Muhammad Husayn Farāhānī, Iranian Pilgrim3 
 
 
 “A Woeful Crescendo of Death” 
 
 From 1865 until at least World War I, India experienced what Ira Klein describes 
as “a woeful crescendo of death.”4  A staggering death rate of 41.3 per 1,000 in the 
1880s, already high by contemporary European standards, rose to 48.6 per 1,000 between 
1911 and 1921.  As David Arnold explains, “the causes of this savage upsurge in 
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mortality have been much debated.”5  While Arnold, Klein, and a host of others have 
focused their attention on the balance of advancements and limitations in the way that 
Western medicine and sanitation were being applied to nineteenth-century Britain and 
India,6 William McNeill’s Plagues and Peoples (1976), stresses the role of British 
military campaigns in creating new patterns of disease transmission across the 
subcontinent.7  Other studies, most notably Mike Davis’ scathing Marxist exposé Late 
Victorian Holocausts: El Niño and the Making of the Third World (2001), have pointed 
to the expansion of capitalism and modern systems of trade and food distribution, which 
resulted from industrialization and the rise of new transportation options, particularly the 
introduction of rail and steamship connections.8  Moreover, Davis recasts India’s 
exorbitant levels of mortality primarily as a function of the large-scale famines that 
resulted from the deteriorating economic, social, and environmental conditions created by 
Britain’s exploitation of the subcontinent’s land and resources.9  Davis also underscores 
that while natural factors, such as the failure of the monsoons, contributed to droughts 
and famines, nineteenth-century India’s catastrophic mortality rates and the synergistic 
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relationship forged between drought, famine, and cholera were in fact man-made crises, 
born of colonial India’s unjust economic and political systems.10  However, Dadabhai 
Naoroji’s classic study of underdevelopment, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India 
(1901), puts it best: “how strange it is that the British rulers do not see that after all they 
themselves are the main cause of the destruction that ensues from droughts; that it is the 
drain of India’s wealth by them that lays at their own door the dreadful results of misery, 
starvation, and deaths of millions…  Why blame poor Nature when the fault lies at your 
own door?”11   
 Regardless of whether one places more emphasis on economic, political, 
technological, or pathogenic factors beyond human control, the death tolls are 
undeniable.  Between 1896 and 1921, outbreaks of plague accounted for about 10 million 
deaths.  Malaria deaths during the same period accounted for probably twice that number.  
There was also the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, which wiped out another 12 to 15 
million.12  However, even these sobering epidemiological statistics pale in comparison 
with colonial India’s first and most prolific killer, cholera.  Between 1817 and 1865, 
rough estimates suggest that some 15 million cholera deaths occurred.  After 1865, more 
systematic and reliable mortality statistics began to be collected.  From 1865 until 1947, a 
further 23 million deaths were recorded.13  Although, as we shall see, it is highly likely 
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that many more deaths went unrecorded for purely political reasons.14  Worse still, the 
millions lost to cholera were only part of a much larger colonial-era demographic 
catastrophe.   
Extended periods of drought, followed by intense famines, ravaged the Indian 
countryside from 1876-1879 and again from 1896-1902.  Though statistics vary widely, it 
is estimated that these two famines produced between 12.2 and 29.3 million victims.15  
As a result of these waves of drought and famine, India became fertile ground for the 
incubation of cholera and other epidemic diseases.  Though hot, dry conditions are 
generally a hindrance to the proliferation of the cholera bacillus, years of failed monsoons 
pushed villagers to seek water from contaminated sources.  Chronic malnutrition 
combined with changes in diet and behavior worked to weaken immune systems and 
raise the risks of infection.  Starvation led to desperate searches for sustenance, leading 
people to consume roots, leaves, and other marginal food sources, which resulted in 
diarrhea and other complications.16  Whether the victims of famine or disease, many 
attempted to flee to other villages, towns or cities, while others were concentrated in 
relief camps.  As a result of both the mobility and concentration of victims, normal 
family and community standards of care-taking and hygiene collapsed into poverty and 
chaos, while British efforts at medical relief were more often than aimed at protecting 
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white colonists and balancing budgets instead of ameliorating the plight of those who 
were actually suffering.17  
Working in tandem, the vicious cycles of famine and cholera in India set into 
motion a sanitation crisis which would eventually assume global proportions.  Though 
cholera had long been endemic in Bengal, over the course of the nineteenth century it 
rapidly transgressed its previous boundaries.  The disease first came to the attention of 
Britain and Europe in 1817, when there was an outbreak in the environs of Calcutta.  
Unlike the outbreaks of pre-colonial times, new patterns of British trade and military 
movement allowed the disease to grow beyond its previous limits, infecting new 
territories, where human resistance and coping mechanisms were nonexistent.  Pre-
colonial patterns of cholera transmission seem to have revolved around Hindu pilgrimage 
and festival circuits.  Large crowds of celebrants would contract the disease and carry the 
infection back home, where it would run its deadly but still endemic course.  From 1817 
onward, however, cholera transmission dramatically expanded its reach.  British troops 
brought the disease overland to Nepal and Afghanistan by 1818, while British ships 
spread it from East Africa to China during the 1820s.  By the 1830s British trade had 
ensured the global diffusion of cholera.  However, the arrival of cholera in Mecca in 1831 
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made that diffusion an annual event. Like India’s Hindu pilgrimage circuit before it, the 
hajj became a prime vehicle for the expansion and globalization of cholera ransmission.18 
In 1831-1832, cholera made its first appearance in Britain.  Yet, this first outbreak 
was not framed by contemporary observers as a colonial crisis, nor was it immediately 
connected to India or the hajj.  Rather, as Sheldon Watts points out in Epidemics and 
History: Disease, Power and Imperialism (1997), at this point, cholera was more closely 
associated with elite attitudes toward working-class people.  It was argued that cholera 
was a non-contagious “variant of an English fever which could be expected to target 
those who were predisposed to it by their immoral living, their poverty, their neglect of 
family values, their holding of opinions about political matters, and their heavy 
drinking.”  As in the case of the “Irish disease,” mostly likely typhus, which had swept 
across Britain from 1817 to 1819, cholera was viewed as a “disease of filth.”  By 
connecting “‘superstitious’ Catholicism, poverty and death through disease, then 
contrasting it with ‘enlightened’ Protestantism, wealth and good health,” cholera became 
associated with “predisposing causes.”19  As we shall see, the rhetoric of “predisposing 
causes” became deeply engrained in British responses to cholera in both Britain and 
India.   
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Edwin Chadwick and the Foundations of British Attitudes Toward Cholera 
The driving force behind this ideology of “predisposing causes” was the acid-
tongued lawyer, Edwin Chadwick.  It was Chadwick, the one-time secretary to Jeremy 
Bentham, who was at the center of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and its 
subsequent administration.  As Watts reports, Chadwick “took up the task of creating a 
new system of poor relief which would at one and the same maintain the fiction that 
England was a Christian country and cater to the ideological needs of the propertied 
classes.”  The result was a war on the supposedly “idle” poor.  Though a national network 
of poorhouses was constructed in accordance with the Poor Law Amendment Act, 
conditions were so miserable that no able-bodied person would willingly subject 
themselves to these facilities.  The guiding principle behind the construction and 
administration of these poorhouses was Chadwick’s notion of “less eligibility,” which 
subjected those who were desperate enough to find themselves in the poorhouse to prison 
conditions.  These individuals were given minimal nutrition, alcohol and tobacco were 
forbidden, all reading materials except the Bible were forbidden, and inmates were 
segregated by sex and torn from family members.  All of these moralizing restrictions 
were meant to keep the costs of poor relief down, while supposedly “forcing the willfully 
idle to work for their bread.”  As a result of these measures, ordinary men and women of 
the working classes came to regard poorhouses as degrading “bastilles,” which were to be 
avoided at all costs.  Even starvation or suicide became preferable options to the 
poorhouse. 20 
 It is important to note how Chadwick’s Poor Law ideology spilled over into 
sanitary concerns in both Britain and India.  Using his position as Poor Law chief as a 
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stepping-stone, Chadwick was later given the responsibility of creating a Royal 
Commission to study the health of English towns.  In his 1842 report, Report on the 
Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain, Chadwick also sought 
to defend his Poor Law strategies.21  Despite the fact that those living in Chadwick’s 
poorhouses were two to three times more likely to die of cholera than the general 
population, Chadwick sought to prove that not only had poverty been alleviated under his 
watch but that he also had a strategy for combating cholera.  Combining a heavy dose of 
moralization with the mid-nineteenth century’s muddled Galenic understanding of 
disease transmission and newer ideas about sanitary engineering, Chadwick hypothesized 
that the way to combat cholera and move public health forward was to update sewage 
systems and water supplies.  Chadwick’s rationale was that diseases were caused by 
“miasmas,” which rose from festering waste materials.  According to Chadwick’s logic, 
removing the waste materials that caused these dangerous “miasmas” from working class 
neighborhoods would in turn eliminate disease and the principal causes of working class 
poverty, moral decay, and alcoholism.  Ironically, while Chadwick correctly pointed to 
the water-borne nature of cholera by advocating the modernization of sewage systems, 
his ideologically motivated ideas concerning “miasmas” and “predisposing causes” 
would ultimately prove to be among the greatest obstacles to the scientific understanding 
of cholera in the nineteenth century.  Over time Chadwick’s line of thought became 
institutionalized as the underpinning of Britain’s official response to cholera.  In 1848-
1849, when cholera returned to Britain, Chadwick was the head of the General Board of 
Health.  He would continue to hold that position until 1854 and would continue to lecture 
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until 1877.  Under Chadwick’s tutelage scores of doctors and sanitary experts working in 
both Britain and India came to view cholera through the theoretical framework he had 
elaborated.22 
 Britain’s General Board of Health also began to apply Chadwick’s attitudes 
toward cholera on an international scale.  Since Chadwick and the General Board of 
Health were convinced that outbreaks of cholera arose from local conditions found 
among certain classes or neighborhoods or through certain environmental factors, such as 
the quality of the air or water, the official British position was that cholera was not a 
contagious disease.  This set of ideas came to be known as the “localist” position.  By 
contrast, other European nations, particularly Mediterranean states, such as France and 
Italy, maintained that cholera was definitely a contagious disease.  They reasoned that it 
was communicable from person to person.  Thus, it was possible to transport the disease 
from its endemic homeland in India to Europe.  According to this school of thought, 
otherwise known as “contagionist theory,” stringent quarantines and sanitary cordons 
were necessary to stem the transmission of the disease.23 
 As early as 1848, Britain’s General Board of Health had a clearly defined policy 
in opposition to “contagionist theory” and quarantine regulations.  Foreign Office 
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documents, particularly the “Letter from the General Board of Health respecting the 
spread of Cholera in this Country, and the inutility of Quarantine Regulations for 
preventing its introduction” (1848), indicate that British authorities were hostile to both 
the “notion of contagion” and preventative quarantines and cordons even before the 
international cholera crises of the 1860s to the 1890s.  Citing the Metropolitan Sanitary 
Commission, the Royal College of Physicians of London, and the “special knowledge” of 
“medical men” observing the disease in India, the General Board of Health argued that 
“Asiatic cholera” has “rarely been communicated by personal intercourse, and that all 
attempts to stay its progress by cordons or quarantine have failed.”  Therefore, 
“preventative measures, founded on the theory of contagion, namely internal quarantine 
regulations, sanitary cordons, and the isolation of the sick, on which formerly the 
strongest reliance was placed, have been abandoned in all countries where cholera has 
appeared, from the general experience of their inefficiency.”  Moreover, it was also 
argued that quarantines and sanitary cordons were a “useless waste of public money,” 
which would “prejudice affairs and trade.”24   
At face value, the Board of Health’s opposition to “contagionist theory” and 
quarantines might appear as nothing more than an expression of scientific and 
professional opinion.  Like Chadwick’s earlier work as Poor Law chief, however, such 
opinions seem to have been linked closely with the interests and prejudices of the 
propertied classes.  Because the horrors of cholera were rhetorically linked with working 
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class people and their impoverished neighborhoods, Britain’s elites felt more threatened 
by the financial effects of quarantines than by cholera itself.  As Watts reminds us, “every 
Briton knew since, since the era of the Continental Blockade imposed by Napoleon, 
Britain’s prosperity had depended on its mercantile fleet and world-wide freedom of 
trade.”25  Owing to these intermingling historical and ideological perspectives on the 
relationship between poverty, cholera, and free trade, as British policies toward cholera 
developed over the course of the nineteenth century, especially after the opening of the 
Suez Canal, Britain was decidedly less concerned with controlling cholera’s transmission 
from India to Europe than with the protection of her Indian trade route against quarantine 
restrictions and sanitary cordons.  It was even feared that France and other maritime 
powers might be able employ lengthy quarantine delays to erode the profits of British 
vessels traveling from Bombay via the Suez Canal.26  This paranoia was most bluntly 
expressed in an 1883 edition of the British medical journal, Lancet, released just after the 
opening of the Kamaran Island quarantine station at the southern end of the Red Sea: 
“those who love quarantine, hate England.”27  Ultimately, these attitudes would set the 
British Empire on collision-course with both international political opinion and scientific 
consensus. 
 
Science versus the Science of Denial 
 Though the precise cause of cholera remained hotly contested among legitimate 
scientists until at least the mid-1880s, as Sheldon Watts points out, a working hypothesis 
concerning the transmission of cholera had already been worked out and publicly stated 
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as early as 1849 by John Snow.  Snow, an anesthetist by training, who had worked with 
cholera victims in the coal mines near Newcastle-upon-Tyne during Britain’s first cholera 
epidemic in 1831-1832, became famous for exposing the link between cholera and 
contaminated water from the infamous Broad Street Pump in London in 1854.28  Snow’s 
groundbreaking research identified the causal agent of cholera, a “poison,” reputed to 
reproduce itself within the body of the victim.  He also identified its principal modes of 
transmission, through the victim’s “dejecta” (vomit and feces) and through the movement 
of people (human intercourse).  Snow even explained how the provision of clean, 
uncontaminated drinking water could block the spread of the disease.29 
Though Snow’s conclusions demonstrated the role of water in the local 
epidemiology of the disease, his findings would also play an important role in the 
consensus reached by mainstream European scientists participating in the 1866 sanitary 
conference, concerning how best to halt cholera’s advance at the global level.  Moreover, 
Snow’s research would eventually be reconfirmed by the findings of the German 
bacteriologist, Robert Koch.  Through his investigations of cholera in both Egypt and 
India, Koch was able to discover the causal agent of cholera, the comma bacillus, in a 
Calcutta water tank in 1884.  With Koch’s discovery of the role played by the human 
intestinal tract in the life-cycle of the bacterium, Vibrio Cholerae, and his confirmation of 
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cholera’s waterborne transmission through infected human waste products, the scientific 
debate surrounding how best to contain cholera should have come to a screeching halt.30      
 However, the Government of India’s Sanitary Commissioner, Dr. J.M. 
Cunningham, serving from 1868 to 1884, had built his career around the denial of 
contagion theory and the obstruction of international quarantine efforts.31  Cunningham, a 
disciple of Edwin Chadwick’s localist school of thought, insisted that cholera was caused 
solely by local sanitary imperfections.  Cunningham remained convinced that some 
“mysterious influence” in the state of the atmosphere, a particular “season” or the 
“fermentative products of the soil” were responsible for cholera outbreaks.  He held that 
such imperfections in India’s environment were caused by “unwholesome surroundings” 
or the “filthy habits” of Indians, not by any “specific communicable germ.”32  Thus, he 
repeatedly argued that quarantine measures based on “contagionist theory” were “no 
more logical or effectual than it would be to post a line of sentries to stop the 
monsoon.”33  Rather, Cunningham espoused that the only truly appropriate response to 
cholera was a strict Chadwickian regimen of “pure air, pure water, pure soil, good and 
sufficient food, proper clothing, and suitable healthy employment for both mind and 
body.”34  
 During his tenure as Sanitary Commissioner, Cunningham ruled the Anglo-Indian 
medical establishment with an iron fist.  In fact, one of his first acts in office was to write 
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a damning commentary on the annual report of 1869, which had been prepared by his 
subordinate Surgeon-Major A.C.C. DeRenzy, the Sanitary Commissioner for the Punjab.  
While they had cooperated successfully during their campaign to halt the advance of the 
Hardwar cholera epidemic of 1867, just two years later Cunningham and DeRenzy had 
become bitter enemies.  DeRenzy stubbornly insisted on following the cutting-edge 
recommendations of John Snow.  However, in political terms, this was career suicide.  
Under Cunningham’s anti-contagionist regime, DeRenzy’s appeal to scientific consensus, 
would ultimately lead to his removal from office in 1876.35 
 Similarly, Cunningham made certain that subsequent investigations undertaken in 
India conformed to his official position.  In 1878, T.R. Lewis of the Army Medical 
Department and D.D. Cunningham of the Indian Medical Service were appointed by the 
Indian Medical Service to examine the etiology of cholera using the latest methods of 
laboratory science and microscopy.  Under the watchful eye of J.M. Cunningham, Lewis 
and D.D. Cunningham were indoctrinated into the localist school of thought.  They 
concluded that “human agency alone could not explain the peculiar spread and 
periodicity of the disease and held the opinion that ‘cholera has as good a chance as 
malarial diseases to a telluric [soil-based] origin.”36        
 Although Cunningham’s localist approach to the etiology of cholera had been 
popular among medical authorities in India since the early nineteenth century, this 
doctrine was reinforced from the 1860s onward by the work of the German miasma- 
specialist Max von Pettenkofer.37  Pettenkofer, Koch’s long-time nemesis, put forth a 
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soil-based theory, which stated that the presence of a specific germ and a susceptible 
victim could not alone produce cholera symptoms.  Rather, cholera required the presence 
of specific soil conditions.  Only then would the germ acquire its pathogenic qualities and 
produce an epidemic.  As an anti-contagionist, Pettenkofer was naturally opposed to the 
European consensus, which called for quarantines and cordons sanitaires in response to 
cholera outbreaks.  As a result, his theories, despite their unpopularity among the 
scientific community in continental Europe, proved a valuable tool in British India’s 
battle against quarantine regulations.38  Pettenkofer’s denial of contagion theory 
culminated in his shocking experimentum crucis of 1892, in which, “having first 
neutralized his stomach, he swallowed a culture of cholera vibrios without apparent 
effect.”39    
 Following Koch’s discovery of the cholera bacillus in 1884, his research was 
predictably attacked by his archrival Pettenkofer.  While Koch was able to thoroughly 
refute Pettenkofer’s localist position at the Second Cholera Conference, held in Berlin in 
May 1885, Britain’s deeply institutionalized opposition to contagion theory would 
survive for nearly another decade.40  In his last days as the Government of India’s 
Sanitary Commissioner, Cunningham expressed both “patriotic pique as well as 
professional chagrin that an outsider like Koch should presume to unravel the mystery 
which had baffled India’s own medical service for more than sixty years.”41  Similarly, as 
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Sir Joseph Frayer, Surgeon-General at the India Office Council in London, put it: “I am 
also very anxious to avert the evil consequences that may accrue from the effects of this 
so-called discovery on our sea traffic and international communication.”42  Moreover, 
Fayrer was determined that Britain would not take Koch’s discovery lying down, 
commenting that: “Happily we have pathologists and microscopists who are as competent 
as any in Germany or elsewhere to carry out such an investigation, and, in view of the 
important issues concerned, I would most strongly urge the Secretary of State in Council 
to assent to such an inquiry.”43   As a result of Frayer’s request, Drs. Edward Emanuel 
Klein and Heneage Gibbes were dispatched to conduct their own “independent 
investigation.”  To the great relief of the Government of India and the India Office, in 
1885 Klein and Heneage reported that Koch’s bacillus was actually innocuous and could 
not be the sole cause of cholera.44         
 Armed with the Klein-Gibbes report, “An Enquiry into the Etiology of Asiatic 
Cholera,” Frayer, with the support of the Italian delegate, managed to almost single-
handedly derail the 1885 International Sanitary Conference in Rome.  Frayer and his 
Italian colleague managed to prevent Koch from defending this research at the 
conference.  In fact, it was even agreed that matters surrounding Koch’s theory should 
not be discussed at all.  By casting doubts on Koch’s hypothesis, Frayer pushed for a 
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relaxation of quarantine restrictions at both Kamaran Island and Suez, hoping for the 
return to a less stringent system of medical inspections.45 
 As a result of Britain’s continuing denial of the overwhelming scientific evidence, 
“the rapport between Britain and the continental states [especially France and Germany] 
became more and more strained.”  However, the other European powers were 
unsuccessful in counterbalancing British domination through “the weak apparatus of 
internationalism.”  As a result, the Rome conference was adjourned without being 
reconvened.  No binding international agreement was reached.  Thus, “more decisive 
than the question of who had the power to voice their interests at these conferences was 
therefore that of who had the power simply to refuse to co-operate.”46  In many ways, 
British obstructionism at the Rome conference is a useful metaphor for understanding the 
entire series of sanitary conferences from 1851 onward.   
 
International Sanitary Conferences and the Quarantine Controversy 
International efforts to stem the spread of cholera from India began in earnest in 
1838 when Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) established the Constantinople Superior 
Board of Health (Le Conseil Supérior de Santé de Constantinople).  Though originally 
composed only of members appointed by the Porte, it quickly became clear that 
quarantine measures proposed by the Board in 1839 could not be enforced against 
foreigners.  Thus, regulations and taxes were referred for approval by foreign consulates, 
who were ultimately invited to appoint their own delegates to the board in 1840.  Despite 
this gesture, as David Long explains, “the Board was constantly hamstrung by political 
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intrigue by its European members as well as by Ottoman lethargy and obstructionism to 
what it felt was infringement by the European powers on its sovereignty.”47  In large part, 
this body would become the primary instrument through which subsequent international 
action (or more often than not inaction) against cholera would be taken.  At its height, the 
Board maintained a large sanitary service at all the principal ports of the Black Sea, 
Eastern Mediterranean, and Red Sea, staffed by a corps of Levantine medical officers and 
amply funded by high quarantine dues.  The Board even maintained services along the 
Ottoman Empire’s Persian frontier in order to monitor the Shia pilgrimage traffic 
destined for Najaf and Karbala.48  Similarly, the Egyptian Quarantine Board 
(L’Intendance Générale Sanitaire d’Égypte) was established in 1831.  As in the case of 
the Constantinople Board, it was also dominated by foreign consuls.  In 1881, a Khedival 
decree separated the Egyptian Quarantine Board into an internal or native-run branch, 
based in Cairo, and an external or international branch, Le Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et 
Quaranteaire d’Alexandrie, based in Alexandria.  Often referred to as the International 
Quarantine Board, this body also played a major role in the sanitary control of the Suez 
Canal, the Red Sea, and the hajj.  However, like its Ottoman counterpart in 
Constantinople, Egyptian efforts to halt the advance of cholera would also have to 
contend with British hostility toward quarantine regulations.49            
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The first evidence of an impending diplomatic crisis over cholera prevention 
methods came in 1852, when the first international sanitary conference was convened in 
Paris in an attempt to settle the disputed question of quarantine.  This conference marked 
the battle lines of international opinion on cholera prevention, which, would last until at 
least 1896.  Mediterranean doctors and governments, inheriting centuries-old methods 
that been developed to combat the Black Death, continued to believe in contagion and the 
necessity of quarantine, while Britain and other northern European states scoffed at such 
“antiquated ideas,” preferring explanations involving “localist” theories, which viewed 
miasmas and sewage as the primary causes of cholera.  As a result of these irreconcilable 
differences, cholera prevention was no longer being imagined as merely a matter of 
public health in Britain, India and Europe.  Rather, it had become a matter of foreign 
policy and free trade.50 
Although another international conference was convened in Paris in 1859, like its 
predecessor in 1852, consensus still proved unattainable.  In 1865, however, a new sense 
of urgency developed when Europe experienced its fourth and most severe cholera 
outbreak.  As has already been noted, a third sanitary conference gathered at 
Constantinople in 1866 to address the problem.  During the seventh months that the 
conference met, a new era of sanitary interventionism emerged.  The conferees took a 
strongly “contagionist” stance, concluding “that cholera is communicable from the 
diseased to the healthy.”  Moreover, they “affirmed Asiatic cholera to be endemic in 
India, and in no other country.”51  As for the mode of transmission, the delegates pointed 
to the squalid conditions of Hindu pilgrimage centers within India, as well as of the “hajj 
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to Mecca, seen as the second stage by which cholera was relayed from India to 
Europe.”52  From these conclusions, the delegates prescribed rigorous measures of 
quarantine, which eventually entailed the establishment of Red Sea and Caspian Sea 
quarantine stations (lazarettos) in order to inspect the health of those pilgrims infected 
with disease arriving in the Hijaz and, if necessary, to restrict the movement of infected 
pilgrims and the vessels carrying them.  Finally, it was also recommended that the 
number of pilgrims traveling to Mecca be reduced and their “quality” improved through 
the administration of a “means test.”53 
 Again in 1874, another international sanitary conference was held in Vienna to 
discuss the “best means of checking the spread of Epidemic Diseases, such as Asiatic 
Cholera.”  The conference took as its highest priority the adoption of a “uniform system 
of preventative measures,” to be instituted in all of the participating nations and their 
colonial possessions.   However, little had changed since the previous sanitary conference 
in 1866.  Despite the protests of British delegates, cholera was still considered to be 
contagious by the majority of conference delegates and India was still blamed as its 
primary source.  And though it was recommended that the controversial quarantine 
measures be adopted by all the participating nations, in the end it was recognized that 
individual states could opt for a less robust system of medical inspection instead of the 
more rigorous quarantines.  Thus, the implementation of sanitary measures, whether 
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through a system of quarantines or the medical inspection of ships, would be “left to the 
discretion of individual states.”54 
 Under the proposed quarantine system, arrivals from an infected port were to be 
observed from one to seven days depending on the severity of the outbreak.  In the ports 
of the eastern Mediterranean or under exceptional circumstances the period of 
observation might be extended to ten days.  If cases or suspected cases occurred while at 
sea, the period of observation for uninfected persons was set at seven days from the time 
of their isolation.  The sick, however, were to be landed separately for medical care, 
while the vessel and infected items onboard were subject to a rigorous disinfection 
process.  Even arrivals from a port that was merely considered suspect, despite having no 
reported cases of infection or having been given free passage at another port of call, were 
subject to an observation period of five days.  The boldest regulation of all, however, was 
concerned with “vessels considered particularly dangerous,” which specifically targeted 
ships carrying pilgrims and emigrants.  Any vessel carrying passengers labeled as such 
would be subject to “special precautions,” which essentially meant that they could be 
held in quarantine for longer periods than other vessels.  In order to implement this 
system it was decided that a chain of quarantine stations governed by an international 
commission would be constructed throughout the Red Sea at Suez, al-Tūr (El Tor), al-
Wajh, Kamarān Island, and the Straits of Bāb al-Mandab.55  
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   By contrast, the system of medical inspection, largely unchanged since the 
Constantinople conference, called for greater intelligence sharing as opposed to the 
enforcement of quarantines.  Under this system, each port was to employ an officer who 
would be responsible for gathering information regarding the health of the port under his 
care.  These officers would communicate the relative status of their ports and statistics 
relating to mortality, and provide bills of health for departing vessels.  According to this 
more permissive proposal, even a vessel from an infected port would be allowed passage 
through the Red Sea, if it had not reported any infections during its voyage or if it had 
called at another uninfected port during its voyage.  If these conditions were not meant, 
only then would the vessel be delayed for medical inspection.  Vessels under suspicion 
would be boarded and inspected for signs of sickness or deaths having resulted from 
cholera.  If no cases were observed, the ship would be free to continue.  If evidence of 
cholera was found, however, the vessel, its crew and passengers would be subject to 
disinfection, but merchandise would be allowed to pass immediately.56    
 Having left sanitary measures largely to the discretion of individual states, it was 
proposed that the conclusions reached in Vienna should be formalized as an International 
Convention.  In the years following the Constantinople and Vienna conferences, 
however, both the representatives of Britain and British India repeatedly showed a 
preference for more flexible systems of medical inspection and intelligence sharing.57  
British India also sought to implement its own package of sanitary and pilgrimage-related 
reforms rather than assenting to any permanent agreements or surrendering any 
sovereignty to an international commission.  Therefore, it was no great surprise when in 
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1876 the Government of India formally “declined to be fettered in their in their 
legislation by any such Convention.”58 
 Despite the Government of India’s rejection of the proposed International 
Convention in 1876, British officials were ultimately unable to avoid the implementation 
of the quarantine facilities first envisaged in 1866.  Although Ottoman authorities had 
long delayed building quarantine stations because of the considerable expenses involved, 
a new station was opened at Kamarān Island, a barren strip of land just off the coast of 
Yemen at the southern end of the Red Sea, just in time for the 1882 pilgrimage season.59  
Prior to its opening, Indian pilgrims had undergone occasional quarantines in makeshift 
camps in Jidda.  Without British support for quarantine measures, the expenses for the 
establishment of the Kamarān Island station fell upon the Ottoman government.  As a 
result, provisions at the camp were less than comfortable for the pilgrims forced to 
embark upon its shores.  Moreover, an exorbitant head tax was levied to recover the 
funds need to establish the station.60        
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Figure 5.  An Early Sketch Map of the Kamaran Island Quarantine Station, 1892.61 
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 Almost immediately after the first Indian pilgrims set foot on the island, the 
British consulate in Jidda received a deluge of complaints. Pilgrims complained that the 
quarantine fees were excessive, foodstuffs and cooking fuel were prohibitively expensive, 
and that water was both scarce and brackish.  The lack of water was further compounded 
by the island’s insufficient accommodations.  Seventy pilgrims were herded into each 
Tihāma-style thatched hut, provided by the Ottoman provincial authorities in Hudayda.  
The station’s supervising physician calculated that this would have provided 
approximately 11.3 square feet per pilgrim.  Given the sizzling temperatures for which 
Kamarān is infamous, this amount of space would have proven positively suffocating for 
healthy pilgrims, let alone sickly or elderly ones.62  As one physician who accompanied 
pilgrims to Kamarān noted, “the shelter which is meant for their short imprisonment is 
totally unfit for such a place as Camaran, where sometimes the heat (sultry) is even 
greater than Muscat, and the poor pilgrims have to keep themselves half scorched under 
their cow-sheds until relieved.”63  Worse still, there were also troubling accusations of 
intimidation and beatings at the hands of Ottoman guards and women being forcibly un-
veiled for medical inspections.              
 As Harrison points out, in light of the conditions on Kamarān Island, “the Turkish 
Sultan had provided the anti-quarantine lobby in India with just the evidence it needed to 
make a powerful case against such restrictions.  Seizing its chance, the Indian 
government launched an immediate inquiry into conditions at Kamarān.”64  The report  
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Figure 6.  Tihāma-style Hut, Kamarān Island,  
photo by Michael Christopher Low, 2006. 
 
stated that “pilgrims were subjected to oppression and extortion amounting to positive 
cruelty.”  Moreover, the whole arrangement seemed to be designed solely for the 
pecuniary benefit of the Turkish authorities.”65  Owing to the difficult living conditions 
on Kamarān Island, the Indian government even began to suggest that the quarantine 
station itself might become an epicenter for cholera transmission.  As the editor of the 
Bombay Gazette put it in 1883: “more sickness occurs on the island of Kamarān than 
during the voyage.  On board ship pilgrims are tolerably well cared for.  At Kamarān they 
[the pilgrims] are turned onto a desert island without an adequate supply of water or 
shelter from the sun.”66  Despite years of complaints, even as late as 1891, petitions from 
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aggrieved pilgrims, such as those of the ill-fated S.S. Sculptor, published in The Times of 
India, reflected similar experiences: 
    The [S.S.] Sculptor was not sent back, but the pilgrims petitioned the captain to take    
    them back to Bombay as they were seriously alarmed by their treatment in Camaran.  It  
    should be remembered that up to the time the pilgrims landed on that quarantine  
    station, there was not a single case of cholera on board, and their sufferings  
    commenced when they had set foot on the island and drunk of the brackish and  
    unwholesome water which the authorities there had kept in store for them.  The so- 
    called sanitary arrangements for the accommodation of pilgrims were highly  
    incomplete and such as would scarcely reflect credit on any civilized or humane   
    Government.67             
  
 Though, as has already been discussed, the 1885 conference in Rome was doomed 
from the outset by British intransigence regarding the etiology of cholera, important 
discussions regarding the quarantine stations at Kamarān Island, Suez, and al-Tūr did 
take place.  However, owing to Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882, relations between 
the British and Ottoman empires had seriously deteriorated.  Thus, when Britain renewed 
its demand for the withdrawal of quarantine restrictions at Kamarān and Suez, the Sultan 
took exception to these demands, announcing that vessels traveling from India to 
Ottoman territories would thereafter be subject to ten as opposed to five days in 
quarantine.  Similarly, British and Indian proposals that ships agreeing not to dock before 
reaching England should be exempted from the Suez quarantine were soundly defeated.  
As a result of Britain’s new-found influence in Egypt, many nations, particularly France, 
were also extremely concerned that Britain would manipulate the Alexandrian Quarantine 
Board in order to relax quarantine measures, which were rightfully regarded as Europe’s 
last line of defense against the onslaught of cholera.68   
                                                 
    
67
 F.O. 195/1730, in “Correspondence printed in the Times of India,” 26 July 1891,” in Records of the 
Hajj, vol. 9, 216.  The preamble to the petition was written by A.H.A.Z.A. Shirazi, Agent, Bombay and 
Persia S.N.Co., Ltd.  However, the petition itself was author by Oomer Jamal, et al.   
   
68
 Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 127, 131.    
  
65 
The Thomas Cook Hajj: 
Reforming the “Sanitary Pariah of the East” 
 
 With the failure of the Rome conference, it might seem that the Indian 
government was completely incapable of reconsidering its own sanitary policies.  Despite 
the continuance of its unilateralist approach to international sanitary reforms and 
quarantine restrictions, however, by the mid-1880s external pressures from Europe and 
the Ottoman Empire as well as the growing acceptance of Koch’s discovery of the 
cholera bacillus began to mount.  These external factors coupled with internal pressures, 
particularly complaints about the plight of indigent pilgrims from the Indian Muslim 
community and the reporting of pilgrimage-related scandals in the Anglo-Indian press, 
forced Britain to intensify its own efforts to reform the sanitary conditions of the ocean-
going pilgrimage trade.           
 British India’s first steps toward reforming the pilgrim trade had already been 
made in 1858.  Act XXI of 1858, a precursor to what eventually came to be known as the 
Native Passenger Ships Act of 1876, was primarily designed to restrict the number of 
passengers per vessel in the hopes that by alleviating instances of over-crowding the risk 
of cholera outbreaks would also be mitigated.69  Yet, as British officials in Jidda and 
Egypt acknowledged, these regulations were easily evaded.  Ship masters embarking with 
far too many passengers than British regulations allowed would simply land at a 
neighboring port under Turkish or Egyptian administration.  As the “men on the spot” 
complained, they did not have the resources to inspect every ship arriving and departing 
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from Jidda much less those which actively sought to evade the law.  Moreover, these 
officials also wondered whether or not they had any jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire 
or over vessels which were no longer on British Indian soil.70  Despite the fact that no 
piece of British Indian legislation could be truly effective without Ottoman and Egyptian 
cooperation in the Red Sea, British officials repeatedly scoffed at such cooperation, 
alternatively citing the incompetence and corruption of both administrations.71 
 In the absence of any effective international regulations, however, the 1880s 
would emerge as a decade of pilgrimage-related scandals.  Undoubtedly the best known 
incident occurred in August 1880.  The steamship Jeddah, sailing under a British flag, 
embarked from Penang with nearly a thousand Malay and Indonesian pilgrims on board.  
After enduring some difficult storms, the ship began taking on water, and sprung a heavy 
leak just off Cape Guardafui, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden.  With the water rising 
rapidly, the captain and the ship’s European officers panicked and abandoned the 
passengers to their fate, an apparently certain death.  Escaping with one of the ship’s few 
emergency crafts, the Europeans were picked up by another vessel and were taken to 
Aden.  Astonishingly, however, given that the Jeddah and its passengers had been left for 
dead, the Jeddah herself arrived in Aden some twenty-four hours later, having been 
towed by a French vessel.  In many ways, this was a great moral role reversal for the 
“natives” and their supposedly superior colonial overlords.  The Malay pilgrims had 
courageously worked the pumps and kept their vessel afloat until help arrived, while the 
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white men onboard had shown themselves to be cowards, violated their own codes of 
seafaring behavior, and abandoned their charges to die.72 
 The official inquiries that followed sparked an international scandal, which 
effectively shamed British authorities from Aden to Singapore.  In 1898, this great 
“scandal of the Eastern seas,” would eventually provide the basis for Joseph Conrad’s 
famous novel, Lord Jim.73  Conrad’s fictional pilgrimage vessel, the Patna, was 
essentially a literary recreation of the conditions onboard the Jeddah.  Like most pilgrim 
ships of the time, the Patna was small, inhumanely overcrowded, and completely lacking 
emergency equipment, proper sanitation facilities, and access to medical attention.  Even 
the space demanded by law was a mere nine superficial feet per adult.  Perhaps no other 
description of the period captures the ominous sense of foreboding that must have 
accompanied pilgrims as they set out for Mecca:  
    They streamed aboard over three gangways, they streamed in urged by faith and the   
    hope of paradise, they streamed in with a continuous tramp and shuffle of bare feet,   
    without a murmur, or a look back; and when clear of confining rails spread on all sides  
    over the deck, flowed fore and aft, overflowed down the yawning hatchways, filled the  
    inner recesses of the ship—like water filling a cistern, like water flowing into crevices  
    and crannies, like water rising silently even with the rim.74 
 
While the Jeddah incident ultimately did not move British officials to take action, 
some five years later the issue of overcrowding returned to the public eye with a 
vengeance.  On 31 October 1885, The Times of India ran a scandalous story, “The 
Pilgrimage Trade.”  This exposé shed light on the most gruesome details of the trials to 
which India’s “pauper pilgrims” were subject during their voyages to Mecca and 
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ultimately pressed the government to take drastic new steps to reform the pilgrimage 
business.75  Having virtually ruled out cooperation with the Ottoman Empire, however, 
Britain turned to an unlikely savior.  In 1885, Thomas Cook’s son John Mason Cook was 
approached in Constantinople by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff with a request from the 
Governor General of India, Lord Dufferin, to assist the colonial administration in 
rationalizing, reforming, and monitoring the entire pilgrimage transportation network 
between India and Mecca.  Thus, from 1886 to 1893, the famous travel agency Thomas 
Cook and Son was appointed as the official travel agent of the hajj.  As Harrison 
explains, the government “hoped that Cook’s high reputation would reassure Muslim 
leaders and the International Boards that Bombay was no longer the ‘Sanitary Pariah of 
the East’.”76   
On 4 January 1886, a three-year agreement was struck.  The terms of that 
agreement were as follows: Cook’s was to be the sole travel agent of the hajj.  As agents 
of the government, Cook’s representatives were to receive assistance from government 
officials throughout India.  One of the firm’s tickets was to be issued to each pilgrim by a 
government officer along with a passport.  The office of the Protector of the Pilgrims, a 
centralized administrative office opened in Bombay in 1882, was to be placed under 
Cook’s control.  Thomas Cook and Son were to arrange with the railway administrations 
and steamship proprietors for the conveyance of the pilgrims, quoting fares from all chief 
                                                 
    
75F.O. 78/4094 in “British efforts to improve travel conditions for pilgrims; appointment of travel agent; 
problem of indigent pilgrims,” October 1884-February 1887, Records of the Hajj, vol. 3, 593-626. See also 
W. Fraser Rae, The Business of Travel: A Fifty Year’s Record of Progress (London: Thomas Cook and 
Son, 1891), 208-219; Edmund Swinglehurst, The Romantic Journey: The Story of Thomas Cook and 
Victorian Travel (London: Pica Editions, 1974), 133-136; F. Robert Hunter, “The Thomas Cook Archive 
for the Study of Tourism in North Africa and the Middle East,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 
36, no. 2 (Winter 2003), 157-164; Donald M. Reid, Whose Pharoahs: Archaeology, Museums, and 
Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
90. 
    
76
 Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 132.    
  
69 
stations from India to Jidda and back.  The government agreed to indemnify Thomas 
Cook against any financial losses that it might incur in the course of its work.77       
Recognizing the enormity of the task before him, John Mason Cook is said to 
have commented: “I know this business is surrounded with more difficulties and 
prejudices than anything I have hitherto undertaken.”78  In hindsight, it would appear that 
Mason Cook’s words were prophetic.  The situation facing Cook’s was grim.  Muslim 
pilgrims, many of them so poor that they could not even afford to pay for transportation 
to Bombay, India’s largest point of embarkation for the hajj, often walked from hundreds 
and even thousands of miles away.  Indeed, many of them died before their sea-journey 
had even begun, while those who did survive the overland trip to Bombay were often in 
poor condition.  Even these hardships were only the beginning.  Unfortunately, the piety 
of the pilgrim was matched if not exceeded by the thievery and exploitation of Bombay’s 
pilgrimage brokers, whom John Mason Cook, once referred to as Bombay’s version of 
the “Liverpool Crimp.”  Often pilgrims were kept waiting for weeks, while their funds 
were depleted by inflated prices for accommodations, food, and scams of every 
description.  For those who were able to successfully secure a steamship ticket from 
Bombay to Jidda, a new struggle began once they boarded.  The competition for space 
was intense.  The weak were elbowed aside and trampled upon and in some cases crushed 
to death, while those who did manage to stake claim to a space “were crowded together 
below decks in conditions hardly better than those on slave ships.”  As one can imagine, 
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the combination of rough seas and cramped quarters created appallingly unsanitary and 
often deadly conditions.79  
Despite the increased sanitary restrictions imposed by subsequent legislative 
actions, namely the Pilgrim Brokers Act of 1886 and the updated Native Passenger Ships 
Act of 1887, even the vaunted Cook’s could not tame the hajj.80  In 1889 a retired 
Muslim Inspector of Hospitals, Muhammad Yakub Ali Khan, accused Cook’s of having 
sold more tickets for the return journey from Jidda than there had actually been 
accommodation available for onboard the steamship Tanjore, highlighting the 
overcrowding and sufferings endured by the pilgrims involved.  Again in 1891, Cook’s 
pilgrimage operations were implicated in a major outbreak of cholera aboard the S.S. 
Decan, owing to the overcrowded conditions below its decks.81  
Ultimately, this novel experiment in colonial governance proved unsatisfactory 
for both Cook’s and the British officials charged with overseeing the reform of 
pilgrimage transport.  In 1889, Cook’s announced losses, stating that the firm’s 
pilgrimage operations were unlikely to ever turn a profit.  Cook’s claimed that it had not 
received the support it had expected from India’s Muslim community, and would only 
agree to continue its operations if the government would agree to reimburse the firm for 
any future losses.82  The relationship was finally terminated in 1893.  Despite Cook’s 
obvious failures, on the occasion of the banquet commemorating Cook’s fiftieth 
anniversary, the company’s efforts were hailed not only as an absolute success and 
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solution to the pilgrimage question, but were lauded as selfless acts of humanitarianism, 
social justice, and most importantly a great service to Britain’s prestige in “the East.”83   
 
Pauper Pilgrims, the Suez Canal, and the Civilizational Boundaries of Travel 
A recurring theme that runs across the Foreign Office correspondence with 
Cook’s regarding the hajj, The Times of India’s reporting on the subject, Turkish and 
Egyptian complaints to the British government, the observations of elite Indian Muslims, 
and the reports of European observers traveling in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea 
points to the fact that “pauper pilgrims” were widely considered the root cause of the 
sanitary crisis that surrounded the pilgrimage for most of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.  This collective sentiment is well summarized by the almost hopeless description 
offered by W.H. Wilson, the Acting Commissioner of Police for Bombay (1886): 
    The Acting Commissioner has the honour to report that a large number of the Indian   
    Pilgrims are no doubt very poor, and go to the Hedjaz not so much with the intention  
    of maintaining themselves by begging…but on account of the sanctity of the place and  
    with a feeling that if they die there they will go straight to Paradise.  Some stay on  
    waiting til death overtakes them, and others having no funds to return to India are  
    forced to beg; but beyond warning them; it seems impossible to prevent them from  
    going there.  Any interference in this matter on the part of the British Government  
    would be certainly taken as an interference in their religion.84 
 
In contrast to the Commissioner’s comments, other observers were much less charitable.  
In a description of her journey through the Suez Canal, Mary French Sheldon described a 
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caravan of pilgrims as “unclean, utterly miserable, degraded human beings, knowing only 
a migratory life, in common with their camels and their vermin.”85            
 While one might suspect that Indian Muslim observers would have taken 
exception to such comments, this was not always true.  As in the case of the Egyptian and 
Ottoman complaints to British authorities, many Muslim notables’ opinions reflected a 
strong bias against their lower class Muslim brothers and sisters.  In fact, in response to 
government inquiries regarding what should be done to reform the pilgrimage, the 
Central National Muhammadan Association responded by noting: 
    …there appears to be considerable truth in the complaint of the Turkish Government.   
    A large majority of the destitute Indian Muhaammadans who go to Mecca are more  
    actuated by the worldly motive of making a livelihood from the charity of the richer  
    pilgrims; and in many cases they prove themselves a nuisance to their well-to-do   
    fellow compatriots.  Under the Muhammadan law no person is entitled to make the huj  
    unless he has the means of paying for the journey to and fro, and maintaining himself  
    at the same time.86 
 
Moreover, the advice of the Muhammadan Association was that a means test or security 
deposit be instituted to separate out those pilgrims who could not actually afford to 
undertake the hajj.   
 British authorities, however, remained reluctant to take such a step.  As Harrison 
explains, “the majority of pilgrims, most of whom struggled to meet the cost of the 
pilgrimage, appear to have resented increased fares more than overcrowding or the lack 
of sanitary facilities.”  Moreover, “Sanitation on board pilgrim vessels was primarily the 
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concern of well-to-do Muslims, willing to meet the cost of increased fares and to pay the 
sanitary levies introduced in some Indian ports.”87  Similarly, British authorities 
repeatedly resisted measures to increase the amount of square footage allotted for each 
pilgrim.  To increase space requirements would have reduced the number of pilgrims that 
could be carried by each ship, raising fares, and damaging the competitiveness of British 
steamship operators.  As one member of Bombay’s European community, writing under 
the pen name “Oliver Twist,” put it in a letter addressed to the Bombay Gazette:                      
    the effect of increasing the space [for each pilgrim on board ships] would be simply   
    that the Hadj would become more expensive a thing than it already is, and  
    philanthropically disposed as Government may be, it has no more right to legislate in    
    that direction that is has to make it law that no-one shall go home except in a first-class    
    P. & O. Steamer.88 
 
While the administrative reforms put in place by Thomas Cook and Son may have 
alleviated these tensions to a certain extent, the ultimate solution to this lingering problem 
came only when a degree of international consensus regarding the hajj was finally 
reached at the sanitary conferences of 1892 and 1894 in Venice and Paris.  In 1892, 
delegates at the Venice conference proposed different sanitary regulations for pilgrims as 
opposed to other travelers and commercial traffic.  In 1894, the Paris conference 
prescribed strict disinfection and control measures for pilgrims while generally 
advocating that quarantining all travelers was unnecessary.  While this compromise 
assuaged British concerns, the decision to differentiate between pilgrims and other 
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travelers aided in the construction of an imaginary boundary between different forms of 
mobility.89 
  As Valeska Huber explains, “while some types of mobility—connected with 
European expansion and trade became a marker of modernity, other types came to be 
seen as a symbol of the Orient and its lack of civilization.”  Thus, as opposed to the 
European tourist, trader, or soldier, pilgrims, immigrants, the poor, and non-Europeans 
were generally considered dangerous and their movements necessitated surveillance and 
regulation.  In other words, “this categorization of border-crossers” styled “some cross-
border enterprises as choler-free linked with trade but also with the movement of troops.”  
At the same time, however, “the singling out of the pilgrims as the main vector of cholera 
justified the lowering of restraints on other groups of travelers.”  As a result, the Suez 
Canal became a kind of border, “permeable to European colonial and commercial 
enterprises, but impermeable to others.”90     
In many ways such distinctions reinforced and made concrete the perception that, 
following the opening of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea had become a vulnerable border 
zone between Europe and Asia.  Just as it was common practice for travelers of the 
period to fashion their passage through the Red Sea and the Canal as a turning point in 
their journey, marking their transition to and from “civilization,” travelers themselves 
were labeled in much the same way. 91 At least in the minds of European travelers, the 
Suez Canal was both the “gate of the East…with all its mysteries, its glamour, it history, 
                                                 
    
89
 Huber, “Contact Zone,” 4-6; Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Diseae?,” 468-476.  For Huber’s 
conception of “Boundaries between Mobilities,” see John Urry, Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for 
the Twenty-First Century (London and New York, 2000). 
    
90
 Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease?,” 474.  
    
91
 Huber, “Contact Zone,” 2. 
  
75 
its wonders,” but also a vulnerable connection to its “dangers and depravities.”92  As a 
result of this perception, “the Suez Canal was in many ways Mecca’s counterpart at the 
conferences.”  While “the first represented the triumph of technology and Western 
modernity, the latter was connected with ‘Oriental’ backwardness and disease.”93 
The implications behind this civilizational demarcation were certainly not lost on 
the delegations from Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Persia.  For them, “the Suez Canal 
issue highlighted the unequal relationship between Western Europe and the Orient, 
ambiguously shifting between co-operation and exploitation.”  Ironically, “while treating 
the countries of the Middle East condescendingly,” Europe “still relied on their 
assistance.”  In effect, the Orient had become the semi-civilized, but still expendable, 
buffer zone between the Indian disease pool and the civilized nations of Western 
Europe.94   
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICING PAN-ISLAM
 
 Obedience to the Sultan is mandatory;  
 This is enjoined by the Koran and oral tradition. 
 Any Muslim who contradicts this 
 Is, surely, a wicked hypocrite! 
                               -Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ārif ibn al-Sayyid  
                     Ahmad Al-Munīr al-Husaynī’l-Dimashqī1 
  
 … as along as the union of Islam continues, England, France, Russia, and Holland  
 can be counted on my finger tips, because in the Muslim lands now under their  
 domination even one word of the Caliph would be enough for starting a jihad  
 against them which would be a catastrophe for the Christians. 
                                                                                              -Sultan Abdul Hamid II2  
 
The Rise of British Surveillance in the Red Sea and the Muslim Holy Land 
 British India extended well beyond the national boundaries that constitute present-
day India.  It included the territories of present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma and 
its western frontiers stretched into the Persian Gulf, Arabia, the Red Sea and the coasts of 
East Africa.  Far from being confined to a contiguous land mass, British India was 
actually an Indian Ocean Empire, which safeguarded British India’s regional interests 
through an archipelago of scattered dependencies, consulates, and agencies.  These 
agencies, writes Robert Blyth, “met India’s strategic needs, served commercial interests, 
dealt with the consequences of the Indian diaspora, facilitated pilgrimage to Arabia and 
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acted as listening posts across much of the Islamic world.”3  These outposts originally 
developed around the commercial needs of the East India Company and India’s native 
merchant diaspora.  During the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the Company 
was already active in the Red Sea, particularly in Jidda and Mocha.  It seems probable 
that Company residents, particularly Muslims, became involved in preexisting pilgrimage 
networks of shipping, lodging, and financial transactions.  As a result of this mixture of 
trade and pilgrimage, large communities of Indian Muslims could be found in Mecca, 
Jidda, Mocha, and Aden.4   
After the Mutiny and Parliament’s transfer of East India Company possessions to 
the Crown in 1858, new security needs led the imperial state to project its power 
throughout the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.  However, even before 1858, a more 
aggressively imperial mode of operations was already emerging.  Though the British 
were forbidden from physically entering the Holy Places, they were allowed in Jidda.  
From Jidda and their footholds in the other ports of the Red Sea, they began to build 
greater intelligence capabilities and press for more direct influence in the Red Sea.  The 
intensification of British interests in the region began in earnest with the voyage of the 
steamship Hugh Lindsay on 20 March 1830.  Aggressively backed by the Bombay 
Presidency, even when plans for the ship and its proposed Red Sea route had been 
discarded by the East India Company’s Court of Directors, the Hugh Lindsay quickly 
proved its worth, reducing the journey from Bombay to Suez to a mere twenty-one days.  
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Seeing the potential benefits of this new steam technology, the Bombay Presidency and 
the Government of India both looked to the Red Sea with renewed interest.5   
The opening of the Red Sea to regular steamship services, however, still depended 
on the military support of British India to ensure its success.  In order to provide coaling 
station for its ships the Bombay Presidency forcibly seized the Island of Socotra, off the 
Horn of Africa, in 1835.  Four years later in 1839, when the port of Aden was found to 
offer a better harbor and climate than that of Socotra, Aden’s ruler, like Socotra’s, was 
intimidated, bribed, and ultimately overpowered.6  Not surprisingly, this aggressive 
stance in the Gulf of Aden rapidly intensified the activities of British agents in the region.  
By the 1830s British agents were given greater political responsibilities and upgraded 
titles.  Another sign of change came in 1837 when the East India Company began to 
appoint “English” (i.e., non-Muslim and non-Indian) agents to Red Sea posts, such as 
Jidda, Mocha, Suez, and Qusayr.  By August 1838 these very same agents were 
recognized by the British Foreign Office as Vice-Consuls.  As Alexander Ogilvie, the 
first British Vice-Consul at Jidda, reported to his new post, his French counterpart, 
Fulgence Fresnel, described the scene: “Jeddah, that old concierge of the Holy City, 
received within its walls, stupefied, a European consul arrayed in the European fashion 
and the cannon of the Muslim fortress saluted with 21 guns the English flag as it was 
hoisted over the consular residence.”7  To underscore the significance of this shift in Red 
Sea’s balance of power, only sixty years earlier the Ottoman Sultan had considered “the 
sea of Suez” and the “noble pilgrimage to Meccah” to be wholly Muslim affairs.  In fact, 
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the Sultan had warned his Viceroy in Egypt that “to suffer Frankish [non-Muslim, 
European] ships to navigate therein, or to neglect opposing it, is betraying your 
Sovereign, your religion, and every Mahometan…”8 
Despite such resentment, no Muslim power, not even the Ottoman Sultan himself, 
was in a position to halt Britain’s expansion into the Red Sea during the first forty years 
of the nineteenth century.  The following two decades, however, revealed that Britain’s 
steam-powered imperialism had spawned a number of unintended consequences.  Chief 
among them were growing numbers of Indian pilgrims traveling to Mecca, including 
rising populations of indigent pilgrims and Indian Muslims living and working 
throughout the region, which arguably culminated in the development of a nascent Pan-
Islamic bond between Mecca and Muslim resistors to British imperialism in India.   
Around the mid-nineteenth century the annual flow of ocean-going pilgrims from 
the subcontinent is estimated to have hovered between 5,000 and 7,000 participants.9  By 
the 1880s, however, average numbers rose to around 10,000.10  Doubling again during 
the pilgrimage season of 1893, the number of Indian pilgrims was reported to have 
exceeded 20,000.11  While Indians normally accounted for the largest proportion of 
pilgrims arriving by sea each year, the growth of the steamship-era hajj was not confined 
to this one group.  The total number of pilgrims rose from an estimated 112,000 
participants in 1831 to some 300,000 in 1910.12 
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By the 1850s British observers began to take note of the potential dangers and 
embarrassments presented by the rising tide of Indian pilgrims in the Hijaz.  Not 
surprisingly, their principal concern was with the high proportion of destitute pilgrims.  
As early as 1814 the explorer John Lewis Burkchardt had commented on the wretched 
state of Indian pilgrims, but it appears that little urgency was attached to these 
observations before the Mutiny and the international cholera crisis of 1865-1866.13  Prior 
to these events, British officialdom had not yet considered the potential link between the 
hajj and its capacity to spread disease and political subversion.  Consequently, no 
passports or travel documents were required of pilgrims from British territories, despite 
Turkish proposals from as early as the late 1840s.14  Likewise, no real effort was made to 
document the numbers of pilgrims traveling.  Nor was there much that British officials 
thought they could do to protect the pilgrims themselves.  As the Vice-Consul in Jidda 
commented in 1853, “I am directed to afford relief to all destitute British subjects and to 
enable them to return to their own country.”  However, he lamented that little could be 
done to curb the proliferation of indigent pilgrims because the Government felt strongly 
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that it had “no right to prevent any person who desires to do so, from proceeding on 
pilgrimage.”15 
In sharp contrast to this laissez-faire attitude, Sir Richard F. Burton’s experiences 
during his famous pilgrimage-in-disguise in 1853 convinced him that the problem of 
indigent pilgrims would eventually have much wider political implications.  In his 
famous pilgrimage narrative, Burton related the tale of a Punjabi, who, “finding life 
unendurable at home,” sold his possessions, gathered his family, and set out for Mecca.  
As with many poor pilgrims of the period, it was very likely that this family would either 
fall victim to physical privations or settle in the Hijaz, never to return to India again.  
Using this example, Burton described a dangerous pattern of Muslim emigration and 
radicalization in the Muslim Holy Land.  He warned: 
    To an ‘Empire of Opinion’ this emigration is fraught with evils.  It sends forth a horde   
    of malcontents that ripen into bigots; it teaches foreign nations to despise our rule; and    
    it unveils the present nakedness of once wealthy India.  And we have both prevention  
    and cure in our own hands.16         
 
Burton’s “cure” prescribed that pilgrims should be made to prove their solvency 
before being permitted to embark from Indian ports.  He further recommended that 
pilgrims be made to register with the Vice-Consul upon their arrival in Jidda.  Burton also 
pointed to the need for a stronger British presence in the region.  In short, Burton forecast 
that the hajj would become an outlet for Muslim radicalism and anti-British sentiment.  
Morevoer, he understood how easily negative opinions about British rule could be spread 
to other parts of the dar al-Islam via the hajj and the diaspora of Indian exiles who were 
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beginning to circulate around it.  In retrospect, the aggressive steps recommended by 
Burton were at least ten or twenty years ahead of their time.   
 Only two years after the publication of Burton’s hajj account, the Sepoy Mutiny 
shook British India to its very core.  For the most part British officials tended to label the 
Mutiny as an example of Muslim fanaticism.  Despite the oversimplified assumptions 
behind such views, much of the symbolism of the rebellion was undeniably Islamic.  
Upon capturing the Mughal capital of Delhi and collecting their would-be emperor, the 
mutineers fashioned the elderly Mughal Emperor, Bahadur Shah, as the leader of the 
revolt.  Uprisings followed in predominantly-Muslim areas, such as the Northwest 
Frontier and the recently annexed province of Awadh.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
contemporary British observers tended to conflate the Mutiny with previous frontier 
jihads in India.  Such responses are best exemplified by the life and work of Sayyid 
Ahmad Barelwi (1786-1831).  Like many Indian ‘ulama’, dislocated by the rapid changes 
in India’s legal and educational systems, he took refuge in Mecca.  During the 1820s, he 
twice performed the hajj and resided in Mecca from 1821 to 1824, where he came under 
the influence of the militant Arabian reform movement of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhāb (1703-1792).  In his semi-official history, The Indian Musalmans (1871), W.W. 
Hunter explicitly blamed Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi’s Wahhabi-inspired religio-political 
activism in North India as the inspiration behind the Sepoy Mutiny.  Though laced with 
stereotypes and exaggerations, Hunter vividly described “Wahhabi” influence as a 
“chronic conspiracy” and a “standing rebel camp,” which threatened both India’s 
frontiers and its internal security.  Consequently, Hunter’s readership was left to assume 
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that external influences, rather than heavy-handed British policies, were the primary 
source for Muslim radicalism in India.17     
 If, as Hunter suggested, Muslim anti-colonialism in India was subject to external 
influences from Arabia and the rest of the dar al-Islam, is it not also reasonable to 
assume that events in India might also have had a similar impact on public opinion in 
Arabia and other parts of the dar al-Islam?  Just as Burton had predicted, intersecting 
networks of pilgrims, merchants, and exiles could easily send tremors of anti-British 
sentiment throughout the Islamic world.  The first real evidence confirming this theory 
seems to have been the outbreak of anti-Christian violence in Jidda on 15 June 1858.  On 
that evening the British and French Consulates were ransacked and their respective flags 
pulled down.  Among the victims was the British Vice-Consul, who was reported to have 
been cut into pieces and thrown from a window of his residence.  The French Consul and 
his wife were also murdered.  In all, more than twenty Europeans, mostly Greeks, were 
slain, while another twenty-six were later rescued by the steam frigate, The Cyclops.18 
 Though the exact causes for this violent outburst remain obscure, it seems that a 
variety of commercial, political, and religious variables collided in Jidda.  Ottoman 
authorities argued that the massacre arose from a dispute over a vessel confiscated by 
British authorities.  This explanation did not, however, satisfy European observers, who 
rightly argued that such a matter could not have precipitated a general slaughter of 
Jidda’s European population.  Although Foreign Office correspondence acknowledged 
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that the most probable cause for the violence was Muslim bitterness over the increasing 
presence of Christians in the Islamic Holy Land, noting that such an uprising had long 
been expected, British officials also feared that the violence was related to the ongoing 
Mutiny in India.  Despite reports suggesting that a shaykh from Delhi and sixty of his 
followers in Mecca may have incited the violence, however, more consistent evidence 
suggests that the violence originated with the Hadrami mercantile community, whose 
grievances extended beyond the problem of Christians in the Muslim Holy Land.19  There 
is also evidence to suggest that the violence in Jidda was precipitated, at least in part, by 
Hadrami resistance to European and Ottoman efforts to abolish the slave trade.  More 
generally speaking, however, the Hadramis resented the damage being done to their share 
of the shipping and pilgrimage trades as a result of British and European steam-power in 
the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.20  More importantly, these same Hadrami merchants and 
boatmen also had close cultural and commercial contacts with India, which would have 
facilitated their interactions with radical Indian exiles, ex-mutineers, and pilgrims 
traveling through the Red Sea region.21  In fact, corroborating reports suggest that 
Hadrami sailors enthusiastically spread news of the Jidda outbreak in an attempt to 
foment a similar rebellion among the inhabitants of the port of Suez.22   
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Fearing that similar attacks might be in store for Europeans stationed in Cairo and 
Suez, Alfred Walne, the British Consul at Cairo, remarked that “from the breaking out of 
the revolt in India, in which Moslems have taken such a prominent part, there has been 
here reason to suppose that Indian and Persian partisans have done their best to increase, 
if not to excite, that sympathy.”23  Viewed in isolation Walne’s analysis might be 
dismissed as the expression of a panicky insinuation.  However, seemingly unrelated anti-
European or anti-Christian disturbances in one corner of the dar al-Islam often formed 
the background events for subsequent outbreaks of violence elsewhere.  Unfortunately, 
the processes of resistance to imperialism have often been handled by historians as part of 
discrete colonial, national, or regional histories, thereby occluding the inter-regional 
connections between various locales within the dar al-Islam.  By contrast, Juan Cole has 
described a period of generalized Muslim resistance to European, especially British, 
expansion from the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-1858) to the ‘Urabi Revolt in Egypt (1881-
1882).  He connects episodes of urban violence, such as those in Lucknow and Delhi 
(1857-1858), Jidda (1858), Damascus (1860), and Alexandria (1882), as well as wider 
events like the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), to reveal a larger pattern of conflict.24 
Taking this model into account, it would appear that the polarizing effect of India’s 
many frontier jihads, particularly the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839, and then the 
Mutiny of 1857-58, were relayed through international networks of Muslim activists, 
merchants and radicalized members of the ‘ulama’, many of whom had been displaced by 
the advance of European interests in India, had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, and had 
subsequently settled in Aden, the Hijaz, Egypt, Syria, and Istanbul.  Population statistics 
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also support this claim.  By the 1860s the British Consul in Jidda estimated that there 
were at least 10,000 Indians living in the Arabian Peninsula, up significantly from 
Richard Burton’s estimates during the previous decade.  Among these immigrants to 
Arabia were growing numbers of Afghans and Indians with bitter experiences forged by 
years of fighting against the British.  Intermingling with the Hadrami trading 
communities of the Red Sea ports, these immigrants provided a volatile anti-imperialist 
and anti-Christian element that contributed to the massacres in Jidda and later episodes in 
Damascus and Alexandria.  Even beyond the Red Sea ports, Egypt and the rest of the 
Middle East experienced a similar increase in South Asian Muslim sojourners and exiles.  
Although fewer than a thousand British subjects registered with the authorities in Egypt, 
one British Consul suggested that their actual numbers were probably closer to 10,000. 
Though the bulk of Egypt’s Indian community lived in Cairo, even in the more remote 
towns of Upper Egypt there were reports as late as 1865 of fugitive holy men-cum-
revolutionaries provoking peasant rebellions.25  Noting these disturbing developments in 
1873, British officials in India began to sense the far-reaching dimensions of the Indian 
Muslim diaspora in Mecca and Red Sea region and its potential as conduit for the kind of 
radicalism that would eventually fall under the term Pan-Islam.  As Sir Bartle Frere, a 
former Governor of the Bombay Presidency, observed, “the Hedja[z] is the natural 
asylum for fanatical Moslem exiles from India.”  He added that even though many of 
these exiles “pass their lives in a congenial atmosphere of fanaticism” their strong 
influence “cannot be safely disregarded either in Aden or in India.”26   
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Perhaps even more worrisome for British authorities was the elite group of Indian 
exiles who took up residence in Istanbul alongside Pan-Islamic activists like Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/9-1897) and began to lobby for an Ottoman-supported 
jihad against European imperialism.27  Thus, in the decades that followed the Mutiny and 
the Jidda massacre, British officialdom became increasingly sensitive to the trans-
imperial networks being forged between Indian dissidents and the Porte.  However 
diffuse these connections may have been during the 1850s and 1860s, by the reign of 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II such sentiments had matured into a more robust Pan-Islamic 
movement. 
 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II: 
Caliph, Protector of the Holy Places, and Master of Pan-Islamic Propaganda 
 
Following the psychological watershed of the Mutiny, Indian Muslims were forced 
to come to terms with the loss of a Muslim state and the consequences of foreign 
domination.  Even after the Great Rebellion, there were still those Muslim leaders who 
called for either jihad or hijra, citing Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s famous fatwa of 1803, which 
declared British-controlled India to be dar al-harb.  However, British repression in the 
wake of the Mutiny made it clear to most that jihad was at best futile and at worst 
suicidal.  Defeated and deprived of Mughal power and prestige, Indian Muslims turned 
increasingly toward the Ottoman Caliphate “in search for an alternative psychological 
and spiritual center.”28  The Ottoman Sultan was the only remaining independent Sunni 
power and he was also the Protector of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina.  He 
embodied not only the survival and supremacy of Islamic law, but also a living link to the 
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temporal power and glory of the Islamic past.  This acknowledgment of the Ottoman 
Caliphate was a major change.  During their prime, from roughly 1526 to 1707, the 
Mughals had regarded themselves as “caliphs of India,” citing Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwanī’s 
fatwa legitimizing the simultaneous presence of multiple caliphs.29  However, the 
destruction of Mughal power forced Indian Muslims to engage in “the invention of 
tradition,” a process of legitimizing change through references to the past, which usually 
occurs “when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns 
for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed.”30   
However, Indian Muslims were not the only Islamic society to engage in this kind 
of “invention of tradition.”  The social and political fabric of the entire dar al-Islam came 
under increasing pressure from the imperial powers of Europe, especially Britain, France, 
the Netherlands, and Russia.  In response to these encroachments, disparate groups of 
Muslims from Central Asia to Indonesia rallied around the Ottoman Caliphate.  The 
Ottomans were inundated with pleas for military, political, and spiritual support from 
conquered territories throughout the dar al-Islam.  Out of these diffuse efforts to protect 
the Islamic world against Western domination, a broad-based religio-political movement, 
otherwise known as Pan-Islam (Ittihād-i Islam), eventually coalesced under the auspices 
of loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.  However, the Pan-Islamic response to 
imperialism did not become a conscious, focused movement until the mid-1870s.  It was 
during this period that the Ottomans began aggressively to assert the Sultan’s ecumenical 
claim of jurisdiction over Muslims living under the rule of non-Ottoman governments.  
However, these claims rested on extremely tenuous foundations.  According to the  
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Figure 7.  Sultan Abdul Hamid II, c. 1890.31 
 
 
official myth, title of Caliph had devolved from the last Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, 
to the Ottoman blood line as a result of the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517.32 
From the late eighteenth century onward, but especially during the reign of Abdul 
Hamid II, the role of Caliph gained new importance.  After the Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-1878), the Ottoman Empire lost a huge portion of its territory and the majority of 
its non-Muslim population in the Balkans.  This allowed the Sultan to place more stress 
on the Islamic foundations of the Ottoman state.  However, due to the shaky grounds 
                                                 
    
31
 Reproduced from the George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress. 
    
32
 M.E. Yapp, “’That Great Mass of Unmixed Mahomedanism’: Reflections on the Historical Links 
between the Middle East and Asia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 1 (1992); Selim 
Deringil, “Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II, 1876-1909,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, no. 3 (Aug., 1991), 346.  
  
90 
upon which the Sultan’s caliphal claims were based, a secondary “basis for the Sultan’s 
legitimating ideology was his position as defender of the Holy Places, the Haram al-
Haramayn, in Mecca and Medina.”33  By accentuating these roles, Abdul Hamid hoped to 
bolster the international position of the Ottoman Empire, which had been reduced to a 
“tributary state” by Western powers through war and the economic and political coercion 
of the Capitulations. 
The new Pan-Islamic orientation of Abdul Hamid’s reign was also designed to 
capitalize on the Sultan-Caliph’s increasing status in the eyes of non-Ottoman Muslims.  
Not surprisingly, the Porte was intrigued by the rise in Indian enthusiasm for the Sultan-
Caliph that had developed during the Russo-Turkish War.  While the rapid growth in 
Pan-Islamic sentiment in India and beyond has often been attributed to Sayyid Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, under whose influence the development of a mass movement advocating 
the political, social, and intellectual rejuvenation of Islam world began to take shape, an 
even more crucial factor in this process seems to have been the growth of India’s 
vernacular press, particularly in Urdu.  While in 1835 there had only been only 6 
vernacular newspapers in India, by 1850 the number was up to 28, and by 1878 northern 
India alone had as many as 97 vernacular papers with a total circulation of some 150,000.  
By 1880, the number of vernacular journals had risen to 330.  The explosion of 
publications around the time of the Russo-Turkish War provided Indian Muslims with 
greater access to news from around the Islamic world, much of which was translated 
from Turkish and Arabic newspapers, such as al-Jawaib, Tercuman-i Rum, Akhbar dar 
al-Khalifat and Tercuman-i Mashriq.  However, the most influential publication of all 
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was Paik-i Islam, an Istanbul-based journal, written in Turkish and Urdu and edited by an 
Indian Muslim.  Designed as an official organ of the Porte, it raised Sultan-Caliph’s 
profile and promoted closer ties between Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire.34   
As a result of the proliferation of pro-Ottoman newspapers and journals, numerous 
voluntary organizations sprang to life, decrying the Turkish plight and urging Indian 
Muslims to give financial aid to the Ottomans in their time of need.  According to 
Ottoman registers, Indian efforts to support the Ottoman war effort were an 
overwhelming success.  Over 124,840 Ottoman liras, equal to over 10 lakhs (million) of 
Indian rupees, were collected.  More importantly, organizations like the Anjuman-i Islam, 
the Anjuman-i Teyyid-i Turkiye, and the Meclis-i Mueyyid-i Islamiyye drew this financial 
support from diverse quarters of the Indian community.  As a result, normally divergent 
Indian Muslim groups like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Aligarhi loyalists, Deobandis, 
Shias, and even Hindus joined in this overwhelming financial response.35   
 As a result of this almost unanimous wave of support, the Ottomans envisaged an 
elaborate system of consulates, missions, and emissaries in India.  Based in Bombay and 
Calcutta, these officials were charged with stimulating interest in the fortunes of the 
Ottoman Empire.  They encouraged Indians to invoke the Sultan-Caliph’s name during 
the Friday khutba (sermon).  They often bestowed honorific titles or imperial decorations 
upon elite Indian benefactors.  They even urged average Indians to write to the Sultan.  
These letters varied from expressions of moral support to demands for the opening of 
more Ottoman consulates in India to protect Muslim rights.  Many of these letters were 
also used as propaganda in the Turkish press to emphasize the Sultan-Caliph’s 
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ecumenical authority at home and abroad.  Similarly, Ottoman press agencies circulated 
news and appeals for financial support in India’s vernacular press.  Turkish press 
extracts, republished in India, included glowing accounts of the Sultan-Caliph’s good 
deeds and the need for strengthening the bonds of religion.  Clearly, these journalistic 
efforts served as an important medium for the transmission of Pan-Islamic thought to 
distant Muslim communities.  However, British officials from Calcutta to London 
became increasingly suspicious.  Ottoman representatives were kept under close 
surveillance, their access to the vernacular press circumscribed, and their requests for 
opening new consulates were rejected.  Although intelligence inquiries into Indo-Turkish 
activities often failed to yield any firm conclusions as to whether the Porte’s activities 
were part of a systematic political plot, the British remained perpetually concerned about 
Ottoman activities in Bombay, the Northwest Frontier and Afghanistan.  The British 
particularly feared the possibility that Abdul Hamid was engaging in the kind of wild 
Turco-Indo-Afghan jihad-ist schemes advocated by al-Afghani.36 
 However, much of Abdul Hamid’s propaganda effort was not undertaken on 
Indian soil.  The un-colonized space provided by Mecca represented a perfect opportunity 
to solidify the bond between non-Ottoman Muslims and their Caliph.  Not surprisingly, 
this “sacred” bond also involved the profane business of propaganda distribution.  Indeed, 
great care was taken to draft propaganda materials that would appeal to each language 
and nationality.  Thus, some pamphlets called for Central Asian Muslims to rise against 
their Russian masters, while others called upon Indians for financial support.  These 
materials urged Indian Muslims to send their zakat to the Ottomans.  Such pamphlets 
even declared that by doing so: “God would reward them, otherwise they would be 
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punished and disgraced both now and in the hereafter.”  As if God’s wrath were not 
enough, such tracts even included disclaimers for loyalist Indian Muslims, reminding 
them that Anglo-Ottoman relations were friendly and that “the British Government would 
not object to support given by the Indian Muslims.”37 
 Aside from Abdul Hamid’s propaganda and financial appeals, the Holy Places 
themselves became a major part of the Sultan-Caliph’s public image.  Embarrassed by 
complaints from European officials regarding the mistreatment or cheating of their 
colonial subjects in Jidda, Mecca, and the quarantine stations of the Red Sea, the Sultan-
Caliph went to great lengths to demonstrate his not only his spiritual importance, but also 
his temporal power and competence as Protector of the Holy Places.  By raising the 
visibility of his good works in the Hijaz, increasing the official Ottoman presence at the 
Holy Places and the caravan routes, imposing passport fees and regulations, and policing 
hajj-related territories and commerce, he endeavored to make a better showing in this 
critical area of Ottoman foreign policy.38   
While such reforms were meant to underscore the Sultan-Caliph’s competence and 
beneficence as Protector of the Holy Places, the most compelling example of this public 
image campaign was the monumental Hijaz Railway project.  On 2 May 1900, Abdul 
Hamid announced the construction of a railway linking the Syrian coast with the Hijaz.  
As William Ochsenwald explains, “this railroad was to be the single physical 
embodiment of the Pan-Islamic movement.  If the Empire could handle the project using 
                                                 
    
37
 Ibid., 75; F.O. 195/1653, in “Commercial exploitation of the Hajj involving forcible booking of tickets 
to India and the sale of Qur’ans, 1888-1889,” in Records of the Hajj, vol. 4, 27-110.  Particularly during the 
1890s and again during World War I, British officials charged Ottoman authorities with extortion, claiming 
that pilgrims were forced to contribute to Ottoman war coffers against their will.  They also charged that 
pilgrims were pressured to buy official Ottoman-printed Qur’ans and book their return tickets at exorbitant 
prices.   
    
38
 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire," 26. 
  
94 
only Ottoman sources of supply and personnel it would indicate to Europeans and 
Ottomans alike that technical and economic independence was possible.”39  This project 
would also make extensive use of the modern propaganda and fundraising methods that 
had developed from the Russo-Turkish War onward in order to signal to Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike that the Sultan-Caliph was capable of properly organizing the hajj, 
maintaining the Holy Places of Islam, and protecting Arabia from foreign attack.  Thus, 
while construction started without any accumulated capital, it was hoped that Muslims 
could rally together to raise the necessary funds.  The Sultan himself made the first 
donation, setting an example for other Muslims.  In India, the Central Committee for the 
Hijaz Railway was soon founded in Hyderabad.  Following the Sultan’s lead, Indian 
organizers persuaded donors to give liberally by stressing how the plight of suffering 
pilgrims had spurred the Sultan-Caliph to act for the sake of religion.  As a result of this 
Indo-Turkish press blitz, fifty percent of the total bill was raised through subscriptions.  
In 1908, just before the end of Abdul Hamid’s reign, the line finally reached Medina.  For 
Indian Muslims, the railway’s completion was the physical embodiment of Pan-Islam.  
The success of the project signaled that the dar al-Islam was still capable of protecting 
itself.  More importantly, the Hijaz Railway project and others like it provided an 
alternative symbolic structure of financial and political links between India, the 
Caliphate, and the Holy Places, which provided a model for the later development of 
Muslim anti-colonialism, particularly during the Khilafat movement of 1918-1924.40 
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Secret Agent Man: Dr. Abdur Razzack and British Intelligence in the Hijaz 
 
Despite many warning signs, British policy-makers did not immediately recognize 
Pan-Islamic sentiment as a major threat to British India.  In fact, from the Crimean War 
(1853-1856) until the Russo-Turkish war, the British were more concerned with Russian 
expansion in Central Asia.  During these decades, Anglo-Ottoman relations were strongly 
aligned against Russia.  On multiple occasions pro-Ottoman sympathies were actually 
encouraged in order to either bolster their own legitimacy or to check Russian advances 
in Central Asia.  However, by the 1870s, Austen Henry Layard, the British ambassador at 
Constantinople, and Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, began to worry that pro-Ottoman 
feelings could be directed against the British in the event of a future deterioration of 
relations with the Ottomans.  As Lytton pointed out, “If either by pressure of public 
opinion at home, or political difficulty abroad, Your Majesty’s Government should be 
forced into a policy of prominent aggression upon Turkey, I am inclined to think that a 
Muhammedan rising in India is among the contingencies we may have to face.”  Lytton’s 
worst fears came true, during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, when William Gladstone 
spear-headed a public denunciation of the “Bulgarian horrors” perpetrated by the 
Ottomans against their non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans.  Gladstone’s rhetoric sparked 
an anti-Turkish crusade in the press, effectively ending Britain’s pro-Ottoman policy.  
Thus, when Russia invaded Turkey in 1877, Britain did nothing.  As a result, Britain was 
no longer able to tout itself to Indian Muslims as the Sultan’s ally and protector.  As a 
result of this the anti-Ottoman turn in British foreign policy, even previously loyal 
Muslims became disillusioned and began to question why British support for the Ottoman 
Empire, considered sacrosanct in the 1850s, had abruptly ended during 1870s.  
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Undoubtedly, this sense of disillusionment led a great number of Indian Muslims back 
into the political arena, particularly into the embrace of Pan-Islam.41   
Just as Lytton predicted, the deterioration in Anglo-Ottoman relations did in fact 
raise the threat of Indo-Ottoman intrigues.  Moreover, anxious reports from Layard 
pointed to Mecca as the main point of contact for anti-British activities.  He warned that 
“ex-mutineer Indians at Mecca were in communication with the Porte and that through 
them the Ottomans could make an attempt to bring about a rising in India.”42  In a similar 
reaction to the spike in Pan-Islamic sentiments during and following the Russo-Turkish 
War, the English pilgrim-adventurer John F. Keane reported the following ominous 
details about his 1877-1878 pilgrimage: 
    …the community of Meccah is composed of the most bigoted Mohammedans, the  
    fanatical scum of the whole Modhammedan world.  Now the precarious position of an  
    unbeliever in any wholly Mohammedan town is well known; but let a Jew, Christian,  
    or idolater approach to defile ground so holy and held in such veneration as is Meccah  
    in the eyes of Mohammedans—ground of which many declare that should any but a  
    True Believer stand on, it would open and swallow him—to say that he would be      
    stoned to death, torn in pieces, burnt and his ashes sent out of the country, would only  
    be repeating what I have heard Mohammedans declare.  I am confident the life of a  
    solitary white man refusing to make “profession of that faith” would not be worth an  
    hours purchase—two hours outside the walls of Jeddah—even to this day… 
 
He goes on to warn of violent Pan-Islamic schemes being hatched in Mecca and Jidda: 
     
    Who can know what alarming projects or conspiracies may not at this moment be on  
    foot in Mecca, that center and hotbed of Mohammedan intrigue?  For my part, I regard  
    the Christians in Jeddah as sitting on the safety valve of the Hijaz, and sooner or later   
    an explosion is inevitable.43 
    
Keane’s sentiments are almost identical to those expressed by the newly appointed 
British Consul in Jidda, J.N.E. Zohrab, who wrote the following in 1879: 
                                                 
    
41
 Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics, 20, 25-29.   
    
42
 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 90-93.   
    
43
 John F. Keane, Six Months in Meccah, 14, 286-287.     
  
97 
    The province of the Hedjaz is the centre to which the ideas, opinions, sentiments and    
    aspirations of the Mussulman world are brought for discussion.  The annual meeting at  
    a fixed time ostensibly for the purposes of the Pilgrimage of Representatives from  
    every Mussulman Community affords a means without creating suspicion to exchange  
    opinions, to discuss plans, to criticize the actions of the European Governments and  
    form combinations to resist the supremacy of the Christian Powers.44    
 
As these comments clearly illustrate, to the official mind of the British Empire the 
hajj would need greater political surveillance if the threat of anti-colonial subversion was 
to be contained.  However, those same officials were constrained by Queen Victoria’s 
famous 1858 proclamation of religious tolerance and non-interference, which sought to 
allay both Hindu and Muslim fears that post-Mutiny India would be subject to aggressive 
Christian missionary activities.45  It was against these guarantees that British authorities 
would have to weigh the need for greater political surveillance in both India and the 
Muslim Holy Land.  Any governmental intrusions that could be perceived as an affront to 
the sanctity of the hajj or the religious freedoms of Indian Muslims carried the possibility 
of a violent backlash.                           
Despite the political and epidemiological threats, officials deemed it too risky to 
discourage Muslims from undertaking the hajj.  As a result, Britain repeatedly resisted 
international sanitary conventions, which would have called for the imposition of a 
means test or passport fees, thereby limiting the number of “dangerous” and “pauper” 
pilgrims.  Instead, Britain opted for a strategy of increased surveillance activities, in 
terms of both public health and politico-religious machinations.  Following this logic, 
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Zohrab recommended in 1879 that “in order to thoroughly sift the questions of aid and 
protection to pilgrims” the entire pilgrimage experience must be understood.  
Furthermore, “to do this effectively it is in my opinion necessary that a Confidential 
Agent of the consulate be sent to watch and follow this year’s pilgrimage.”46  The British 
ambassador at Constantinople proposed in June of 1880 that the Indian Government 
employ Muslim secret agents to infiltrate the Holy Cities.  While Layard’s plan was 
rebuffed at the time, British agents at Aden, Constantinople, and Jidda were charged with 
monitoring any Ottoman propaganda efforts.  In the meantime, British intelligence 
continued to receive reports of Ottoman intrigues from French and Dutch sources as well 
as its own.  At this point, all of the colonial powers were becoming increasingly 
suspicious of Muslim radicalism transmitted via the hajj.  As a result of this common 
interest, in December 1880, the Dutch Foreign Minister proposed to Layard a joint 
program of intelligence sharing and political surveillance related to pilgrims traveling 
from India and Southeast Asia to Mecca.47 
In September 1881, Lord Dufferin revived Layard’s suggestions, arguing for the 
appointment of a “secret paid agent residing in Mecca.”  Ironically, the ideal man for 
Dufferin’s proposed “secret agent” was already at work in the region.  Back in 1878, the 
Government of British India had attached Assistant Surgeon Abdur Razzack of the 
Bengal Medical Service to accompany that year’s pilgrimage from India.  Dr. Razzack’s 
appointment was made in the context of growing administrative and diplomatic questions 
associated with the repeated outbreaks of cholera in the Hijaz, the general welfare of 
pilgrims, overcrowding on vessels carrying pilgrims, and the rising numbers of indigent 
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pilgrims.  Razzack was to report only on the sanitary conditions of the hajj, a task which 
he performed successfully in March 1879.48     
In light of the political concerns raised by Zohrab, Layard, and then Dufferin, 
however, Razzack was pressed to perform a more overtly political role.  In 1882, 
Razzack was chosen as the best candidate for Britain’s political surveillance activities in 
Mecca and the Hijaz.  Razzack was said to be “an excellent man” and “altogether 
separated from the Delhi and Wahbabi schools…clever and ambitious.”  Although 
Razzack’s primary duties were to assist Her Majesty’s Muslim subjects, promote the 
health and comfort of the pilgrims, and protect them in their dealings with Ottoman 
officialdom, he was also instructed that the Consul in Jidda “may wish to avail himself of 
your assistance in obtaining trustworthy information regarding the course of affairs, and 
of public opinion, in Mecca and neighboring places.”  As Razzack pointed out in reply, 
“he would have to visit Mecca frequently in order to obtain such information, and that in 
order to avoid arousing suspicions it would be necessary for him to take a house there, 
and to have an allowance that would permit him ‘to give some small presents to some of 
the religious heads.’”  Although Razzack’s requests were approved, it is unclear whether 
or not Razzack really provided any kind of covert intelligence in his reports.49 
While the degree to which Razzack actually served as a spy is debatable, his 
influence over pilgrimage affairs is unquestionable.  From 1878 to 1895, he was the 
British point-man for pilgrimage affairs.  Razzack’s presence in the Hijaz and later at the 
Kamarān Island quarantine station, which became operational during the 1881-1882 
pilgrimage season, signaled the institution of more accurate documentation of the number 
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of pilgrims undertaking the hajj.  The suggestions made in Razzack’s detailed annual 
reports also seem to have formed the practical basis for the Government of India’s efforts 
to reform and institutionalize the pilgrimage experience.50  Razzack’s reports were 
instrumental in changes made to the major piece of British legislation regarding 
pilgrimage traffic.  Based on an earlier but far less comprehensive piece of legislation 
from 1858, the Native Passenger Ships Act of 1876 was amended in 1883 and 1887 to 
reflect changes suggested by Razzack and in light of the highly contentious diplomatic 
effort to integrate Ottoman and British Indian pilgrimage regulations.51   
These legislative reforms sought to ensure that pilgrims were treated humanely and 
given access to medical attention during both their steamship journey and their stay in the 
Ottoman Hijaz.  Razzack also recognized that new institutions and infrastructure would 
be needed to ensure that such regulations would ultimately be followed.  Thus, in 1881 he 
suggested the establishment of a separate “pilgrimage agency” to administer the hajj.  
While Razzack envisioned this agency as a Muslim-funded charitable effort, his proposal, 
at least as he had imagined it, never came to fruition.  However, a version of his idea was 
taken up by the Government of Bombay, which created a post called the Protector of the 
Pilgrims in 1882.52  
Shortly thereafter, in 1885, efforts were made by the Government of India to 
streamline the entire pilgrimage process by hiring a single agency to handle all rail 
transportation to the ports of embarkation, shipping, passports, and the issuing of return 
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tickets covering all the necessary fees for a successful roundtrip from Bombay to Jidda.  
Thus, from 1886 until 1893, Thomas Cook and Son, were charged with the near 
impossible task of taming the pilgrimage industry and the unscrupulous pilgrimage 
brokers of Bombay.  Though reforming the hajj ultimately turned out to be more than 
Cook’s could handle, this adventure seems to have presaged the commercial travel 
industry’s eventual conquest of the modern hajj.53   
Just as the Thomas Cook scheme had challenged the status quo, Razzack also took 
on powerful vested interests in Jidda and Mecca.  In 1882, he reported the following: 
        The common opinion among the sensible and knowing classes of Arabs and the  
    Meccans themselves is that the cause of sickness which generally prevails among the  
    pilgrims after their descent from Arafat to Moona and continues for some time in  
    Mecca also, is the unsanitary condition of Moona and the abominable stench that  
    pervades the town after the first day, and increases day by day, as well as the impure  
    water which the majority of the pilgrims drink.   
        …and there are few believers in those who tax India with originating Hedjaz cholera  
    instead of recognizing and combating the two obvious causes which alas exist in these  
    “holy places,” on seeing which it is impossible not to feel indignation as a Mussulman,  
    as well as disapproval as a medical man.54     
 
Undoubtedly, Razzack’s scathing comments, which shifted blame away from India and 
located the causes of disease in the Hijaz itself, did little for his popularity.   
 Perhaps even more daring than his criticism of the sanitary conditions in the Hijaz 
was his attempt to take on what might be considered the most entrenched of pilgrimage 
institutions, the mutawwif or shaykh system.55  These hereditary guilds of pilgrimage 
guides, despite their corruption and abuses, provided pilgrims with guidance in carrying 
out the complex rituals of the hajj.  Each guide had different linguistic and cultural 
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specialties to suit their clients’ respective country of origin.  Not only were they a 
necessary part of the pilgrimage experience, but they also stood at the heart of Mecca’s 
government and economy.  The British, however, regarded the mutawwif system as an 
exploitative monopoly, and in many cases it was just that.  Moreover, the British resented 
the closed nature of the system.  They wanted to appoint their own guides in order to both 
monitor events in Mecca as well as to gain greater control over the recruitment activities 
those guides working outside the Hijaz.  It was feared that these guides were distributing 
Pan-Islamic propaganda as they traveled to recruit would-be pilgrims in their country of 
specialization.  Thus, in 1881, when Razzack was first appointed Muslim Vice-Consul in 
Jidda, it was naively hoped that he would work with the Sharif of Mecca to appoint the 
Indian pilgrimage guides.  Though Razzack was never allowed this privilege, he 
repeatedly worked to expose their abuses as well as those of the Ottoman 
administration.56   
Though it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Razzack served as a spy, it 
would seem that either his critical role as part of the growing sanitary regime or his 
suggested role as a secret agent ultimately led to his death.  On 31 May 1895, a band of 
“‘supposed Bedouins’ attacked members of the foreign community in Jeddah walking 
outside the walls of the town, killing Razzack and wounding the British, French, and 
Russian consuls.” 57  These Bedouin assailants reportedly blamed the sanitary authorities 
themselves for bringing cholera to the Hijaz.  On that same day, Mecca’s disinfecting 
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machine was destroyed and the building housing was completely ransacked.58  Two days 
later, Mecca’s hospital was attacked, forcing its physicians to disguise themselves and 
flee for their lives.  Likewise, the disinfection machine in Jidda was demolished by 
Bukharan pilgrims, forcing medical inspectors to seek shelter aboard vessels in the 
harbor.59   
 
 
Figure 8.  Early Twentieth-Century Pilgrims at Jidda's Harbor.60 
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Though it might be impossible to prove, there was a significant feeling on the part 
of the British that perhaps there was more to Abdur Razzack’s murder and the 
accompanying spate of violence against medical personnel than a mere Bedouin raid, 
perhaps a plot coordinated by either the Ottoman or Sharifan authorities.  Such feelings 
were only exacerbated by Ottoman reluctance to carry out harsh reprisals against the 
Harb Beduoins whom they had accused of Razzack’s murder.  Nor did Razzack’s murder 
bring an end to local resistance to sanitary intervention.  In subsequent years Bedouin 
camel-drivers attacked the Yanbu military hospital’s disinfecting machine, claiming that 
the disinfectants were designed to kill rather than protect pilgrims.  Nine died in the 
rioted that ensued.  And yet again, three years later, quarantine and disinfection policies 
directed against the plague sparked riots in Jidda.61 
Despite the loss of their most-trusted operative in the Hijaz, Britain continued to 
pursue its medico-political surveillance efforts.  Thus, just two years after Razzack’s 
murder, the Foreign Office once again urged a new initiative to organize Muslim spies, 
calling for the creation of “an Indian Muhammadan Detective Agency at Constantinople, 
Mecca, Jeddah, and Baghdad.”  However, the proposal was eventually rejected by the 
Government of India, which doubted that “any respectable Muhammadan would consent 
to work as a secret agent in Mecca, Jeddah, or Baghdad.”  Furthermore, they reasoned 
that such work could be more effectively carried out from Jidda, as it had been under Dr. 
Abdur Razzack.62
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TOWARD A NEW ERA OF SANITARY INTERVENTIONISM 
 
  
     The city of Jidda became a vast cemetery, and the most urgent and useful 
 sanitary precautions consisted in burying the dead bodies that filled the 
 caravansaries, mosques, cafés, houses and public places…  
     We saw many cases of lightning-swift death, and this is another still vivid 
 memory—each evening we said farewell to each other, my colleague and I, before  
 retiring, out of fear that we would never see the morrow.  On disembarking from  
 one of the ships in Jidda harbor, I passed on the water Mr. O., and English 
 maritime agent who was embarking on that same ship.  We greeted each other in 
 friendly fashion on passing, but once on board the poor wretch was leveled by a 
 sudden attack and left the ship a corpse…    
                                     -Dr. Oslchanictzki, Ottoman Sanitary Service, Jidda, 18931  
  
 Allah’s Apostle said, ‘There are angels guarding the entrances [or roads] of 
 Medina, neither plague nor al-Dajjāl [the Antichrist] will be able to enter it.’ 
                                                                      -Sahīh al-Bukhārī2 
 
 Every tā‘ūn [plague] is a wabā’ [epidemic], but not every wabā’ is a tā‘ūn. 
         -Muhyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī, Sharh Muslim3 
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Cholera’s Grande Finale 
 
 As a result of the previously unprecedented level of compromise reached under 
the Venice Convention of 1892, British concerns over the economic impact of sanitary 
precautions and maritime quarantine measures were greatly reduced.  As has already 
been discussed in Chapter 2, under the Venice Convention, European passenger ships and 
commercial traffic were differentiated from pilgrimage vessels, which were singled out as 
the most-likely carriers of epidemic disease.  Under this new system, vessels were 
categorized, distinguishing between “infected,” “suspect,” and “healthy” ships.4  Another 
crucial change was the reorganization of the Conseil Sanitaire Maritime et Quaranteaire 
d’Égypte in order to allow for a greater preponderance of European as opposed to 
Egyptian members, a move which further assuaged British concerns.5  The following year 
at the Dresden Conference of 1893 sanitary restrictions on traffic flowing through the 
Suez Canal were further relaxed.  While just a year earlier in Venice, delegates were 
unable to agree upon cholera’s mode of transmission, in Dresden a majority of the 
delegates agreed that Koch’s theories concerning the waterborne cholera bacillus were 
indeed correct.  The likely reason for this volte face  was the confirmation of Koch’s 
findings in the wake of the Hamburg epidemic of 1892.  As a result of the Hamburg 
outbreak, however, contagion and quarantine were no longer an inseparable combination.  
The Hamburg epidemic had shown that quarantine measures failed to prevent the spread 
of cholera to Europe.  While countries with “no rigid system of quarantine like Britain,” 
which “relied on selective medical inspection,” witnessed “declining mortality from 
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cholera, ostensibly as a consequence of general sanitary reforms,” other states with strict 
quarantine measures were devastated by severe outbreaks.6  As a result of this shift in 
perception regarding the efficacy of strict quarantine measures and its impact on the 
relaxation of regulations concerning traffic through the Suez Canal, at least for European 
and commercial traffic, the Dresden Convention was ultimately ratified by eleven states, 
including Great Britain, in 1897.  As in the case of the Paris Conference of 1894, the 
Dresden Conference, stressed targeted restrictions and greater utilization of disinfection 
techniques, “even if this meant treating the pilgrims harshly, for example forcing women 
to undress publicly.”7  However, while the 1892 and 1893 conferences largely avoided 
directly addressing the contentious question of pilgrimage surveillance, in 1894 that 
subject would once again return to the forefront with renewed urgency.8 
   Although the early 1890s saw major breakthroughs in the multi-decade struggle 
between the British Empire and the rest of the international community over issues of 
sanitary prevention, the etiology of cholera, the efficacy of quarantine, and the free flow 
of commercial vessels through the Suez Canal, these diplomatic successes, unfortunately, 
did not bring an end to crisis of cholera.  As F.E. Peters points out, “if the object of these 
measures was to shield Egypt and Europe from infection carried by returning pilgrims, 
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they were apparently a success.”9  However, in the East, cholera continued unabated on 
its path of destruction.  Proof of cholera’s staying power came in 1893.  During that 
pilgrimage season, over 30,000 out of a total of approximately 200,000 pilgrims are 
thought to have perished in Jidda, Mecca, and Medina.10  This appalling death toll, the 
worst ever in the Hijaz, was observed in graphic detail by Dr. Oslchanictzki, an Ottoman-
employed physician, working at the Kamarān Island quarantine: 
    I was sent from Qamaran to Jidda with a colleague to supervise the return of pilgrims.      
    All was quiet in the city, but we knew that at Mecca there was a veritable hecatomb of  
    pilgrims; more than a thousand were being reported dead daily.  An initial convoy of  
    5,000 camels brought 15,000 pilgrims to Jidda.  The ill had to be kept outside the city     
    and only the healthy were admitted.  I went with my colleague to the place and we  
    began our medical inspection, which lasted from 4 A.M. till noon.  The sight was  
    terrible: everywhere were the dead and the suffering, the cries of men, women and  
    children mixed with the roaring of the camels, in short, a terrifying scene which will  
    never be blotted out of my memory.11 
 
 This carnage would once again catapult cholera onto the global political stage.  
Thus, at the Paris Conference of 1894, the pilgrimage question reemerged as a source of 
conflict.  However, by this point, the diplomatic battle-lines had been redrawn.  It would 
be the Ottoman Empire, not British India, which would receive the lion’s share of 
criticism for the catastrophic mortality witnessed during the 1893 pilgrimage season.  It 
became clear that the Ottomans were not properly enforcing the international sanitary 
regulations in their own territories.  As a result, Britain, France, and the Netherlands took 
bold new steps to control the maritime pilgrimage, insisting “that they had a right to 
intervene directly in sanitary questions at Jidda.”12  In particular, British officials were 
                                                 
   
9
 Peters, The Hajj, 302.  
   
10
 Duguet, Le pélerinage de la Mecque, 156-158; Harrison, “Quarantine, pilgrimage, and colonial trade,” 
135.  See also  F.O. 195/1805, Acting Consul, Dr. Abdur Razzack to the British Ambassador, 
Constantinople, 24 Jul. 1893, in Records of the Hajj, vol. 9, 233-237.    
    
11
 Dr. Oslchanictzki’s unpublished memoir, quoted in Peters, The Hajj, 303.  
    
12
 Peters, The Hajj, 304. 
  
109 
quick to justify their new interventionist stance by pointing out that pilgrimage matters 
concerned more British subjects than Ottoman ones, “lay[ing] stress on the fact that India 
contains within her borders more Moslems [roughly 60 million at the time] than any other 
country in the world.”13  And although the Ottoman delegate indignantly complained 
about how the colonial powers “pretended to legislate on internal matters in Turkey,”14 he 
was sharply rebuffed and reminded that the issue at hand was “a question not of national 
sovereignty but of basic human rights.”15     
 Discussions at the 1894 meeting revolved around three main areas of concern: 
sanitary surveillance of pilgrims moving through the Red Sea, the surveillance of 
shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf, and sanitary arrangements to be taken at ports of 
departure.  Britain acquiesced to virtually all terms regarding the Red Sea and ports of 
departure.  However, it fought against further restrictions in the Persian Gulf.  The British 
delegation also refused to agree to terms, which would have required pilgrims to be given 
a minimum space of 21 square feet per passenger below decks, the reintroduction of a 
passport system, and the imposition of a means test.  Despite Britain’s continued refusal 
to assent to these measures, particularly out of deference to official opinion in India, the 
conference exposed a widening rift between London and Calcutta.  Calcutta, which was 
no longer permitted to send a separate delegation, was outraged by London’s acceptance 
of the Convention’s recommendations.  Authorities in India were especially shocked by 
Britain’s agreement to compulsory daily inspections onboard pilgrimage vessels deemed 
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to be sailing from infected ports, forcefully remonstrating that such measures “would 
almost certainly be misconstrued by lower-class Muslims as a provocation on the part of 
the British authorities.”16  Although this matter was ultimately an argument between 
India and the imperial metropole, in an attempt to escape the resentment that further 
sanitary measures would likely engender among Indian Muslims, Calcutta sought to hold 
the Ottoman Empire responsible by cleverly appropriating the Sultan-Caliph’s Pan-
Islamic prestige for its own purposes: 
    If in conformity with the view of European Powers, it should be decided that further  
    restrictive measures ought to be taken in India as regards Indian pilgrims to the    
    Hedjaz, then it would be desirable that such restrictions should be supported by distinct   
    and explicit concurrence of His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, who is recognized by  
    Moslems in India as the protector of Islam and the Viceregent of the founder of their  
    religion.17     
  
 As has been previously mentioned, the Indian Government was by no means the 
only quarter from which the Ottoman Empire came under pressure.  Rather, as John 
Baldry explains, “the Conference developed into the trial of the Ottoman Sanitary 
Administration.”18  The Italian delegate, Count Tornielli, bluntly summarized the mood 
of the conference by boldly plotting a European takeover of Constantinople Board of 
Health.  In his correspondence with the Foreign Office, he wrote: 
        The Supreme Sanitary Council in Constantinople, invested with fresh power and    
    instructions by the Conferences of Venice and Dresden, will take a position of greater  
    importance in the Conference about to take place as to the measures to be taken in    
    regard to the Mecca pilgrims, and the precautions to be adopted in the Persian Gulf.   
    The question may arise whether it should be allowed to remain as it is now.    
        The Conference of Venice modified the Sanitary, Maritime, and Quarantine  
    Council of Alexandria.  There should be no obstacle, and it would only be logical that  
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    the Conference of Paris should on similar lines modify the Supreme Council of    
    Constantinople.  The former revised the Regulations of the Council of Alexandria; the  
    latter might revise those of the Council of Constantinople.  
        The expediency of modifying the Supreme Council of Constantinople is obvious. 
Tornielli goes on to explain that “whilst [the Council] spends it resources in grants to its 
officials, it leaves the hospitals without water, unprovided with sufficient means of 
disinfection, and in such a state that they became rather hotbeds of infection.”  In 
response to these grievances, Tornielli strongly advocated “that the [European] Powers 
[should] always be able to maintain in the face of the Porte, their rights derived from the 
Capitulations against the decisions of the Council.”19   
 In addition to Tornielli’s appeal to Europe’s superior economic and diplomatic 
position with regard to the Capitulations, yet another withering round of attacks was 
launched against the conditions on Kamarān Island and the Ottoman Empire’s other 
lazarettos.  As the Révue d’Hygiène put it, the flag-ship station of the entire quarantine 
system was a virtual “emporium of cholera,” a “scandal and disgrace to every European 
Government represented on the Ottoman Board of Health.”20  Similarly, a British journal, 
The Practicioner, warned: “We know… that mere condemnation [by the delegates at the 
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Paris Sanitary Conference] if only followed by promises of amendment on the part of the 
Sultan and the Turkish Government, will lead to no real improvement.”21   
 To counter this onslaught of criticism, the Ottoman delegation announced that a 
series of improvements and new constructions would be carried out both at Kamarān and 
at the other quarantine stations scattered throughout the Empire.  As Baldry’s analysis of 
the Kamarān quarantine station explains, the Paris Conference of 1894 and the two 
pilgrimage seasons following it “mark[ed] the end of an epoch.”  In 1895, the 
Constantinople Board of Health decided to completely reorganize the entire lazaretto.22  
As Hamza ‘Ali Luqmān’s reports in Tārīkh al-Juzur al-Yamaniyya, a fresh-water-
filtration system for desalinating sea water was installed in 1895.23  Prior to its 
construction, well water had been the only source of drinking water available to the 
pilgrims.  According to Baldry, the instillation of this machine had far reaching 
consequences.  After the instillation of this apparatus the average mortality rate among 
pilgrims quarantined on the island plummeted from 3.37 to 1.04 per 1,000.  Subsequent 
research would eventually establish that water from the wells on the island contained 
microbes conducive to the spread and virulence of the cholera vibrio.  It was also thought 
the water treatment facilities would probably bring outbreaks of cholera at Kamarān to an 
end.  With the exception of one outbreak in December 1907, this conclusion was 
essentially correct.24 
 Ottoman improvements on Kamarān Island were only the beginning.  In the Hijaz 
itself, the Ottomans had announced the reorganization of their quarantine facilities at 
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Jidda, the construction of new shelters for indigent pilgrims, the establishment of new 
hospitals in Mecca, and the improvement of existing hospitals and clinics in Mecca and 
Jidda.  And finally, in April 1895, an imperial firmān “made provision for additional 
doctors during the pilgrimage, a pharmacy, and a corps of sanitary police.”  While these 
reforms were likely responsible for the marked decline in cholera deaths, which dropped 
to only 306 in 1895, it is also probable that the intensification of sanitary activities, 
particularly on the part of Europeans, were at least partially responsible for fomenting the 
atmosphere of violence which ultimately led to Dr. Abdur Razzack’s murder (previously 
discussed in Chapter 3) that same year.25   
 The violence of 1895 notwithstanding, the reorganization of the Ottoman 
Empire’s sanitary facilities yielded long-lasting results.  No subsequent outbreaks of 
cholera were ever as devastating as that of 1893 and after 1912 epidemic cholera no 
longer threatened the Hijaz.  Cholera’s deadly reign had, however, brought the Hijaz 
under non-Muslim surveillance for the first time ever, ensuring the direct involvement of 
Europe’s colonial powers in the sanitary administration of the hajj and the Muslim Holy 
Places until well into the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
The Bombay Plague of 1896:  
The Defeat of British Sanitary Obstructionism 
 
 Sadly, even the defeat of cholera did not signal an end to the threat of epidemic 
disease in the Hijaz.  Just as the Ottoman sanitary service was being overhauled, once 
again British India spawned another epidemiological nightmare.  In September 1896, the 
plague broke out in Bombay.  It appears to have been imported by stowaway rats from 
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Hong Kong, where an epidemic had ravaged that city since 1894.26  As Mike Davis 
explains, “At the time, some scientists theorized that drought, as previously in southern 
China, was a critical factor in driving plague-carrying rats into more intimate 
commensality with human victims.”  In any case, like Hong Kong, Bombay “offered an 
ideal ecology for a pandemic: fetid, overcrowded slums (perhaps the densest in Asia) 
infested with a huge population of black rats.”  While health officials, most notably 
Florence Nightingale, repeatedly warned administrators that by refusing to acknowledge 
the city’s virtual “phantasmagoria” of disease conditions and provide adequate sanitation, 
the entire city would eventually be plunged into an “epidemic apocalypse.” 27  While 
Bombay had experienced an economic boom in the 1880s and 1890s, as both Davis and 
Ira Klein indicate, this expansion was in many ways “subsidized by falling living and 
heath standards of its vast majority.”  In fact, “the wages of unskilled laborers increased 
only five percent in 35 years while grain costs rose 50 percent and land values and rents 
tripled.”  Thus, “the progressive immiseration” of Bombay’s working poor may be seen 
as “the single most important factor” in Bombay’s explosion of mortality around the turn 
of the century.  Despite a number of “panic-stricken exoduses” during the period, famine 
and cholera in the countryside surrounding Bombay left its urban poor trapped in the filth 
of the slums.  Worse still, the city and its suburbs were repeatedly inundated by refugees 
fleeing the carnage of drought and cholera playing out in the Deccan.28 
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 At first glance, it would appear that authorities in India had learned nothing from 
their long experience with cholera.  In the first weeks of the plague outbreak, officials in 
Bombay tried to reassure both Bombay’s urban populace and international observers that 
the epidemic was not truly plague, but rather a “bubonic fever” or “plague of a mild 
type.”  Moreover, reports to the contrary were denounced as “scaremongering.”29  Given 
the state’s prior reluctance to acknowledge the full extent of cholera outbreaks, its fear of 
provoking public opposition, particularly among Muslims, and its unwillingness to spend 
more than the absolute minimum amount of money on public health for India’s native 
population, such denials might lead us to believe that British India’s response to plague 
would be less than impressive.  However, once the plague had been announced in 
October 1896, the Government of the Bombay Presidency and municipal authorities in 
the city acted with a speed and aggressiveness never before witnessed during previous 
epidemics. 30 
 Within a few days of the official admission of the outbreak quarantine measures 
had been imposed against Indian vessels at Suez and at numerous ports the world over.  It 
is important to note, however, that under the more lenient rules of Venice Convention of 
1892 the quarantine at Suez was no longer an obstacle to most commercial ships.  French 
and other Mediterranean ports would prove to be much less flexible.  In Marseilles, 
passengers arriving on steamers from Bombay were not permitted to land, while other 
ports opted to tighten the regulations agreed upon at the Venice and Dresden conferences.  
France, Germany, and Italy all imposed restrictions or total bans on the importation of 
Indian raw hides and other suspect items like raw cotton, which had been deemed likely 
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to harbor plague by an emergency sanitary conference held in Venice in 1897.  Some 
nations even banned tea imported from Bombay.  Others, opting for a slightly less 
stringent response, decided to disinfect suspect products only to those ships sailing from 
ports known to be infected.  The accumulated economic impact of these restrictions was 
swift and severe.  Although Bombay was the primary target of these restrictions, Calcutta 
also suffered great losses, despite the fact that it was practically untouched by plague.  
Bombay, however, suffered more from restrictions placed upon its commerce with other 
Indian ports.  Combined with the interruption of its export trade and the flight of some 
100,000 people, the city’s commercial operations were decimated.31                            
 Fearing that the plague, like cholera before it, might escape India’s borders and 
find its way to Europe, the international community threatened a total embargo on trade 
with not only Bombay but all of India unless colonial administrators decided to take 
decisive action to contain the outbreak.32  In order to satisfy these demands, in an 
unprecedented step the government imposed a full quarantine, rather the customary 
system of medical inspections, at Madras, Karachi, Calcutta, and Rangoon against all 
vessels sailing out of Bombay.33  Internally, the municipal authorities took even more 
drastic steps.  Under the Municipal Act of 1888, the powers vested in local authorities 
allowed “the enforced segregation and hospitalization of suspected cases and municipal 
health officers’ right of entry into infected buildings.”  At the same time, officials 
launched a massive campaign of “urban cleansing.”  They “flush[ed] out drains and 
sewers with oceans of seawater and carbolic, scouring out scores of shops and grain 
warehouses (in the vicinity of which many of the first cases had occurred, sprinkling 
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disinfectant powder in alleyways and tenements.   Even more tragically, this brutal 
campaign also destroyed “several hundred slum dwellings in the hope of extirpating the 
disease before it could fully establish itself.”34 
 Despite this energetic, if brutal, response, the plague continue to spread 
throughout the city.  Faced with the gruesome prospect of combating plague across the 
entire subcontinent, on 4 February 1897, Lord Elgin, the Viceroy at the time, approved 
“An Act to Provide for Better Prevention of the Spread of Dangerous Epidemic Disease.”  
This piece of legislation was hurried through Elgin’s council and approved with little 
debate.  The act applied to all of India and took effect immediately upon its passage.  It 
was a drastic departure from previous sanitary measures and its powers were applied in a 
ruthless, almost reckless fashion.  Under its provisions official were now allowed to 
inspect any ship or suspect passenger; to detain and segregate those suspected of 
infection; to destroy infected property; to disinfect or simply destroy any dwelling 
suspected of harboring plague; to prohibit large gathers, such as fair and pilgrimages; and 
to examine and detain rail passengers.  In short, India’s medical personnel were 
unleashed upon populace with few restrictions.35 
 Men, women, and children were dragged from their homes, their belongings burnt 
and their shrines and places of worship desecrated.  Victims of the disease were 
kidnapped, their families only finding out about their whereabouts after they had died in 
quarantine.  With some four out of five victims dying in the government-run plague 
camps and very few ever returning home alive, rumors ran wild.  Some even suspected 
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that victims were being murdered by the authorities “to extract a vital oil to be employed 
as a magic ointment by Europeans.”36 
 While for decades officials in Britain and India and their delegates at the 
numerous sanitary conferences of the period had claimed that bold sanitary restrictions 
would inflame the religious passions of their Indian subjects, during the plague outbreak 
of 1896, Indian opinion was simply brushed aside as mere “superstition.”37  What then 
was catalyst for this dramatic change?  The colonial government’s new interventionist 
stance was likely the product of both internal and external pressures as well as by both 
medical and political factors.  The most important factor, however, was that the 
international pressure to control the plague swiftly and effectively was tremendous.38  
The foundations for British India’s transition to a more robust policy of sanitary 
interventionism had been some three to four decades in the making.  The international 
sanitary conferences had consistently pushed Britain to take action against its public 
heath crises, whether related to cholera or plague.  Finally, the tenth sanitary conference, 
which met in Venice in February and March 1897 specifically to address the plague 
emergency, pressed the Government of India to take extreme measures to ensure that the 
advance of plague be stopped at India’s shores.  The conference was essentially a final 
ultimatum: act now, undertake the international community’s suggestions, or India’s 
ports will be indefinitely closed to all foreign commerce.39  
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 Once the Indian Government had formally acknowledged the plague outbreak in 
October 1896, Ottoman and European officials demanded that the hajj be suspended.  In 
January and February of 1897, the duration of quarantine and disinfection periods at 
Kamarān and other Red Sea ports was raised from 10 to 15 and then eventually to 20 
days.  As a result, further departures of Indian pilgrims during the 1896-1897 season were 
forbidden.40  And for the first time ever, on 20 February 1897, the Government of India 
followed France and Russia in announcing that the hajj would be formally suspended as 
long plague prevailed.41  Unfortunately, however, some pilgrimage vessels had already 
left India before the ban.  The steamship Pekin arrived at Kamarān Island carrying two 
plague victims.42  And despite having been officially discouraged from making the 
pilgrimage, in June 1897, Foreign Office reports estimated around 2,500 Indian pilgrims 
present in Jidda, some 5,000 in Mecca, and around 4,000 still at Yanbū‘.  Not 
surprisingly, at the end of the pilgrimage season plague broke out in Jidda.  Despite rather 
dubious claims from British officials in the Red Sea that this outbreak originated from 
Yemen’s Tihāma coast or from among “the poorer Arabs from Hadramout,” who 
appeared “to have been the first and chief sufferers,” the international community 
remained nonplussed.  India was once again to blame for bringing epidemic disease to the 
Hijaz.43 
 With the plague having made its way to the Hijaz during the 1896-1897 
pilgrimage season, it was the expressed “wish of the Constantinople Sanitary Board that 
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the prohibition against Moslem pilgrimage from India should be maintained.”44  
Although the Secretary of State for India ultimately opted not to impose a total ban on the 
hajj during the 1898 season, authorities remained convinced that half-hearted sanitary 
controls would no longer be tolerated by the international community.  As a result, 
pilgrims were publicly discouraged from making the journey during the 1898 season.45  
Instead, pilgrims were encouraged to save their money for upcoming seasons.  
Authorities announced the imposition of lengthier and more stringent quarantines in the 
Red Sea.  Even more important were the internal restrictions placed on would-be pilgrims 
within the subcontinent itself.  No pilgrims were allowed from the Bombay Presidency, 
nor were pilgrims allowed to begin their journey from Bombay.  Thus, pilgrims were 
rerouted to other ports via specially isolated trains, provincial and central observation 
camps were set up along these new routes, and pilgrims were segregated and placed 
under medical supervision at their port of embarkation.  Perhaps the most effective 
restriction was placed on pilgrimage brokers and shipping agents, who were prohibited 
from selling hajj-related tickets except with in the purpose-built observation camps.  As a 
result of these more aggressive steps, only 893 Indian pilgrims arrived at Kamarān Island 
during the 1898 season.  Even still, the disease struck Jidda yet again in March 1898.46 
 After successive seasons of plague in Jidda, the Constantinople Board of Health 
drew up new regulations, based on recommendations of the Venice Convention of 1897, 
in the hope that plague outbreaks would not become an annual occurrence in the Hijaz.  
Under these new rules, all ships carrying pilgrims would be diverted to Aden for a 
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shipboard medical inspection before being allowed to continue onward to Kamarān and 
Jidda.  In addition to this extra precaution, strict quarantine measures were imposed on all 
persons, whether pilgrims or not, leaving Jidda by land or sea.  In an even more drastic 
step the entire town was cordoned off.  Pilgrims were forced to land outside the town and 
routed directly to Mecca.  As a result, Jidda’s merchants were completely cut off from 
their principal source of income.  The devastating economic impact of these restrictions, 
the intensification of European involvement in the local affairs of the port, and the 
carnage wrought by repeated bouts of plague set the stage for confrontation.  That same 
year some 1,500 Jiddawis rioted against the quarantine and looted the quarantine 
facilities outside the city’s Mecca gate.47 
 It was precisely this climate of chaos and fear that Mīrzā ‘Alī Khān Amīn al-
Dawlah (1844-1904), the former Grand Vizier of Iran, and his companions faced on their 
1899 journey to Mecca.  While these men were neither poor pilgrims nor Indians, even 
these wealthy, powerful aristocrats would have to stare down their own mortality along 
their route to the Hijaz.  Even before they had set out from Iran, they were strongly 
discouraged from traveling by both an Ottoman sanitary official (sent specifically to 
monitor Iranian precautions against the Indian plague) and the Russian embassy.  As they 
traveled they obsessively inquired about the “rumors of plague in Jidda.”48  And as the 
reports of the disease continued in each new port along the way, their conversations 
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frequently oscillated between expressions of bravery in the face of adversity, fear, 
uncertainty, regret, and resignation to God’s will.  As Amīn al-Dawlah explains:     
   The frequency of the news of plague in Jidda confused everyone, and they sometimes  
   blamed my stubbornness in undertaking travel to the Hijaz, because to throw oneself  
   into a fire and to put oneself in a situation in which you will certainly die; it is against  
   reason and religion.  I wished health and safety, not for myself, but for my companions.   
   I wished that, God willing, we would return to our homeland in good condition, and  
   that I would not be responsible [for bringing harm to them].49 
 
At other times along the journey, however, Amīn al-Dawlah displays the kind of suicidal 
resignation to his destiny and inclination toward martyrdom that British officials 
repeatedly complained about when referencing the poorer pilgrims of India, many of 
whom believed that perishing en route to Mecca or in Mecca would send them straight to 
Paradise.   
    If plague in Jidda is verified, it is against reason and logic to proceed toward death by  
    one’s own footsteps… [However,] we need not be afraid of the plague that is in the   
    way of God’s house.  If we are destined to die this year, it is better that our reward is  
    given to us by God according to the divine promise.50 
 
His companions were more realistic, however, and warned him that they would not allow 
him to behave so rashly.  They replied:   
   With plague it is not an opportunity to show your mystical bravery.  And if it is proven  
   that there is disease their [in Jidda].  We will not allow you to move.  We will have to  
   choose another route.  After entering Istanbul we may decide…51 
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    Though first-hand accounts of pilgrims traveling directly toward a known 
epidemic or plague-stricken city are understandably few and far between, it is reasonable 
to believe that the feelings expressed by Amīn al-Dawlah and his companions give at 
least some indication of the conflicting fears and motivations that animated the countless 
masses of hajjis who braved the numerous cholera and plague outbreaks of the period in 
question.  The final cholera outbreaks of 1907-1908 and 1911-1912 not withstanding, the 
successive plague outbreaks in Jidda and the Hijaz just before the turn of the century 
represent something of a climax in the international and inter-imperial struggles over 
sanitary control of the hajj.52  Both the British and Ottoman empires took previously 
unthinkable steps in order to avoid allowing plague to become endemic to the Hijaz.  
While it is tempting to focus our attention solely on the global political and diplomatic 
implications of cholera and plague, it is crucial that we not overlook the very real 
sufferings and deaths of the countless pilgrims who died in an attempt to reach the 
pinnacle of their spiritual lives as Muslims.  
 From 1890 to 1919, cholera deaths in India averaged around 4 million per decade, 
while plague is estimated to have swept away some 10 million souls during roughly the 
same period (1896-1921).53  While cholera and plague continued to haunt India and the 
Hijaz during the first two decades of the twentieth century, in the wake of Bombay 
plague outbreak of 1896, Britain’s longstanding policy of opposition to the 
implementation of sanitary restrictions was no longer politically viable.  As a result of 
having finally acknowledged international concerns regarding quarantine and pilgrimage 
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procedures during the sanitary conferences of the 1890s, at least one aspect of Britain’s 
dilemma regarding its pilgrimage policy was settled.  However, the problem of Pan-Islam 
and anti-colonial radicalism still remained. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
ALL THE CALIPH’S CONSPIRATORS:  
INDIA, THE HAJJ, AND PAN-ISLAM DURING WORLD WAR I
 
 
 The rule of the Turk is regarded as drawing to a close by people of position in 
 Mecca, fanatical or liberal.  Our policy now should be guided by our intentions, or 
 at least our wishes, when that rule ceases.  If we have no views, it would be well 
 to form them.  We ought to be ready, and making up our mind in time… 
                                                                  -G.P. Devey, British Consul, Jidda, 18971 
   
 The Muhammadans in Asia, Europe and Africa adorned themselves with all sorts 
 of arms and rushed to join the jehad in the path of God.  Thanks to Almighty God 
 that the Turkish Army and the Mujahidin have overcome the enemies of Islam… 
 Oh Muslims, therefore attack the tyrannical Christian government under whose 
 bondage you are… Hasten to put all your efforts, with strong resolution, to 
 strangle the enemy to death and show your hatred and enmity for them. 
                                              -Ghalib Pasha, Ottoman Governor of the Hijaz, 19152  
 
 We have had a lot of disquieting reports about the propaganda of the Pan-
 Islamists in and out of India and there can be little doubt but that there has been a 
 good deal of contact and sympathy between them, the Wahabis [colonial 
 shorthand for Pan-Islamic radicals] and the Maulvi [‘ulama’] class.  But up to the 
 present the Muhammadan ill-feeling against us has manifested itself only in a 
 number of unpleasant incidents which outwardly at least are connected into one 
 big movement.  Pan-Islamist journalists have written very objectionable articles, 
 Maulvis have praised the Sultan of Turkey and jehad, religious teachers have 
 shaken the dust of India from their feet as a sign that they considered it an unholy 
 country [dar al-harb], schoolboys have been instigated to join our fanatical 
 enemies across the frontier…  
                             -Criminal Intelligence Office, Shimla/Delhi, 19163 
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Caliph and Ka‘ba: Pan-Islam and the Reunification 
 of Indian Muslim Public Opinion on the Eve of World War I 
 
 In many ways, the Pan-Islamic connections between India and the Ottoman 
Empire, first forged during the Russo-Turkish War and throughout the reign of Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II, had matured by the dawn of the twentieth century.  The methods of 
symbolic mobilization, journalism, political organization, and fundraising devised and 
honed during Abdul Hamid II’s reign had proven that Pan-Islam could be both an 
effective method of anti-imperial resistance and a way to foster varying degrees of 
nationalistic solidarity among disparate groups of Indian Muslims.  Pan-Islam also 
provided Indian Muslim activists a measure of protection against British objections.  
Given Queen Victoria’s post-Mutiny guarantees of religious freedom, Indian Muslims 
were able to argue that their organizational and financial efforts to support the Ottoman 
Sultan-Caliph and the protection of the Holy Places were wholly legitimate expressions 
of religion, rather than seditious acts of jihad or nationalism.  Thus, by expressing 
political discontent in terms of the defense of religion, Pan-Islamic symbolism allowed 
groups that had not previously dared to voice their opinions publicly to reenter the 
political arena.4    
Since the divergent cultural and educational reform movements that came in 
response to the events of 1857-1858, however, Muslim elites had been divided into 
polarized factions.  After the carnage of the Great Rebellion, it had become clear to most 
Indian Muslims that waging jihad against British hegemony was at best futile and at 
worst suicidal.  In light of this conclusion, both Muslim political leaders and the ‘ulama’ 
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came to the consensus that their best interests lay in the cultivation of educational, 
religious, and cultural affairs, and in strengthening the Muslim community from within.5  
This process of adaptation to the newly-imposed British regime generated two 
main responses.  For the ‘ulama’, Muslim reform could only be achieved through the 
purification and standardization of Islamic practices and a staunch refusal to collaborate 
with British rule.  The most prominent example of this strand of ‘ulama’-led revival was 
the Deoband movement.  Because this movement was founded in 1867, at a time when 
the British had stripped away the umma’s expectations of protection under an Islamic 
state, it was envisioned as a state-less community of revitalized religious practice under 
the leadership of the ‘ulama’. Thus, instead of relying on political organization as their 
method of communal solidarity, its members used local madrasas as their avenue to 
preserve and reform the personal religious practices of Muslims.  Deoband’s reform 
college, the Dār al-‘Ulūm, instituted a curriculum that stressed the study of the revealed 
sciences and Islamic law over the study of modern science.  In fact, the Deoband 
curriculum was explicitly designed to train students for a public mission: to instruct the 
community in the “orthodox” practice of Islam.  By reforming or opposing syncretistic 
festivals, the veneration of saints, and other parochial rituals, the Deobandis strove to 
integrate Muslims of varied geographical backgrounds and particular cults into a more 
homogenous version of Islam.  Acting as professional spiritual guides in this process of 
standardization, the Deobandis instructed their communities not only in the madrasas, 
but also through Urdu vernacular publications. The result was a wide-spread middle- and 
                                                 
   
5
 Francis Robinson, “The Muslims of Upper India and the Shock of the Mutiny,” in Islam and Muslim 
History in South Asia (Oxford and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 138-155; Ira Lapidus, The 
History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 630-631.  
  
128 
lower-middle class base of support, paving the way for the opening of more than forty 
branch schools within thirty years of its founding. 6  
While there were significant differences between the two, the Deobandis also 
shared a great deal in common with older scholarly centers of the subcontinent like 
Farangi Mahal, a maze of residences and courtyards in the Lucknow Chauk.  Founded 
during the reign of Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707), Farangi Mahal remained among the most 
influential centers of Islamic scholarship in the subcontinent thanks to Mulla 
Nizamuddin’s dars-i nizami, the basic Islamic curriculum taught in Indian madrasas from 
the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries.  Although this curriculum emphasized “rational 
studies,” such as Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, and jurisprudence, rather than solely 
focusing on Qur’an and hadith as in the case of the Deobandis, its reform-minded and 
regularized institutional structure mirrored the efforts being undertaken by its Deobandi 
counterparts.7   
In many ways, the worldview of ‘ulama’ groups like the Deobandis and Farangi 
Mahal was built upon the earlier Delhi-based intellectual traditions of Shāh Walīullāh (d. 
1762) and his son Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (d. 1824).  However, they also drew upon the 
grassroots revivalist model of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi and its Arabian influences.  The 
most significant difference between the Barelwis and the post-Mutiny ‘ulama’, however, 
were their respective positions on political involvement and jihad.  In the wake of the 
Mutiny, the ‘ulama’ opted to avoid methods of direct confrontation and political 
mobilization lest they meet the same fate as Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi or that of the Sepoy 
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mutineers.  Thus, while the ‘ulama’ maintained a stoic silence on political issues, they 
still harbored deep anti-British and Pan-Islamic sentiments.8 
Conversely, the former Mughal political elites focused their attention on 
educational reforms designed to facilitate the absorption of Western science and the 
creation of a modernist Muslim political identity.  The most famous example of this trend 
is undoubtedly Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), scion of a family that served first 
under the Mughals and then under the British, who argued that Muslims were not only 
dependant on British favor but that British rule was in fact lawful.  According to Ahmad 
Khan, British rule and its post-Mutiny pledge of non-interference in religious affairs 
allowed Muslims to live in peace and under the shari‘a.  As a result, Ahmad Khan 
consistently opposed Pan-Islamic agitation and Indian nationalist sentiments, while 
remaining loyal to the British, Western educational reforms, and his dream of a future 
British-Muslim power-sharing arrangement.9   
In Ahmad Khan’s mind, Western educational and technological superiority 
offered proof that the umma was in desperate need of reform.  If Muslims were the 
recipients of God’s final revelation, why were they no longer prospering, innovating, and 
ruling?  It seemed to him that if Muslims were being surpassed by British innovations 
that the umma’s understanding of Islam had wandered astray.  This convinced him that 
Indian Muslims would have to learn from the British and their advances in modern 
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technology before they could resume any position of power.  Nowhere was Ahmad 
Khan’s secular-liberal style more evident than in his approach to educational reform.  In 
1875, he founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, which was 
designed to be India’s Muslim version of Eaton.  The school encouraged political 
conservativism, rooted in an understanding of British governmental institutions and the 
gentlemanly skills of British culture.  Aligarh also exposed its students to a hybrid 
curriculum of Islamic studies, English, and Western science.  Its goal was to forge an 
Islamic brand of modernism that could reconcile Western science, secularism, and 
political theory with the fundamental teachings of the Qur’an.  However, while Aligarh 
began as a loyalist institution, by the first two decades of the twentieth century it 
eventually became the training ground of the Indian subcontinent’s twentieth-century 
Muslim nationalist leaders and hotbed of anti-imperialism.  Aligarh’s students were 
instrumental in forging a nationalist Indian Muslim identity, which ultimately spawned 
the All-India Muslim League, its successor the Muslim League, and eventually the 
creation of the Muslim-majority Pakistani state in 1947.10 
While Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s college at Aligarh was successful in its creation of 
reform-minded, nationalist political elites, it did not, however, capture the imagination of 
the ‘ulama’ or a hegemonic hold on the loyalty of the masses.  The ‘ulama’ of north India 
and their millions of followers did not share Ahmad Khan’s enthusiasm for British rule 
and innovation.  Instead, they saw their primary role as the protectors of faith and 
religious heritage during a time of non-Muslim rule.  For the ‘ulama’, Ahmad Khan’s 
attempt to westernize the Muslim upper classes through secular, English-language 
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schooling was simply an anathema.  This split helped to create separate educational and 
reform philosophies, one designed with primarily local political objectives and one with 
more universal religious objectives.  The “institutional dualism” created by the rift 
between the ‘ulama’ and the modernist political elites conditioned a remarkably durable 
pattern of tension and competition between Islamic revivalism and secular nationalism, 
which in turn conditioned different orientations toward British rule, Pan-Islam, and 
eventually to the nationalist politics that led to Indian independence and partition in 
1947.11                 
 While the Western-educated elites graduating from Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s 
loyalist school, the Aligarh Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, might have seemed 
unlikely to join forces with the religiously-educated ‘ulama’ of the Deobandi or Farangi 
Mahal schools and vice versa, at the beginning of the twentieth century the Indian 
Muslim political environment was undergoing a radical transformation.  From 1885 to 
1911, the loyalty of Western-educated Muslim elites to the British was severely eroded as 
events in the Middle East and India began to reinforce Muslim anxieties of British and 
Hindu domination.  At the local level, the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, 
had already begun to gain momentum toward Indian national independence.  It expressed 
Indian resentment of British arrogance and racial superiority, called for increased Indian 
participation in civil service, demanded increased political representation, and opposed 
British economic policies that threatened Indian interests.  However, Congress was 
dominated by Hindu lawyers, who seemed to outmaneuver their Muslim counterparts at 
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every turn.  In both the 1880s and 1890s British efforts to reform municipal self-
government in India resulted in electoral systems that heavily favored Hindu interests.  In 
light of governmental policies that deliberately favored Hindu civil servants and political 
appointees over Muslim candidates, the first episodes of Hindu-Muslim communal riots, 
and the Hindu crusade against the dominant place of Urdu in governmental affairs, even 
loyal Muslims and Western-educated elites began to question whether their long-standing 
policy of collaboration with British interests was still appropriate.  However, no single 
event shifted Muslim opinion more than the partition of Bengal.  In 1905, the British had 
created a Muslim-majority province in Eastern Bengal and Assam, but under Hindu 
pressure had reversed their decision in 1911.  In the minds of many Muslims, even the 
loyalists of Aligarh, this reversal was viewed as a sign that collaboration and loyalty were 
utterly discredited.  However, the final straw among the Aligarh community was when 
the government halted plans for the opening of an Aligarh Muslim University in 1912.  
Thereafter, a new generation of Western-educated Muslim officials, lawyers, and 
journalists that had graduated from Aligarh began to distance themselves from the earlier 
loyalties of Sayyid Ahmad Khan.  Indeed, the younger generation became more radical 
and thus more amenable to both the goals of Pan-Islam and Indian nationalism.12   
 To make matters worse, events in the Ottoman Empire and the greater Middle 
East seemed to prove that the Muslim world was tottering on the brink of disaster.  In 
1897 came the Greco-Turkish war, followed by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 to 
create spheres of influence in Iran, the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II by the 
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Young Turks in 1908, from 1911 to 1913 a rapid succession of Muslim defeats in the 
Turco-Italian and Balkan conflicts, and the French imposition of a protectorate over 
Morocco.  Taken as a whole, these events were interpreted by the Muslim press as a plot 
by the Christian powers of Europe to crush the Ottoman Empire, the Caliph, even religion 
of Islam itself.  Part of this conspiracy theory was based on the belief that European 
agents were covertly attempting to sow the seeds of revolt among the Ottoman Empire’s 
Arab population.  During this same period, there was also a spate of rumors and 
conspiracy theories claiming Italy and Britain had entered into an anti-Islamic alliance 
and were  threatening “to bomb the Ka‘ba in Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet in 
Medina in order to pressure Turkey into suing for peace.”13   
As Muslim frustrations and fears mounted, the Western-educated and religiously-
educated factions of Muslim India finally began to combine forces.  This new sense of 
unity and anti-British feeling brought forward a new circle of leaders: Aligarh men, such 
as the brothers Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali and their classmate Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. 
Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, Maulana Abul-Kalam Azad, Maulana Mahmud Hasan of 
Deoband, and Maulana Abdul Bari and Shaykh Mushir Husain Qidwai of Farangi Mahal.  
This new generation of Muslim leaders collaborated to found a variety of new journals 
and charitable organizations, ostensibly designed to raise money and medical aid for their 
Muslim brothers in the Ottoman Empire, to protect and defend the Holy Places, and to 
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aid Muslims making the hajj, but which eventually transformed into more outwardly anti-
British and nationalistic activities.14 
The Balkan conflicts quickly sparked new currents of Muslim militancy in the 
Urdu press.  In 1912, a young ‘alim-turned-journalist, Abul-Kalam Azad founded al-
Hilal (the Crescent).  Al-Hilal blended Middle East news, religious reforms, and satirical 
Urdu poetry with a healthy dose of gory battlefield photographs and stories from the 
Turkish frontlines.  Moreover, al-Hilal preached that Muslims were a single people 
bound by religion and their Caliph.  Thus, Azad argued that the time for jihad had arrived 
and that it was the duty of Muslims to push for Indian home rule and to actively support 
the Ottoman Caliphate.15  In many ways, al-Hilal’s Pan-Islamic message was mirrored by 
Muhammad Ali’s Comrade and Zafar Ali Khan’s Zamindar.  As Gail Minault argues, the 
overarching goal of these three major journals was “to speak for Muslims in general” in 
an attempt “to create a consensus of Muslim opinion they could then represent.”16   
 As a result of the Urdu press’s increasingly grim reports from the Ottoman 
Empire and across the Islamic world, literate Indian Muslims were profoundly disturbed.  
Through the efforts of the aforementioned journals and a number of similar papers and 
organizations, Indian Muslims demonstrated their heart-felt support for their Ottoman 
coreligionists by establishing and contributing large sums of money to Turkish relief 
funds.  In 1913, al-Hilal also launched a successful boycott of European goods similar to 
that of the Hindu Swadeshi campaign, which was supported by fatwas (Islamic legal 
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opinions) from a number of leading ‘ulama’.17  Shaukat Ali issued an appeal to organize 
a volunteer corps to fight on behalf of the Ottomans in the Balkans.  Similarly, his 
younger brother Muhammad Ali advocated that funds collected for the stalled Aligarh 
University project should be handed over to the Ottomans as a loan.  The call for war-
time financial support even prompted the Deobandi ‘ulama’ to issue a fatwa, which made 
it obligatory upon Muslims to donate funds to the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, even 
declaring it permissible to divert zakat (required almsgiving) funds if necessary.18  As a 
result of both the intense media coverage and fatwas concerning the Turkish relief effort, 
by May 1913, Indian Muslims had donated more than half of the total amount of relief 
funds that reached the Ottoman Red Crescent Society from all over the Islamic world.19  
While India’s financial support of the Ottoman war effort was substantial and cut across 
previous factional divisions between Aligarhis and the various ‘ulama’ groups, the most 
notable organizational successes of the period were those of the Indian Red Crescent 
Mission to Turkey and the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba (Society of the Servants of the 
Ka‘ba).  Through these activities, leaders from the Indian Muslim community were able 
to travel to the Hijaz, Egypt, Istanbul, and the Ottoman frontlines, bringing them into 
direct contact with Ottoman dignitaries and anti-colonial activists from across the Islamic 
world.  It is also through these earlier Pan-Islamic schemes that we begin to see the 
emergence of the organizational framework around which the Khilafat Movement, 
India’s first mass nationalist movement, would ultimately form. 
 The idea of sending a medical mission to the Ottoman Empire was first expressed 
by Shaukat Ali in the Comrade on 12 October 1912.  Just one week later it was 
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announced that Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, a former resident at the Charing Cross 
Hospital in London, had been asked to organize the mission.  Ansari’s preparations 
proceeded quickly and within less than a month the mission was deemed ready for 
departure.  The mission consisted of 5 doctors and 19 female nurses, representing all 
parts of India.  On 15 December 1912, the mission departed for Turkey with the blessings 
of the Viceroy, who received the entire delegation in Bombay.  Each member wore a 
distinctive Turkish cap, a khaki quasi-military uniform handsomely adorned with red and 
silver crescents, and a coat embroidered with the Arabic inscription: al-wafd al-tibbiyya 
min bilād al-Hind (the Medical Delegation from India).  Upon their arrival in Istanbul, 
they stayed for several weeks before continuing to the front, during which time, they met 
with high-ranking officials, including Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha, as well as other 
Young Turks, and Egyptian nationalists, most notably Abdul Aziz Shawish.  Armed with 
warm expressions of Turkish gratitude and their own glowing impressions from their 
experience in Istanbul, they crafted a series of pro-Ottoman articles, which were 
published in the Indian Muslim press.20  While the importance of the Indian Red Crescent 
Mission has often been overlooked or downplayed as merely a humanitarian gesture, the 
political contacts made by Ansari and the Red Crescent Mission were in fact substantial.  
As Ansari himself emphasized, the mission was responsible for “the formation of a bond 
of union between the Turkish nation and the Indians.”21  Subsequently, Ansari, Shawish, 
the Ali brothers, and Zafar Ali Khan would collaborate with Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha 
in an attempt to raise the funds needed to establish a refugee colony for Muslims 
dislocated by the Balkan conflict.  Ansari and the Ali brothers would also attempt to 
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promote the sale of Turkish bonds in India.22  Although these schemes ultimately failed 
to gain any real traction, the relationships formed between all the parties involved provide 
important clues about subsequent Pan-Islamic activities, particularly the formation of the 
Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba, which is widely considered to be the most important 
forerunner of the Khilafat Movement. 
 The idea for the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba originated with Abdul Bari, the 
leading figure of Farangi Mahal at the time.  Abdul Bari’s enthusiastic support of the 
Sultan-Caliph can be traced back to the Greco-Turkish war in 1897.  Upon Turkey’s 
victory, Lucknow Muslims celebrated the occasion and forwarded a congratulatory 
message to the Sultan-Caliph.  When Abdul Bari performed the hajj in 1910-1911, he 
took the opportunity to visit Istanbul, at which time he became fascinated by the Ottoman 
capital, which he considered to be “last vestige of Islamic greatness.”23  During the 
Balkan wars, Abdul Bari and his students traveled across north India collecting funds for 
Turkish relief and for the Red Crescent Medical Mission.  As a result of these fundraising 
efforts, he came into contact with the Dr. Ansari, the Ali brothers, and other Aligarh men 
who were engaged in the same campaign.  Abdul Bari was first introduced to the Ali 
brothers in December 1912 by Shaykh Mushir Husain Qidwai, one of his former 
students.  Upon their meeting, Abdul Bari suggested that they form a society dedicated to 
protecting the Holy Places of Islam from harm at the hands of the European colonial 
powers, suggesting that the Ottoman Empire could no longer do the job alone.  He 
proposed that they call it the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba (Society of the Servants of the 
Ka‘ba), and suggested that they should open its membership to all Indian Muslims.  
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Through the organization, he argued that they could raise funds to ensure the safety of 
Mecca and Medina and offer aid to indigent pilgrims.24 
 For their part, the Ali brothers were impressed by Abdul Bari’s ideas.  For some 
time they had hoped to use their considerable political and journalistic influence in order 
to nurture an issue that could unite all Indian Muslims behind a single cause.  While their 
previous Turkish relief efforts had been successful, those projects lacked both the 
religious rationale and symbolic value of the association suggested by Abdul Bari.  
Equally important, this would also mark the first major collaboration between the secular 
Aligarhis and the ‘ulama’.  The depth of this collaboration is further demonstrated by the 
fact that in subsequent years Abdul Bari took the Ali brothers as his religious disciples.  
Under his tutelage, they read the Qur’an in Urdu and corresponded with him about 
questions of spiritual import.25 
 Shortly after their first meeting, the Anjuman was formed and on 31 March 1913, 
the Ali brothers made the idea public in a speech given in Amritsar.  Abdul Bari became 
the president (Khādim al-Khuddām or servant of the servants), while Mushir Husain 
Qidwai and Shaukat Ali served as general secretaries.  According to its promoters, the 
Anjuman’s chief aims were to maintain the honor and sanctity of the Ka‘ba and the other 
Holy Places of Islam and to defend them against non-Muslim aggression, purposes which 
they claimed were “strictly religious, having nothing to do with politics.”26  In order to  
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Figure 9.  Dastūr al-‘Amal (Rules of the Society), 
 Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka'ba, 1913.27 
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accomplish these rather amorphous goals, the founding members sought to solicit a one 
rupee membership fee each year from every Muslim in India.  The money collected from 
membership dues was to be divided into three parts: one third was to be given to any 
independent Muslim state that was in charge of the Holy Places (i.e. the Ottoman 
Empire); one third was devoted to orphanages, schools, and other Islamic missionary 
activities; and the remainder was reserved for the future defense of the Ka‘ba and for 
aiding pilgrims.28   
 It was also hoped that the Anjuman’s membership rolls would be expanded by 
establishing branch offices throughout the subcontinent.  Each new member was required 
to take an oath of loyalty to the Anjuman, promising to maintain the dignity of the Ka‘ba 
and to sacrifice life and property if necessary.29  In addition to the oath of allegiance, each 
member was expected to prominently display a yellow and black crescent logo, bearing 
the name Khādim-i Ka‘ba (servant of the Ka‘ba) on their clothing.30 
 While the goals stated in the organization’s Dastūr al-‘Amal (Rules of the 
Society), were by no means political in nature, from the outset the lofty ambitions of the 
society’s founders betrayed the true character of the Anjuman.  It was hoped that the first 
year’s dues would amount to around a crore (ten million rupees).31  It was proposed that 
this far-fetched sum could be used build a Muslim fleet to protect the Holy Places or 
failing that to buy at least one dreadnought for the Turkish navy.  If not a Muslim navy, it 
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was thought that the Anjuman might purchase airplanes for presentation to the Ottomans.  
Another scheme called for funds to be earmarked for sending Indians abroad for military 
training.  More realistic goals included the formation of a Turco-Indian Steamship 
Company to carry pilgrims from Bombay to Jidda in an attempt to break the British 
monopoly over the pilgrimage traffic.  Eventually, however, the Anjuman concentrated 
on the more manageable task of aiding indigent pilgrims.  Thus, Shaukat Ali went to 
Bombay and secured a license as a pilgrimage broker.  He promised all pilgrims that their 
tickets, passports, and safety concerns would be well provided for and that all proceeds 
from the sale of tickets would be dedicated to the Anjuman’s fund for indigent pilgrims.32                        
 Although the Anjuman’s cause was extremely popular, the immediate effects of 
its projects were limited.  Some prospective members refused to agree to the rather 
weighty terms of the society’s oath of allegiance.  Nor did the Anjuman raise the kind of 
funds it had hoped for.  While membership topped 20,000 within a year, including some 
2,000 female members, even these impressive numbers could not come close to raising a 
million rupees.  Further setbacks came in the wake of a bookkeeping scandal at the 
Anjuman’s head office in Delhi.  More importantly, with the outbreak of World War I, 
the Anjuman’s activities were abruptly cut short and the Delhi office was forced to close.  
Given the mounting tensions between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the Anjuman had 
been forbidden to send aid to Istanbul without the permission of the government.  As 
Azmi Özcan points out, “the Anjuman was now in a difficult position because, under its 
rules, up to half of the amount of its funds were to be paid to the protector of the Holy 
Places, viz. the Ottoman Sultan, with whom Britain was soon to be at war.”33  Even more 
                                                 
    
32
 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 36; Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 156-160.  
    
33
 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 158-161.  
  
142 
critical than its fiscal quandaries, however, was the fact that with the outbreak of World 
War I, the hajj route was closed, rendering even the Anjuman’s most practical aims a 
moot point.  In a further preemptive strike against the Anjuman, the Viceroy pledged 
“that the present status of the Holy Places would not change and they were to be immune 
from attacks.”34  Thus, for all intensive purposes the Anjuman’s raison d’être had ceased 
to exist.            
 As Minault explains, however, the formation of the Anjuman was “nevertheless, a 
significant step toward cooperation between the ‘ulama’ and the Western-educated 
Muslims, and it provided a pattern for future operations.”  Through the exploitation of 
religious symbols, such as the Ka‘ba, the Caliphate, and the Crescent, public opinion had 
been aroused.35  Thus, for the first time since the Great Rebellion of 1857 the Muslim 
community had united for a common cause.  The Indian ‘ulama’ had returned to the 
political arena and had sown the seeds that would ultimately form the roots of the 
dramatic Pan-Islamic conspiracies of World War I and the subsequent mass agitation 
campaigns that came in its wake. 
 Despite their repeated claims concerning the society’s strictly apolitical character, 
British intelligence officials from Cairo to Calcutta remained unconvinced.  Instead, they 
read the activities of the Indian Red Crescent Mission and the Anjuman merely as fronts 
for a vast Pan-Islamic conspiracy, connecting Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and India.  As 
this report, a “Note on the Pan-Islamic Movement and Its Effect on Political Agitation in 
India,” created by the Cairo police (19 March 1914), indicates: 
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    The promoters of the movement took advantage of the pro-Turkish feeling aroused   
    by the Balkan Wars and the constant arrival of Indians at Constantinople either as   
    representatives of the Red Crescent Society or as journalists… It may be said that  
    almost every Indian who visited Constantinople went back to his country fully  
    prepared to serve the Turks by helping to spread the principles of Pan-Islamism. 
        Some of those same Indians passed through Egypt where they met leaders of the  
    Nationalist Party with whom they conferred and to whom they confided that it was  
    the intention of Indian Moslems to form secret societies under cover of religion for   
    the purpose of sowing the seeds of Panislamism as desired by the Turks and that  
    they would endeavor to come to an understanding with their Hindoo brethren and   
    stir up the spirit of rebellion and independence throughout the whole country. 
        One of the most important if not the most important of these societies is the society  
    called the ‘The servants of Al-Kaaba’ (Khuddam el Kaaba)…(emphasis mine)36     
 
 
World War I and the Call for Jihad: Pan-Islamic Plots Revealed 
 On 1 November 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of 
Austria and Germany against the British Empire and the Allies.  However, when the news 
of the proclamation of jihad by Sultan Mehmed V (r.1909-1918) and the publication of 
five fatwas signed by the Shaykh al-Islam (the chief religious official or mufti of the 
Ottoman state) reached India early in December, the news failed to move Indian Muslims 
toward rebellion.  In the months preceding the Ottoman declaration of jihad, British 
intelligence officials reported an increased intensity in the correspondence between 
members of the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba, the Ottoman Vice-Consul in Bombay, and 
the presence of “several suspicious visitors” from the Turkish Red Crescent Society and  
the Committee for Union and Progress.  Intercepted letters between these persons of 
interest and the leading Pan-Islamists of India had indicated the Ottoman Empire’s intent 
to enter the war and their continued need for India financial contributions.37  During the 
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same period, India’s triumvirate of Pan-Islamic journalists, Muhammad Ali, Zafar Ali 
Khan, and Abul-Kalam Azad, had also launched a series of “objectionable” articles, 
“sneering at any loyal effusion” and expressing their admiration for both the Ottomans 
and their German allies.38  In response, “the government brought out its long arm and set 
the Press Act [of 1910] in motion to gag some of the Muslim papers and ban those 
imported from Turkey.”39  Despite the fact that colonial officials remained uneasy about 
the possibility of an Ottoman-inspired Muslim rebellion being concocted in the Muslim 
press, however, it was widely believed that “the Muslim community would remain 
passively hostile” so long as the government could assure Muslims that the Holy Places 
of the Hijaz as well as those in Iraq (Najaf and Karbala) would remain immune from 
Allied attacks.40 
 For the most part, the government’s assumption was correct.  The bulk of Muslim 
opinion remained loyal.  With the notable exceptions of Mahmud Hasan of Deoband and 
Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal and Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba fame, the government 
was able to secure support for a loyalist fatwa from most quarters of the ‘ulama’.  The 
fatwa stated that the Sultan’s declaration of jihad was invalid because the war between 
Britain and the Ottoman Empire was politically rather than religiously motivated.41  
Although it is important to point out that such expressions of loyalty were often 
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pragmatic political maneuvers aimed at the Indian Muslim community’s own self-
preservation, throughout the war’s duration, the vast majority of Indian Muslims 
remained loyal and contributed greatly to the defeat of their Caliph.  Indeed, some 
240,000 Indian Muslim soldiers, despite some desertions, fought and died for the British 
Crown.42  This fact was certainly not lost on Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who 
later admitted that without their assistance, “we should not have conquered Turkey at 
all.”43 
 While India remained relatively secure, the hajj, however, still remained a 
politically sensitive subject as well as the most important conduit through which the 
currents of Pan-Islamic anti-colonial radicalism continued to flow.  With the outbreak of 
hostilities between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the hajj once again became an 
Ottoman propaganda outlet.  In November 1914, leaflets were distributed to India 
pilgrims, proclaiming the jihad and stating that “the Allies were the enemies of Islam and 
that anyone who helped them was an infidel.”44  For the most part, however, Ottoman 
propaganda efforts were overshadowed by the more immediate need to evacuate Indian 
pilgrims from the Hijaz.  As Foreign Office reports indicate, upon hearing the news of 
fighting between the Ottomans and Russia, “the pilgrims were panic stricken and there 
was a great scare among them, and soon after return from Arafat to Mecca everybody 
hurried to reach Jeddah so as to catch the first steamer.”45  Unfortunately, only 3,000 of 
the nearly 12,000 Indian pilgrims present in the Hijaz were able to secure return tickets, 
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leaving the remainder “with heavy hearts, resigned… to the prospect of being stranded at 
Jeddah until the war was over.”46  The panic among the pilgrims sparked a dramatic spike 
in both the availability and price of food and transportation, instantly reducing many 
stranded pilgrims to a state of destitution.  Problems of price gouging were further 
compounded by the increased risk of pilgrimage vessels being confiscated either at Jidda 
or by hostile Ottoman warships at sea.  As a result, the Government of India became 
concerned that news of stranded, starving pilgrims might ignite a massive scandal with 
the potential to foment further civil unrest in India.  In response, the Viceroy felt initiated 
a program to arrange for food aid and rescue ships, indemnifying shipping companies 
involved in the pilgrimage trade against any possible losses incurred in rescuing the 
stranded hajjis.  Furthermore, it was deemed necessary that the Red Sea pilgrimage route 
should be constantly patrolled by British warships.47 
 Despite having averted this initial humanitarian crisis, by January 1915, it had 
become clear from the reports of returning hajjis that Ottoman propaganda activities in 
the Hjiaz and India had begun to bear fruit.  It was reported that 700 pilgrims had 
remained in the Hijaz in order to fight on behalf of the Caliph.  These hajjis-turned-
mujahidin had come under the influence of Atta Muhammad and Abdul Wahid Aba, both 
of whom were members of the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba.  This discovery would only 
reconfirm previous British suspicions concerning the Anjuman and its leadership’s true 
intentions.48  However, even this rather significant act of subversion was little more than 
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a prelude to an even larger web of Pan-Islamic and anti-colonial conspiracies, which once 
again followed the pilgrimage route. 
 In August 1916, the plot known as the “Silk Letter Conspiracy” was uncovered.  
Spearheaded by the Deobandi ‘alim, Maulana Mahmud Hasan, the plot was an ambitious 
bid to raise a frontier jihad in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier in order to 
overthrow British rule in India.  Up to a decade in the making, Mahmud Hasan had 
dispatched his former student Ubaidullah Sindhi to Kabul,49 where he would establish 
contacts with a group of students from Lahore and the Northwest Frontier, who had 
crossed into Afghanistan as a result of Mahmud Hasan’s 1915 fatwa, which had called 
for Indian Muslims to perform the hijra (migration of Muslims to escape a territory 
deemed to be dar al-harb).50  In Kabul, Sindhi would also make contact with the Turco-
German Mission operating in Afghanistan and the German-supported Indian 
revolutionaries, Raja Mahindra Pratap and the Ghadr-party member Professor 
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Muhammad Barakatullah, who were building a shadow government, the “Provisional 
Government of India.”51  While Sindhi was in Afghanistan, Mahmud Hasan was to 
proceed to the Hijaz, ostensibly as a pilgrim, before making his way to Istanbul, and 
eventually to the Indo-Afghan frontier.  Before making his way to the Hijaz, however, 
Mahmud Hasan stopped in Bombay, where he stayed at the Bombay offices of the 
Anjuman-i Khuddāam-i Ka‘ba and was reportedly inducted into the society, cementing 
the marriage of the Deobandi ‘ulama’ to the Anjuman’s Pan-Islamic coterie.52  While in 
the Hijaz, Mahmud Hasan established contact with Enver Pasha and Ghalib Pasha, the 
Ottoman governor of the Hijaz, from whom he obtained a declaration of jihad.  This 
document, known as the Ghalibnama, was then smuggled to India by a Deobandi 
associate, copied and distributed in order to raise recruits for the proposed frontier jihad.  
These recruits were to form the nucleus of a proposed Jund-Allah (Army of God).  This 
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army was to be the centerpiece of Islamic alliance between the Ottoman Sultan, the Shah 
of Iran, and the Amir of Afghanistan.  Its headquarters were to be at Medina, under the 
command of Mahmud Hasan, while secondary centers were to be established in Istanbul, 
Tehran, and Kabul, which was to be under Sindhi’s generalship.53 
 The entire plot was stumbled upon and subsequently unraveled by British 
authorities in the Punjab as a result of their discovery and capture of the infamous “Silk 
Letters.”  The letters consisted of three pieces of yellow silk, finely inscribed with 
messages in Urdu.  The messages contained reports of Sindhi’s progress in India and 
Afghanistan, which were to be forwarded to Mahmud Hasan in Medina by intermediaries 
in the Punjab.54  Naturally, when the letters were discovered, plans for the Jund-Allah 
fizzled.  Although the mujahidin and frontier tribesmen amassed by Sindhi continued to 
skirmish with British forces, the entire plot was eventually crushed and numerous arrests 
were carried out in India.  And finally, Mahmud Hasan and four of his associates were 
apprehended in the Hijaz by Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali (Amir and Sharif of Mecca under 
Ottoman suzerainty from 1908-1916, King of the Hijaz from 1916-1925) and handed 
over to the British.55  As a result of these arrests and subsequent investigations, it was 
definitively established that there had been substantial correspondence and cooperation 
between Mahmud Hasan and his Deobandi associates, Abul-Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, the 
Ali brothers, and other leading members of the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba.56   
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 The landscape of Indian Muslim politics had truly undergone a sea change.  The 
‘ulama’ and their Western-educated counterparts had not only come together, they had 
even begun to contemplate the merits of jihad and costs and benefits of open rebellion.  
Thus, decades of British fears had been realized.  While it has traditionally been held that 
it was Indian concern for the Ottoman Caliphate that provided the inspiration for such 
cooperation, given the prominence played by the hajj in these Pan-Islamic plots, one 
could argue with almost equal force that the hajj served a similarly critical role both as 
unifying symbol and a vehicle for spread of Pan-Islamic sentiments.   
 
Arabia in the Balance: The Caliph Deposed and the Hijaz Colonized 
 With the Ottoman declaration of jihad against the British Empire, colonial 
officials in London, Cairo, and Delhi began to cast about for a Muslim dignitary who 
might be persuaded to align himself with Britain and her allies in an attempt to 
counterbalance the prestige of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph.  Ultimately, they would find 
their man in the person of Sharif Husayn ibn ‘Ali, the Amir of Mecca.  Appointed to 
office by Abdul Hamid II in 1908, his position as the Amir of Mecca was the most 
prestigious Arab-Islamic title in the Ottoman Empire.  The holder of this office was 
recognized as the guardian of the haramayn in Mecca and Medina.  Though the Ottoman-
appointed governor of the Hijaz was placed in control of administrative and military 
affairs in the region, the Amir of Mecca retained a certain degree of autonomy as a result 
of his responsibilities for maintaining the sanctity of the Holy Places and the safe and 
orderly conduct of the hajj.  Given the spiritual important of these duties, the Amir of 
Mecca was selected only from among those families claiming direct descent from the 
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Prophet Muhammad, the Hashimite clan, and the Quraysh tribe, thereby entitling him to 
the honorific title of Sharīf.  A highly ambitious man, Sharif Husayn had greatly 
distrusted the leadership of the Young Turks on both political and religious grounds.  As 
a result, he had devoted himself to obtaining a greater degree of autonomy from Istanbul 
during the years preceding World War I.  Through the careful construction of tribal 
alliances, Sharif Husayn had hoped to secure sufficient political capital to make his office 
hereditary within his own family.  With the outbreak of World War I, however, Sharif 
Husayn’s bid for regional autonomy was instantly launched onto the stage of global 
political intrigue.57 
 On 9 June 1916, Sharif Husayn’s tribal forces cut the Hijaz railway near Medina, 
and on the following day the Arab Revolt began with an attack on the Ottoman garrison 
at Mecca.  By September of that same year most of the Hijaz had been wrested from 
Ottoman control, with the exception of Medina, which would remain under siege for the 
remainder of the war.  The Hijaz was but the first step in a process that would completely 
reorder the political landscape of the modern Middle East.  With the assistance of a small 
cadre of British military advisors, among them the famous Captain T.E. Lawrence, and a 
group of Iraqi ex-Ottoman officers, Husayn’s tribal forces would eventually capture 
Damascus in 1918.  As a result, centuries of shared history between the ethnically 
Turkish leadership of the Ottoman Empire and their Arab subjects was irrevocably 
severed.  While it is tempting to romantically interpret these events as a popular Arab 
uprising against Ottoman domination, this was not the case.  Rather, it was more of a 
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marriage of convenience between Husayn’s personal ambitions and the strategic concerns 
of his British patrons.58 
 In October 1914, the then Minister of War, Lord Kitchener, had promised that if 
Husayn and the “Arab Nation” were to support Britain’s war effort, the British would 
recognize Arab independence and guarantee the Arabian Peninsula against foreign 
aggression.  However, Kitchener did not stop there.  He made a promise that would 
generate a firestorm of controversy for years to come, stating that it might be possible for 
“an Arab of the true race” to “assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina.”  Kitchener’s 
cavalier language prompted a sharp rebuke from the India Office.  Both India Office 
personnel in London as well as officials in Delhi were well aware that any British 
attempts to interfere with the Caliphate would likely incite a violent backlash among 
Indian Muslims.59   
 However, the dye had already been cast.  In the months following Kitchener’s 
initial suggestion, a clique of British officials serving in Egypt and the Sudan became 
fervent advocates of an Arab Caliphate.  Reginald Wingate, the then Governor-General of 
the Sudan, Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and his 
Oriental Secretary, Ronald Storrs, would all come to support this position.60  Thus, when 
in July of 1915, Husayn sent a letter to McMahon proposing the conditions under which 
he might be persuaded to enter into an alliance with Britain, MacMahon and his 
colleagues in Cairo responded eagerly.  This was the beginning of the infamous Husayn-
McMahon correspondence (July 1915-March 1916), an exchange of ten letters, which 
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would spark bitter post-war disputes and permanently reconfigure the entire map of the 
Middle East.  In addition to British promises of Arab independence after the war, 
McMahon would reaffirm Kitchener’s promise of an Arab Caliphate.61  Thus, as it turned 
out, the India Office had virtually lost all control over Britain’s Middle East policy.  As 
World War I progressed, it became increasingly clear that the Foreign Office’s newly 
created Arab Bureau, based in Cairo, would be the final arbiter of British strategy in the 
region.62   
 While the Foreign Office had initially supported Kitchener and McMahon’s 
course of action, the India Office insisted that “an attitude of absolute… neutrality was 
the only acceptable course.”  Eventually, the Foreign Office would come to see the 
wisdom of their colleagues in India and would later enjoin MacMahon to lower Husayn’s 
expectations.  Thus, it was officially decided that the “question of the Khaliphate is one 
which must be decided by Moslems without interference from non-Moslem Powers.”  
However, “Should Moslems decide for and Arab Khaliphate that would… be respected… 
but the decision is one for the Moslems to make.”63  Despite these explicit instructions, in 
his correspondence with Sharif Husayn, MacMahon failed to make these qualifications 
clear.  Instead, he continued to encourage Husayn, noting that Britain “would welcome 
the resumption of the Khaliphate by an Arab of true race” from “the branches of the 
blessed tree of the prophet” (min furū‘ tilka al-dawha al-nabawwiyya al-mubāraka).64 
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 While historians have often succumbed to overly romanticized visions of 
Kitchener, McMahon, Lawrence, and the devil-may-care, desert-dwelling diplomacy of 
the Arab Bureau, the plot to wrest the Caliphate away from the Ottoman Sultan actually 
had much deeper historical roots.  As Kemal Karpat explains, by the 1880s, the British 
had concluded that the Hijaz was destined to become a “major power base” from which 
the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph would “incite the Muslims of India to revolt.”65  To counter 
this threat it was reasoned that the British could undermine Caliphal influence by 
questioning the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate, since the Ottoman Caliphs were not 
descendants of the Prophet’s bloodline, the Arab Quraysh tribe.  As a result of this ethno-
nationalist view, the first plans to manipulate the Caliphate emerged in 1877.  While 
Wilfred S. Blunt, an eccentric English aristocrat, traveler, and Arab enthusiast, has 
traditionally been credited for popularizing the idea of an Arab Caliphate,66 it was 
actually J.N.E. Zohrab, the British Consul in Jidda from 1878 to 1881, who had first 
promoted the idea.  Zohrab argued that Britain should establish a protectorate over the 
Hijaz and bring the Sharif of Mecca under British control in order to allow Britain “to 
guide the whole Mussulman world.”67   
 From this perspective, Kitchener and McMahon’s dealings with Sharif Husayn 
are merely the obvious conclusion to an almost comically ambitious, multi-decade 
project, aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate and the 
establishment of British control over the Muslim Holy Places.  At the conclusion of 
World War I, the Ottoman Empire lay in ruins.  The Islamic world’s most powerful 
empire had been thoroughly defeated.  Its territorial girth would be fragmented into 
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nation-states, not unlike the building blocks of the secular West.  In January 1919, 
representatives from twenty-seven nations gathered in Paris to negotiate a peace 
settlement.  However, for most delegates European issues took precedence.  The 
formulation of a post-war settlement for the Middle East would drag on until August 
1920.  The terms of the Ottoman settlement were agreed upon in April at the San Remo 
Conference and subsequently incorporated into the Treaty of Sèvres.  The treaty dealt 
harshly with the Ottoman Empire, reducing its territories to their original Anatolian core.  
The Arab provinces were divided into a group of regional states (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, 
and Transjoradan) to be administered by Britain and France under the authority of the 
newly-created League of Nations.  From the Arab perspective, although the Hijaz would 
theoretically retain its independence, Britain’s pledges to Sharif Husayn and his sons, 
Faysal and Abdullah, had been sacrificed at the altar of Britain and France’s imperial 
ambitions.68  In the wake of the Ottoman defeat, the Turkish national assembly, under the 
exacting secularist, Mustafa Kemal, passed a resolution to abolish the Ottoman Sultanate 
and turn the Caliphate into a purely religious office with no political authority.  Mehmet 
VI Vahideddin, the thirty-sixth and final Ottoman Sultan was forced to leave Istanbul 
under British protection.  The title of Caliph was then transferred to his cousin, Abdul 
Mejid II.  Two years later, in March 1924, however, the Turkish Republic abolished the 
Caliphate.69 
 Only days after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Hashimites announced 
that Sharif Husayn had accepted the Caliphate in response to “numerous telegrams of 
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allegiance.”70  However, Husayn’s claims rung hollow and were met with little 
enthusiasm in India or elsewhere.  From the first moment that news of the Arab Revolt 
had reached India in June 1916, Muslim public opinion had been strongly opposed to 
Husayn’s betrayal of the Ottoman Caliph.  On learning of these events Husayn was 
condemned by the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba, the Muslim League, and Deobandi 
‘ulama’.  Abdul Bari sent a venomous telegraph to the Viceroy, expressing the 
“consternation and painful anxiety” felt by Indian Muslims, who fear that the Husayn’s 
actions would “convert their most sacred places into fields of slaughter and carnage.”  
Moreover, he added that “the impudent besieger of the tomb of the Holy Prophet and his 
sympathisers will stand forever condemned in the eyes of the Muslim world as enemies 
of Islam.”71  At the same time, at the Muslim League’s meeting in Lucknow, a formal 
resolution was adopted: 
    The Council of the All-India Muslim League places on record its abhorrence of the  
    action of the Arab rebels headed by the Sharif of Mecca, whose outrageous conduct  
    may place in jeopardy the safety and sanctity of the Holy Places of Islam in the Hedjaz  
    and Mesopotamia and condemns them and their sympathisers as enemies of Islam.72 
 
As one Deobandi ‘alim succinctly put it, “The Mahomedans have it firmly fixed in their 
minds that The Sharif of Mecca is merely a puppet of the English and… consequently the 
Holy cities are practically under [British] control.”73 
 This was precisely the response that the India Office had feared.  As World War I 
drew to a close, the agitation among Indian Muslims grew to a fevered pitch.  At the 
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December 1918 meeting of the Muslim League, Dr. Ansari gave a violently incendiary 
speech denouncing Sharif Husayn.  As he saw it: 
    …actuated by personal ambitions and selfish interests, Sharif Husain raised the  
    standard of revolt against the unquestioned Khalifa of Islam, whom he himself had  
    recognised as such.  By doing so he not only disregarded a rule of political morality,  
    but, according to Muslim belief and religious teaching, broke an explicit and clear  
    commandment of God and the Prophet. 
   
Ansari went on to explain that the Ottoman Sultans had discharged their duties as Caliphs 
and guardians of the Holy Places to the “entire satisfaction of the Muslim world and that 
the present Sultan was the only Muhammadan who could possibly be capable of 
successfully combating the intrigues and secret machinations of non-Muslim 
governments.”  Moreover, he “proceeded to define the limits of the Holy Places and 
quoted passages from the sacred traditions of Islam to prove that the whole of Arabia, 
Palestine, and Mesopotamia [including Syria] was included in the Jazirat-ul-Arab from 
which all non-Muslim influence must be removed.”  Finally, he made what could only be 
interpreted as a call for Husayn’s murder.  Quoting from the Qur’an, Ansari warned that 
“if anyone attempts to divide the unity of my people, kill him with the sword, whosoever 
it may be.”74  Ansari’s speech was seconded by Abdul Bari’s keynote address, in which 
he quoted the Prophet: “Remove the Jew, the Christian, and the idolator from the Holy 
Places at all cost.”75  Thus, the position of Indian Muslims was unequivocal.  Sharif 
Husayn was viewed as a usurper and a selfish collaborator, who had aided the British 
Empire in simultaneously undermining the Caliphate, destroying the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire, and bringing the Holy Places of Islam under non-Muslim control.   
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The Khilafat Movement: From the Pan-Islamic to the National 
 As Ansari and Abdul Bari’s fiery rhetoric suggests, the Muslim League’s annual 
meeting in1918 was a watershed moment.  The meeting was well attended by both the 
Western-educated and ‘ulama’-based factions.  Not surprisingly, the resolutions passed at 
this session emphasized religio-political issues.  As Ansari put it: 
    The Indian Musalmans take a deep interest in the fate of their co-religionists outside 
    India… [T]he collapse of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse  
    influence on the political importance of the Musalmans in this country, and the  
    annihilation of the military powers of Islam cannot but have a far-reaching effect on  
    the minds of even the loyal Musalmans of India…76   
 
In many ways, this was the preamble of the Khilafat Movement.  Within the Muslim 
League, religious activists and Bombay barristers had a meeting of the minds.  It was felt 
that Muslims needed to mobilize and give voice to their anti-British sentiments.  As a 
result, the influence of the British loyalists was eroded and the leadership of the Muslim 
League was ousted.  Their position in the Muslim community had been overtaken by the 
Ali brothers, Ansari, and Abdul Bari, essentially the Pan-Islamic nucleus of the  
Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba.77   
 While previous Muslim leaders had avoided coordination with the Hindu-
dominated Indian National Congress, Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers found common 
grounds for an alliance.  With the passage of the Rowlatt Sedition Bills in 1919, the 
government sought to extend into peacetime the emergency wartime powers granted 
under the Defense of India Act.  The widespread opposition to this act of governmental 
heavy-handedness merged with Muslim grievances related to Turkey’s treatment in the 
post-war peace process and the Caliphate issue.  With the Ali brothers locked away in 
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prison for their refusal to abide by the terms of their internment, Abdul Bari and 
Mohandas K. Gandhi (also known as the “Mahatma,” (1868-1948) had turned to one 
another.  Gandhi sought out Abdul Bari’s help in quelling recent outbursts of Hindu-
Muslim communal tension.  In turn, Abdul Bari sought Gandhi’s assistance in the 
campaign to secure the release of the Ali brothers from internment.  They met at Dr. 
Ansari’s home in Delhi in March 1918.  From this meeting the seeds of Hindu-Muslim 
rapprochement had been planted.  Gandhi convinced Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers to 
join his campaign of non-violent resistance (satyagraha).78  Though this alliance was 
often fraught with misunderstandings, Gandhi patiently spelled out his plan: 
    By helping the Muhammadans of India at a critical moment in their history, I want to   
    buy their friendship… It is expedient to suffer for my Muhammadan brother to the  
    utmost in a just cause and I should therefore travel with him along the whole round so  
    long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end.79      
 
Having enlisted his Muslim comrades, Gandhi was able to forge a Hindu-Muslim alliance 
at the joint meeting of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and the All-
India Khilafat Committee in September 1920.  This alliance paved the way for Gandhi’s 
first all-India non-cooperation movement.80   
 Although the Hindu-Muslim accord would only last until 1922, their combined 
efforts represented the greatest challenge to British rule in India since the Great Rebellion 
of 1857.  And despite the fact that the Khilafat Movement’s animating issue had been 
rendered a moot point by finalization of the post-war peace settlements and the Turkish 
Republic’s subsequent abolition of the Caliphate, its symbols and emotional charge had 
been carried over into the realm of anti-colonial agitation and nationalist politics, making 
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it clear that the political consciousness of the Indian Muslim community had become an 
undeniable factor in Indian politics.   
 However, in the process, the movement had also helped define the emerging 
identity of Indian Muslims as a separate community.  Indeed, while the “Congress-
Khilafat alliance has often been evoked by nationalist Indians, in the years since 1947, in 
a kind of nostalgic reverie, as an era of amity that anticipated a road not taken,” the 
historical reality is quite different.81  Instead, the period of Hindu-Muslim cooperation 
witnessed during the Khilafat Movement was actually an anomaly.  Thus, despite having 
moved in tandem for a time, the political distinctions between Hindu and Muslim were 
never broken down.  In the final analysis, Pam-Islam and its offspring, the Khilafat 
Movement, had “unwittingly bequeathed a pattern of politics with which the Muslims of 
India have been familiar ever since.”  Its most important feature has been “the massive 
scale on which religion was imported into politics.”82  Pan-Islam proved both the utility 
and potency of religious symbols as a mobilizing force.  In the years leading up to the 
India’s independence and tragic partition, this basic pattern of political organization 
ultimately lent itself to the creation of a separate brand of Muslim nationalism and, thus, 
a separate, Muslim-majority Pakistani state.  However, unlike Turkey, which was able to 
more fully absorb the concept of territorial nationalism under Mustafa Kemal Attatürk, 
even today, Pakistan remains janus-faced, torn between Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s 
(Pakistan first Governor-General, 1876-1948) vision secular nation-state and its deeply 
embedded Pan-Islamic roots.        
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EPILOGUE 
 
LEGACIES OF THE COLONIAL HAJJ
 
 
A pilgrim in the Hedjaz lands is just as grass 
and a nice piece of meat; every one likes to take a piece of it. 
            -Mohammed Abou-Elewa, Chief Egyptian Dragoman  
               for Thomas Cook & Son, 18861 
 
 Our brethren are quite aware that we came to the Holy Land only to remove  
 from the house of God oppression and misbelief and their supporters, and to 
 extend  assistance to the Moslem visitors… You are aware that the previous rulers 
 of the Hejaz used to treat pilgrims badly and despotically; but, by the grace of 
 God, we shall try as far as possible to put an  end to everything based on bad 
 treatment. 
                                                         -‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sa‘ūd,  
                                                           First King of Saudi Arabia, 19252 
 
 
The Hashimite Interregnum 
 As result of World War I, from 1916 to 1918, the pilgrim ships did not sail from 
India.3  By 1919, however, a new pilgrimage administration emerged from the ashes of 
World War I and centuries of Ottoman hegemony over the Hijaz had been overturned.  In 
its place the regime of Sharif Husayn took shape.  Because it was clearly in their own 
interests, the British had granted Husayn his independence.  In the wake of the armistice, 
British officials in both London and Cairo were fully committed to the advancement of an 
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Anglo-Hashimite strategic alliance throughout much of the Middle East (the Hijaz, 
Transjordan, and Iraq).  However, Husayn and his sons were bitterly disappointed by the 
post-war machinations of Britain and France.  As a result, Husayn rejected both the 
Treaties of Versailles and Sèvres because they entailed his approval of the Mandate 
system.  Husayn stubbornly maintained that his negotiations with McMahon in 1915 had 
provided for Arab independence, not only the Hijaz, but also in those areas placed under 
the Mandatory control.  Not surprisingly, as British negotiations with the Hashimites 
stalled in 1920 and 1921, British support for Husayn cooled considerably.  While Britain 
was reasonably well prepared to suffer Husayn’s intransigence regarding the Mandate 
system, at base all Anglo-Hijazi relations were predicated on the maintenance of the safe 
and sanitary administration of the hajj.  As the post-war negotiations between Britain and 
Husayn soured, however, the administration of the hajj once again became a point of 
contention.4 
 With the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the Constantinople Board of Health 
was dissolved.  In 1915, British forces had seized the Kamarān Island quarantine station, 
and after the war the Government of India assumed control over the lazaretto.5  Similarly, 
administration of the Jidda quarantine was also taken over by the British in 1919.6  Thus, 
with control over the Ottoman Empire’s Red Sea quarantine system and a British-
installed ruler in Mecca, it was becoming increasingly clear that the administration of the 
hajj had fallen almost completely into British hands.  The hajj had been colonized.   
 As a result of more than a half century of sanitary regulation, particularly after the 
defeat of British obstructionism in the wake of the 1896 plague outbreak in Bombay, the 
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commitments of Britain and other European imperial powers in Arabia and the Red Sea 
had become an institutionalized part of the pilgrimage experience.  Moreover, it was 
becoming increasingly apparent that these sanitary precautions were finally paying 
dividends.  By 1922, only eleven patients were treated at Kamarān Island’s hospital.  
Moreover, there had been no reported cases of cholera since 1920, and only 44 cases had 
been documented since 1911.  The situation at the al-Tūr, the principal quarantine station 
for the Red Sea’s southbound pilgrimage traffic, was almost identical.7 
 While Husayn had initially acknowledged Britain’s suzerainty over the sanitary 
administration of the post-war hajj, agreeing to the continuation of their control over the 
Jidda quarantine in April 1920, in late May, “perhaps embittered by the recently 
published San Remo decisions assigning the Mandates to France and Britain and by the 
failure to renew his subsidy,” he abruptly reversed his decision.8  Although the risk of 
epidemics had been dramatically reduced by the 1920s, and the modified International 
Sanitary Convention of 1923 called for only a cursory medical inspection at Jidda, 
Husayn continued to insist that all pilgrims spend 24 hours on the Hijazi island of Abū 
Sa‘d.  As a result, pilgrims were forced to endure a “double quarantine” at either al- Tūr 
or Kamarān and then again in Jidda.  Thus, while Husayn insisted that British 
interference with the Jidda quarantine was an affront to his country’s sovereignty, the 
imposition of redundant quarantine measures led both British officials and pilgrims alike 
to believe that the extra quarantine was simply a ploy to generate additional tax revenues.  
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This feeling was only intensified by the dramatic spike in quarantine fees from 7.5 
Turkish piastres in 1921 to 40 in 1923.9 
 Quarantine fees were not the only taxes, dues, charges, and fees that would 
confront the hajji traveling under Husayn’s watch.  Pilgrims were taxed for health 
certificates, camels, baggage, empty containers, and even the clothes on their backs.  It is 
estimated that the minimum expenses for the hajj in 1922 amounted to around 17 British 
pounds, from which Husayn received roughly 4.5 pounds.  While it is difficult to 
ascertain precisely the level of exploitation suffered by pilgrims of the pre-war period as 
opposed to the post-war period, as one British official put it, the increased cost of the hajj 
under Husayn’s rule was “entirely out of proportion with the cost of living.”10 
 Husayn’s rapacious pursuit of increased revenues also led him to exact an 
increased share of camel fares, taking up to 50 percent of the fares charged by camelmen 
and guides.  As a result, the cost of transport services skyrocketed.  This situation was 
further exacerbated by his tribal policies.  During the pre-war era, the Ottomans had paid 
as much as 70,000 pounds in subsidies to the tribes surrounding the pilgrimage routes.  
Husayn had also paid large sums to the tribes during the war.  However, when the 
subsidies paid by his British patrons were stopped in 1920, Husayn’s payments dried up 
and his relations with the tribes deteriorated rapidly.  As a result, Husayn began to lose 
control of the Mecca-Medina road.  By 1923, the caravan routes to Medina came under 
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repeated raids and collapsed into complete chaos.  Robbery, kidnapping, and murder 
reigned supreme.11        
 The growing British dissatisfaction with Husayn’s administration of the hajj was 
summed up nicely by Captain Mian Nasir-ud-Din Ahmad, the Indian Officer stationed at 
Mecca to protect British interests.  “The pilgrims have a hundred and one grievances for 
which the [Hashimite] officials are primarily responsible.  The King is one of the most 
dreaded persons, but single handed his unable to control the machinery of Government, 
his ministers being mere figure heads.”12  Unfortunately, for Husayn, however, the 
problems facing his rule were much larger than mere incompetence.  His mismanagement 
of the hajj was further compounded by his repeated refusals to come to terms with the 
Mandate system, his rejection of numerous British treaty offers, and his unwillingness to 
resolve lingering border disputes with Britain’s other Arabian client from the Najd, the 
House of Sa‘ūd.  In December 1916, Ibn Sa‘ūd (1881-1953) had concluded a treaty with 
Britain acknowledging his status as the independent sovereign Najd, al-Hasa, Qatif, and 
Jubayl, raising questions as to whether Britain would continue to protect Husayn’s 
sovereignty in opposition to the designs of the Najdis.  The conflict between Husayn and 
the Najdis was further exacerbated by his refusal to permit Wahhabi pilgrims from the 
Najd to make the hajj.  Equally important, however, was the vitriolic opposition being 
voiced against Husayn by the leaders of the Khilafat Movement in India.  In many ways, 
British policy toward the Hijaz and the larger Arabian Peninsula was handcuffed by the 
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Khilafat agitation.  Fearful of further agitating Indian Muslims, Delhi vociferously 
advocated a policy of complete non-interference in the Hijaz.13 
 
The Wahhabi Conquest of the Hajj 
 Thus, when Husayn made his ill-fated bid to seize the Caliphate in 1924, he found 
himself almost completely isolated, at once denounced by Muslims everywhere and 
discarded as a liability by his British allies.  On 4 September 1924, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s Wahhabi 
warriors (al-Ikhwān), descended on Ta’if, the Hashimite summer residence, some 70 
miles from Mecca.  However, Husayn’s pleas for assistance were met with deafening 
silence from London.  Instead of risking becoming entangled in an armed struggle for the 
Holy Places, which would have undoubtedly been met with violent opposition in India, 
Britain decided to leave Husayn to his own devices.  As a result, the Najdis seized Mecca 
and Medina, and then laid siege to Jidda.  Britain limited its assistance to escorting 
Husayn out of harms way.  While they well aware of the dangers involved in the 
Wahhabi conquest of the Hijaz, British patience for Husayn had finally run out.14  As 
T.E. Lawrence explained, there was nothing more that could be done. “The old man was 
a tragic figure in his way: brave, obstinate, hopelessly out-of-date: exasperating.”15  
 This was the unintended, yet far-reaching, consequence of Britain’s adventure in 
the Hijaz.  By reordering the entire region, a power vacuum had been created, launching a 
hitherto insignificant tribal chieftan onto the international stage.  With the dawn of the 
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Saudi state, the ultra-conservative, reformist theological positions first espoused by 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, became the official state religion of Arabia.  With their 
radical conception of tawhīd (the oneness of God), Wahhabis (or al-muwahhidūn as they 
refer to themselves) brought an uncompromisingly ultra-orthodox attitude toward Shia 
Islam, Sufism, and saint veneration, branding all such practices as blasphemous examples 
of polytheism (shirk), deserving of death.  This fundamentalist orientation is further 
evidenced by the Wahhabi insistence that the Qur’an and the hadith were the only 
reliable sources through which God’s will could be ascertained.  While the merging of 
‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s reformist message with the House of Sa‘ūd’s tribal warriors had 
succeeded in capturing Mecca once before in 1803, Wahhabi forces were ultimately 
crushed when, at the bequest of the Ottoman Sultan, Muhammad ‘Ali’s Egyptian troops 
recaptured Mecca and Medina in 1812.16  A century later, however, the second coming of 
the Saudis proved much more durable.  Responding to the rapidly changing realities of 
Arabian politics, Britain would conclude the Treaty of Jidda with Ibn Sa‘ūd in May 1927.  
The treaty recognized “the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of his 
Majesty the King of the Hajaz and of Najd and its Dependencies,” in exchange for Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s guarantee “that the performance of the pilgrimage will be facilitated to British 
subjects and British protected persons of the Moslem faith.”17  The treaty further 
reiterated that Ibn Sa‘ūd should respect Britain’s special relationships with Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.  Having received this formal recognition, in 1932, the state’s 
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name was official changed to al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘ūdiyya (the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia).18 
 As early as June 1924, Ibn Sa‘ūd had cleverly sought to court Indian opinion, 
writing to Shaukat Ali, suggesting that the Caliphate question should be decided with 
“care and consideration” by an assembly of the representatives from across the Islamic 
world.  He had even written a letter to Bombay Chronicle, condemning Husayn’s “greedy 
haste” in assuming the Caliphate, pointing out his unfitness for the office.19  In the midst 
of his conquest of the Hijaz, Ibn Sa‘ūd once again looked to curry favor among Indian 
Muslims.  In his call for a World Muslim Conference, he specifically praised the Indians 
for their opposition to Husayn’s bid for the Caliphate: 
    I have to thank the nations that adopted towards us the position of supporters of right   
    and I have to thank particularly the Indians for their attitude towars the Arabs and their  
    cause at the time when the Arabs themselves were busy with their quarrels and forgot   
    their duties towards religion and country.  I have to thank the Indians because they  
    were the first to answer the call—may God give them the best reward for us and for I    
    Islam.20         
 
Ibn Sa‘ūd also sought to allay Indian and Persian fears that the Wahhabi conquest would 
result in the violation of the haram in Medina and the destruction of the Prophet’s tomb.21  
Indian and Persians, particularly Shias, remained horrified by the prospect of Saudi rule.  
Recalling the Wahhabi sacking of Karbala in 1801, during which the shrines of Imām 
Husayn his half-brother, ‘Abbās, “were stripped of their gold and precious ornaments,” 
Shias protested loudly against the prospect of a similar fate befalling Medina.22 
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 In actuality, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s promises were little more than cynical ploy.  The advent 
of Wahhabi domination was signaled by the destruction of numerous domes and cupolas 
of tombs held sacred by Indian pilgrims, most notably, those of Sayyidnā Hamza, 
members of the Prophet’s family in Medina, and Khadija, the Prophet’s wife and first 
convert to Islam, in Mecca.  British reports on the 1926 pilgrimage listed at least seven 
new religious restrictions imposed upon pilgrims.  Among the most offensive of these 
regulations was the posting of Najdi guards to guard cemeteries and shrines.  Those who 
refused to abide by the Wahhabi sensibilities of these guardians of orthodoxy were 
“denounced as mushriks (idolators) and kafirs (infidels) and beaten.”  This forced many 
pilgrims to surreptitiously steal moments at the tombs of their saints in the middle of the 
night or through bribery.23  As Abul Majid Daryabadi (1892-1977) described the 
situation: 
    Around the Prophet’s grave there are Saudi sipahis [soldiers].  Some of them are very  
    harsh.  They push the pilgrims and sometimes they flog them with their willow and  
    club.  They do not hesitate to even drag women.  Thus they seek to impose the “Nejdi  
    Shariah.”  But some of the sipahis are very mild and they neglect or overlook the  
    violation of the rules and regulations by the pilgrims.  Some of them even take rupees   
    to let the pilgrims do what they want.24     
 
As colonial officials understood, this kind of treatment was deeply hurtful to “the 
Persians who appear[ed] to be inveterate tomb worshippers and the Indians who were 
also inclined in that direction.” Other issues included Wahhabi refusals to allow clerics of 
other sects to lead prayers at Masjid al-Haram and the prohibition of festivities 
celebrating Mīlād al-Nabī (the Prophet’s birthday).  Perhaps most offensive of all, 
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however, was the Wahhabi ban on the chanting of the dorūd (Yā Rasūl Allah!), the 
traditional salutation directed to the Prophet at the His grave in Medina.25       
 Thus, as the Muslim World Conference of 1926 convened, the stage was set for a 
confrontation between and very same Indian Khalifatists who had been previously been 
his greatest supporters.  The most vocal of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s critics were the Ali brothers.  On 
one occasion Muhammad Ali “pointed out to Bin Saud that he could never have 
conquered the Hejaz had it not been for the help he received from India.”  To which, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd scowled, “I won the Hejaz by the sword.”  Muhammad Ali then replied, “Yes, but 
with money we shall take it from you.”  At which point the King angrily left the room.  
As a result of this exchange, the Indian delegation openly stated that “co-operation 
between India and the Wahhabi was not possible under the present circumstances on 
religious as well as many other grounds as no Indian could accept either their doctrines or 
what amount to their ignorance.”26 
 In many ways, the heated exchange between Muhammad Ali and Ibn Sa‘ūd 
marked the end of an era.  With the death of the Ottoman Caliphate and a growing 
realization among Indian Muslims of the depth of Wahhabi intolerance, the hajj’s value 
as an anti-colonial, Pan-Islamic symbol was substantially altered.  Now, the hajj would 
take “on overtones of resistance to both Saudi orthodoxy and European imperialism.”  In 
many ways these two forces, imperialism and religious orthodoxy, were not so different.  
Both the sanitary regulations and spy networks of British India’s pilgrimage 
administration and the puritanical restrictions of the Saudi state sought to “exercise strict 
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surveillance over the performance of the Muslim pilgrimage.”27  However, the faithful 
bravely trudged onward in fulfillment of their duties to God.  They stubbornly endured 
colonial repression, extortion, famine, cholera, plague, treacherous seas, wars, and 
repeated humiliations at the hands of Muslim and non-Muslim alike.  Thus, after decades 
of colonial rule, the hajj had proven itself almost impervious to state boundaries, 
regulation, and the designs of those who sought to manipulate the sanctity of the Holy 
Places to suit their own political goals.28 
 By the time the Saudi state emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the role of 
Britain and the other European colonial powers in the sanitary administration of the hajj 
was substantial.  Between the 1880s and World War I, both Jidda and Kamarān Island 
had become important listening posts for colonial officials.  With their sponsorship of 
Sharif Husyan’s Hashimite regime and the elimination of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Caliphate, Britain had virtually colonized every function of the hajj and had gained 
unprecedented access to and influence over the Hijaz.  While this influence was greatly 
diminished by Saudi conquest of the Hijaz in 1925-1926, their influence over sanitary 
matters remained for another three decades.  In 1926, a new International Sanitary 
Convention was drafted in Paris.  Thereafter, an office was established in Paris to 
coordinate sanitary control over Mecca with the Egyptian Quarantine Board.  This system 
remained in place until the creation of the World Health Organization in 1948.  Indeed, 
despite repeated complaints that this system represented an infringement upon Saudi 
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sovereignty, the international, essentially colonial, control of the hajj would linger on 
until 1957.29 
 Since 1957, however, the Saudi regime has retained full control of the hajj.  For 
the most part this has been a period of remarkable security.  The threat of epidemic 
disease has all but receded.  Unlike Husayn’s anarchic rule, Saudi “justice” has been 
unswerving.  Even the infamously extortionary practices of the pilgrimage guides have 
been curbed.  With the discovery of the world’s largest oil reserve and the 
commencement of commercial production in 1938, the House of Sa‘ūd became extremely 
wealthy.30  As a result of this newfound wealth, countless dollars have been poured into 
the refurbishment of the Holy Places and the construction of modern facilities for the 
pilgrims.  Meanwhile, air travel eclipsed the steamship as the primary mode of transport 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, marking a new phase in the modernization of the hajj.  
As a result of the switch from steamship to air travel, the hajj has grown from 77,000 
participants in 1926 to its present annual total of roughly two million participants each 
year.31 
 Despite these improvements, however, the hajj has also become a major vehicle 
for the spread of Saudi Arabia’s puritanical standards of behavior and the Wahhabi 
doctrine to other parts of the Islamic world.  The House of Sa‘ūd has also proven adept in 
its use of the haramayn as both tools in the manipulation of the Muslim faithful and as 
shields against the aggressions of non-Muslim governments.  Through a combination of 
the prestige derived from its role as the Custodian of the Holy Places and its incredible oil 
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wealth, Saudi Arabia has cultivated an internationally-recognizable Islamic identity rather 
than a national identity.  Their support of innumerable schools and colleges, publications 
and conferences, mosques and charities, and Muslim insurgencies across the world has 
helped to maintain this carefully crafted image.  Indeed, whether their message is directed 
at a Pakistani madrasa student, Muslim families living in the West, or an Indonesian 
pilgrim, the common factor in all of these activities is the propagation of their own 
militant version of Islam, which, despite its highly exclusivist attitudes, has ironically 
helped foster a growing homogenization of Islamic practices and identity.32 
 With the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, the haramayn have become 
the last truly global Islamic symbols.  As such, the Holy Places have once again returned 
to forefront of international affairs.  Just as Pan-Islamists of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, like the members of the Anjuman-i Khuddām-i Ka‘ba and the 
Khilafat Movement, strove to both protect these most valuable of all Islamic positions 
against non-Muslim aggression and Western influence and to deploy these potent 
symbols in order to mobilize political support for their agenda, so too do the Islamists of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Thus, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 
1990 and King Fahd required the Saudi ‘ulama’ to endorse the arrival of American and 
other foreign troops on Saudi soil, Osama bin Laden framed his criticism of the Saudi 
royal family in the following terms: 
        The aggression has reached such a catastrophic and disastrous point as to have 
    brought about a calamity unprecedented in the history of our umma, namely the    
    invasion by the American and western Crusader forces of the Arabian peninsula and  
    Saudi Arabia, the home of the Noble Ka‘ba, the Sacred House of God, the Muslim’s  
    direction of prayer, the Noble Sanctuary of the Prophet, and the city of God’s  
    Messenger, where the Prophetic revelation was received. 
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        This momentous event is unprecedented both in pagan and Islamic history.  For the  
    first time, the Crusaders have managed to achieve their historic ambition and dreams  
    against our Islamic umma, gaining control over the Islamic holy places and the Holy  
    Sanctuaries, and hegemony over the wealth and riches of our umma, turning the  
    Arabian peninsula into the biggest air, land, and sea base in the region.33 
 
While it would be unfair and irresponsible to equate Osama bin Laden’s extremely 
violent brand of jihadist Islamism to the actions of anti-colonial activists in the Ottoman 
Empire or colonial India, it is important to note that the points of reference remain the 
same.  The deeply-held religious sentiments conveyed by invoking the Holy Places 
continue to be an important measure of the delicate relationship between the West and the 
Islamic world.     
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